

# Closing the circle

## The AFP's capacity to fight terrorism

Born out of a terrorist incident – the Sydney Hilton bombing on 13 February 1978 – the Australian Federal Police has come full circle in the fight against terrorism. In harmony with national and international partners, the AFP finds itself well placed as a key, front-line player in preventing terrorist acts affecting Australian interests.

Commissioner Mick Keelty, in a speech to the Managing Security 2003 seminar in Canberra, outlined the preparedness of the AFP to take on the mantle.

“**T**he treatment of terrorism as a crime and the role of law enforcement have been mentioned in two major reviews in the past 12 months. The Review of Homeland Security in the United States undertook a rethink of the arrangements in the US and the capacity of the FBI to deal with the current threat. Closer to home, the government of Singapore released a White Paper on Jemaah Islamiyah last month that deals with arrests and the threat of terrorism and touches on the role of law enforcement while also recommending action to prevent the spread of terrorism and extremist ideology.

While preparing for this presentation today, I took the time to reflect upon the words of Sir Robert Mark, former Commissioner of the UK Metropolitan Police, and the man vested with responsibility to report to Government after the Hilton Bombing in February 1978. Whilst I will not draw upon his whole report, it is interesting to note the following comments. Sir Robert stated:

“Those who framed the constitution can hardly have foreseen the motor vehicle and the aeroplane. Arrangements for the governance of States which were adequate for trade, public order and the social requirements of

the nineteenth century are not appropriate for dealing with serious wrong-doings which transcend State jurisdictions and affect the interest of the Commonwealth as a whole – terrorism, narcotics and organised crime being perhaps the most obvious examples.”

This observation was made in the context of a society – even a world – which had not yet felt the full force of transnational crime. If you replace his reference to State and change it to international you are left with an observation which is as pertinent today as it was 25 years ago.

That of course brings me from the events of February 1978, to what we have all witnessed over the past 18 months.

The 11 September 2001 attacks, and then more recently and tragically for Australia, the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002, have dramatically altered Government and community expectations in respect of terrorism. There is now a strong government and community expectation to not only monitor terrorist activity, but to disrupt it. This expectation extends beyond domestic strategies. Somehow we must engage and co-ordinate like-minded agencies across the region.



*Photo by Kate Geraghty, Sydney Morning Herald*

The events have involved a re-ordering of law and order across the region, and in particular for the Australian Federal Police, where we have had to make major adjustments to planning, operating and training.

### **Terrorism as a Crime**

Experience elsewhere shows that many terrorists can use the same criminal enterprises as any other organised crime figure. They can fund their operation from illegally obtained money and conceal its trail just like any other money launderer, whether through structuring transactions to remain below the reportable threshold or through a convoluted series of transactions including underground banking techniques. They rely upon the same tools of trade as organised crime, including false identities, arms trafficking, corruption and extortion. And they also rely upon the same criminal communities to assist in their deception through the provision of safe houses, protective communities and the like.

There are also similarities in disguising meetings using legitimate gatherings to cloud clandestine recruitment and consorting similar to what we saw in the 1970s with organised crime groups.

Law enforcement has learnt from the experiences of other countries – whether it is Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom or the United States – that terrorist groups often commit a series of crimes as a prelude to their mainstream terrorist activities.

The commission of what I will call prelude offences, provides law enforcement with the ability to take early interdiction, and in turn, prevent a terrorist act.

Whether it is money laundering by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or links between the Provisional IRA and Colombian drug traffickers, the connection between terrorism and other transnational crime is real.

The joint investigation into the Bali bombing revealed the links between the terrorists involved and other crimes. One of the clearest examples of this was the robbery of a gold shop in Serang, Java, in order to provide funding for the terrorist operation.

Not since the Hilton Hotel bombing in Sydney in 1978 has Australia been confronted so starkly with the spectre of terrorism. This event gave rise to not only a royal commission – but also the eventual creation of the Australian Federal Police.

At the policy level, as with the Hilton bombing, and in light of September 11, the Australian Government has reviewed its response to terrorism. This, as we all know, has led to the introduction of a new suite of terrorism-related legislation in Australia.

In his Second Reading speech, Attorney General Daryl Williams said about the new legislation:

“The measures in these bills reflect the government’s commitment to ensuring that our law places us in the best possible position to detect, prosecute and penalise those involved in terrorism and its financing. They will assist our domestic intelligence law enforcement and border protection efforts and will also support

AFP’s regional relationships were put to the test in Bali, a matter of months after an MoU with Indonesia’s National Police was signed – quickly proving the importance of interagency cooperation in the fight against a crime that knows no borders



Photos supplied by NSW Police

our cooperation with like-minded countries internationally.”

These offences provide law enforcement with a strong base on which to attack terrorism both in Australia and overseas and clearly articulate the acceptance and expectation that terrorism is a crime. Moreover, the government has recognised that to combat this crime we must take the fight into the international arena and combat it using the same methods as we have to combat other transnational crimes.

Importantly, the extra territorial nature of many of the offences means that we now have the ability, under certain circumstances, to counter terrorism overseas in partnership with our law enforcement allies.

These new offences are a recognition that an effective means of fighting and disrupting terrorism is to put the terrorists in jail, to seize their assets and to remove their ability to regroup. To this end, the government has recently provided the AFP with one of the most powerful law enforcement tools available in the form of the new *Proceeds of Crime Act 2002*. This Act represents a milestone in Australian – and international – law enforcement and allows us, for the first time, to take civil action against the proceeds of crime and, in the case of terrorism, the money that is used to sponsor, support and facilitate the tragic events we have all witnessed recently.

## Executive Powers

Needless to say, countering terrorism is not the sole responsibility of the AFP. The Australian Defence Force, intelligence agencies, various state and territory police and, indeed, the community, all have a role to play in this regard.

The ability of organisations such as the AFP to search, question, arrest, seize the assets and deprive the liberty of people in our society include some of the most intrusive powers in a modern society. These powers are only provided to certain individuals in some organisations and for good reason.

But the question arises as to how to best disrupt the activities of terrorist groups whether through law enforcement intervention or by some other means. It also needs to be recognised and understood that the Australian intelligence community can and has been effectively disrupting terrorist activities for some time. Therefore, the relationship between law enforcement and the intelligence community must be symbiotic.

While the law provides powers to police to protect the community, the community quite rightly requires protection from the excessive use or even the abuse of those powers.

As the power of the police has become more complicated, this has largely also been mirrored by the accountability arrangements both internally and

Above and background:  
February 13, 1978 – the Hilton bombing led directly to the establishment of the Australian Federal Police



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externally which are imposed, quite appropriately, on daily police duties.

Of course, the final arbitrator for any law enforcement process in Australia is the court, and we can be confident in our judicial system to protect our interests and safeguard our rights.

However, it is this very same system that can make the prosecution of persons suspected of breaching national security problematic. The level of disclosure of a prosecution brief or even the details contained within a search warrant can mean that a prosecution is not going to be in the best interests of future operations or strategies.

I am not complaining about disclosure, I simply make the point that there is a public cost for pursuing it in national security cases. Not only do we expose methodology, but we will often expose all of our knowledge about an individual, their relationships and interrelationships which could render a prosecution outcome ineffective.

I also note, however, our current surroundings – the Press Club – and the fact that among our audience today there is a contingent of media.

The media enjoy an interesting role in the oversight process.

No one can doubt the incredible influence that the media can have in affecting public opinion, government expectation and law enforcement action. Media commentary is an effective reflection of the standards that are generally expected by the community and government. Police action is closely scrutinised by the media and this adds another layer of accountability.

### Strengthening Our Role

Just as September 11 and Bali have brought a new set of demands upon the legislature, they have also brought new challenges to the agencies charged with carrying out public expectations.

The AFP was already well integrated into the region through our overseas liaison officer network and our

efforts to combat other serious and transnational crime. The AFP's longstanding relationship with law enforcement agencies across our region has been the cornerstone of much of our success.

We presently have 40 federal agents in liaison officer positions deployed in 23 countries.

These relationships, however, run much deeper than the recent cooperation on counter terrorism. For many years the AFP has conducted joint investigations and shared intelligence in the region on issues as diverse as drug trafficking, money laundering, sex tourism, fraud and people smuggling. It is these longstanding relationships that have enabled the AFP to work cooperatively with neighbours on terrorism issues.

As law enforcement agencies, we have an obligation to create a safer region along with our neighbours. Instead of the spectre of terrorism playing in the mind of every teenager who is eagerly awaiting their first trip overseas, we should be striving for a region where our children can travel freely, safe in the knowledge that the biggest issue they need confront is how to get more money sent from home.

As part of the AFP's ongoing specific commitment to the fight against terrorism, we now have three officers based in London, Washington and Kuala Lumpur dedicated to counter-terrorism issues.

Once again, the Bali bombing investigation has proved the value of having robust and meaningful relationships with counterpart agencies in the region. Often these relationships are symbolised in the form of agreements and MoUs, however, the true depth of the understanding is tested when assistance – such as in Bali – is really required. In fact, the head of the Indonesian National Police, General Da'i Bachtiar and I had signed such an MoU in June last year – four months before the Bali attacks – and I am certain this had an impact on the swiftness in agreeing to the arrangements for a joint operation.

Even now the AFP has approximately 40 agents and analysts assisting the Indonesian National Police



Photo by Kate Geraghty, Sydney Morning Herald

throughout the country on issues including disaster victim identification, forensics investigation, criminal intelligence analysis and bomb data analysis as well as working hand-in-hand on the investigation and the preparation for prosecution.

What this network enables us to do is to tap into the vast international array of expertise that exists across the world in terrorist matters. To date, investigators from five countries have joined the AFP in investigating the Bali bombings – an unprecedented occurrence in this region.

Similarly, many countries are interested in the Australian experience in terrorism, with several officers from Germany, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the US now working in Australia with the AFP on terrorism and other transnational crime issues.

### Domestically

I mentioned earlier the community's role. Given the longstanding links between the community and the police, what can the community expect from the police? I believe it is safe to say that terrorism, like so many other crimes, cannot be solved or detected without the assistance of the community. Programs such as Crimestoppers and Neighbourhood Watch have constantly shown that a well coordinated program of a vigilant community and responsive police can have a considerable impact on crime. The best approach in this regard to terrorism has recently been displayed in the formation of the National Security Hotline.

However, to achieve the most effective outcome is to have federal and state agencies working cooperatively. For Australia to respond to terrorism effec-

tively there must be sound working relationships between the Commonwealth and the States. The realisation of this has resulted in the recent reform of the National Counter Terrorism Plan and a re-think about the way in which we will prevent and respond to terrorism.

On a more practical scale, the AFP has initiated the formation with all state and territory police services, joint counter-terrorism investigation teams. These teams, consisting of federal agents and their state and territory counterparts, will investigate suspect terrorist activity with the focus of arresting and prosecuting those found to be involved or supporting terrorist activities in Australia or overseas.

These teams are an investment in the prevention of terrorism, not a reaction or response to it. While it is entirely appropriate to increase our spending on those agencies and equipment which will play a role should terrorism again reach our shores, it is the investment in prevention that can ensure we never again arrive at that point.

This is not just about the AFP and our role – it is about law enforcement cooperation to strike at the heart of terrorism before it takes hold in our society. Our role is to be proactive in a criminal law sense.

### Intelligence

Like all good police work, effective intelligence leads the way to effective investigations. The AFP has recently made a significant investment in our intelligence process, increasing the capacity and streamlining our systems. To quote Albert Einstein, "Central to the advancement of human civilisation is the spirit of open enquiry. We must not only learn to tolerate our

Indonesia's Gen I Made Pastika, flanked by Brig-Gen Edward Artonang and AFP's Bali contingent head Federal Agent Graham Ashton, pleads for public assistance in tracking down the Bali bombing suspects

Close relations developed between the police forces of both countries before the terrorist attack proved their worth during the investigation

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differences, we must welcome them as the richness and diversity which can lead to true intelligence”.

It is for these reasons that a thorough debrief of what happened in Bali and why, will be so important. I have been impressed by those initiatives outlined in the Singapore Government’s white paper that espouse the embracement of moderate Islamics and the longer-term strategies identified with Islamic Schools.

Already, the experience of Bali has clearly demonstrated how, through executive action, law enforcement can penetrate terrorist organisations and uncover links and associations which were previously unknown.

During 16 weeks, more information has been uncovered on the operation and networking of JI than in many previous years of intelligence operations but, of course, the aim of intelligence operations is to identify those activities before they happen. Our own revamped intelligence is aimed more at direct and timely dissemination rather than a process of osmosis that can often spread intelligence through many layers of assessment that slows down its dissemination.

A new era has been established for the AFP since the Bali bombing. This has involved forging links with agencies that were not traditional partners of the AFP and re-evaluating some existing relationships – or at least viewing them through new eyes. New partnerships have been formed and working relationships developed to a point which was previously unheard of in the law enforcement and intelligence communities.

The ADF has also become a key partner for the AFP in terrorism-related matters. Even on simple issues such as logistic support, the ADF has played a key

role in transporting people and material to Bali within critical time frames.

Certainly there is a new mutual appreciation for the respective roles of the organisations and this has led to more effective outcomes for both.

Of course, all the intelligence in the world is useless unless a relationship is established with the community in which this intelligence is to be developed, and its use trusted. To this end, I have made it a priority to engage local communities in the law enforcement process and ensure that they are not only aware of our role, but understand and support our goals. This is where police officers can often do their best business.

The role of law enforcement is to police the rich and the poor, the good and the bad, without fear or favour. Our job is not, for example, to marginalise moderate Islamics, but to embrace them in the process. In a similar manner to the long-established Neighbourhood Watch programs, I will continue to meet with community leaders to elicit their support and cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

#### AFP Transnational Crime Centre

Of course, the review of September 11 also highlighted the need for coordination not only between agencies but also within an agency. Transnational crime tends to rely upon aspects of human nature where we classify, segregate and deal with issues on an individual basis. What 25 years of Federal Policing has taught us is that the world is not so simple.

Transnational crime is a series of competing and complimentary interests that, over time, wash over issues and identities. To prevent the “stove piping”





Photos by Brian Hartigan

of information and resultant analysis, the AFP has recently established the Transnational Crime Coordination Centre – part of our total solution to drawing all our potential together.

Teams of analysts and intelligence officers work together with federal agents on the full range of transnational crime issues ensuring that intelligence in well managed and coordinated across the crime types.

As terrorism is another form of transnational crime, it complements the other areas of interest to the AFP. In particular, our expertise in financial

and hi-tech crimes has come to the

forefront for investigations such as Bali. Identifying the congruence of intelligence across these broad crime types is integral to the successful interdiction of terrorism and other transnational crimes.

### Conclusion

Law enforcement agencies are uniquely placed to contribute to the disruption of terrorist activities. As police, we have:

- a long-standing relationship with the community;
- the ability to question, search, arrest and seize material;
- well developed and comprehensive accountability measures; and
- the ability to take executive action and remove terrorists from within our communities.

The AFP finds itself addressing terrorism because of our;

- national jurisdiction;
- joint State/Commonwealth task force arrangements;
- national interface with the Australian intelligence community and ADF;
- long established overseas liaison network; and
- our experience in the investigation of serious, organised and transnational crimes.

In many respects, the AFP has closed the circle in respect to terrorism. Born out of a terrorist incident a quarter of a century ago, the AFP, in harmony with our partners, now plays a key role in respect to preventing terrorist acts affecting Australian interests.

In short – we are contributing to the prevention of terrorism through law enforcement interdiction and effective collaboration and co-ordination both nationally and internationally.



# Operation Alliance – the partnership pays off

**T**he joint Bali bombing investigation and victim identification process, known as Operation Alliance, is the largest operation undertaken by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in its 24-year history.

It was also a turning point for the organisation.

With the birth of the AFP coming as a direct result of an act of terrorism on Australian soil – the Sydney Hilton bombing in 1978 – the AFP now looks to the future with terrorism firmly and more pointedly in its sights following the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and the bombings in Bali.

The Bali bombings in particular united police jurisdictions around the country like no other tragedy, with state and territory support and expertise an important part of the investigation and, in particular, the disaster victim identification (DVI) process in both Bali and Australia.

It has placed a firmer focus on the international role of the AFP and the relationships it has built – and continues to build – with its counterparts in Asia and around the world.

It has also brought into focus the important role of policing and counter terrorism.

## The Blasts

The bombing in Kuta on 12 October 2002, was one of the most horrific acts of terrorism to impact on Australia and Australians.

It was a typically busy Saturday night in Kuta's main tourist area when shortly after 11pm a bomb exploded at Paddy's Bar. A few seconds later a second bomb was detonated outside the popular Sari Night Club. As a result, 202 people died and hundreds more were injured.

A third bomb exploded some distance away, near the United States Consulate.

Initial reports from that night relay a story of confusion, panic and destruction. AFP federal agents already in Bali rushed to the scene and reported massive structural damage, burning buildings, burning motor vehicles, people fleeing the scene, emergency personnel and a huge crater in the street outside the Sari Club.

## Operation Alliance

In the aftermath of the blasts, the AFP sent a team of investigative and forensic officers to Bali to assist the Indonesian National Police (INP) in their investigation.

Six days after the bombing, AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty met with the head of the INP, General Da'i Bachtiar, in Bali and signed an agreement to form a Joint Australia-Indonesia Police Investigation and Intelligence Team.

This was not the first time the INP and the AFP had worked together. Over the years, memorandums of understanding had been signed to allow the two agencies to work jointly on investigations, including people smuggling. The AFP had also maintained a presence in Indonesia from the early 1990s.

Federal Agent Graham Ashton, who headed the AFP's investigation in Bali, said the AFP had already invested a lot of time in building relationships that enabled it to get to first base quite quickly.

"It was a result the relationships we had been building for more than a decade that we were able to strike up our initial agreements in a matter of days, where perhaps if we didn't have those in place it may have taken several weeks," he said.

Opposite top:  
Forensics experts at the AFP's Weston Creek Complex examine fingerprint evidence in the search for Bali bombing suspects

Opposite bottom:  
Members of the AFP's Special Operations Team train for a counter-terrorist role





*Photo by Kate Geraghty, Sydney Morning Herald*

Investigating the Bali bombings was an enormous task, with many team members managing only two to three hours' sleep as they organised lodgings, food, and security for the 140 AFP staff who would arrive over the coming weeks.

Operation Alliance is not only the largest investigation ever undertaken by the AFP or any Australian police force, it is truly an alliance between the Australian and international law enforcement communities.

Each state and territory police service in Australia provided personnel and resources to Operation Alliance both in Australia and overseas. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, German Federal Police, the Metropolitan Police Service Anti-Terrorist Branch along with members of the New Zealand, Japanese, French, Korean, Hong Kong, Taiwanese and Swedish police forces were involved in the investigation.

In just over 19 weeks, Operation Alliance has shed light on the chilling detail of the events of October 12. It is estimated that the Paddy's Bar explosion involved between 500g and 1kg of TNT and was placed in the bar by a suspected suicide bomber. The intent of the bombers was revealed with the discovery of pieces of metal at the crime scene indicating that they were added to the device as shrapnel. Forensic analysis of the scene also indicated the bomb was placed somewhere between 80 and 120cm above the floor near the main bar.

The second and largest device was detonated 15 seconds later in front of the nearby Sari Club where, it is estimated, more than 350 people were enjoying Saturday-night festivities at the time. The force of the blast was strong enough to register on Indonesian seismic instruments. It is estimated this was a lower velocity, high explosive bomb with an effective weight of between 50 and 150kg. It consisted of potassium chlorate, sulphur and aluminium, was placed in a van outside the club, and was possibly remote detonated by mobile phone.

The third bomb, referred to in the media as the "USA Consulate Bomb" was detonated 45 seconds later, 10kms away on the open side of Jalan Raya Puputan. This final explosion involved between 500g and 1kg of TNT and was detonated by mobile phone.

At the height of the investigation that followed, more than 120 Australian law enforcement personnel worked on Operation Alliance in Bali. The AFP also had considerable resources assisting with the investigation in Australia. Immediately following the bombings, 24-hour Major Incident Rooms were set up in Darwin, Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth, with a national Incident Co-ordination Centre operating in Canberra to coordinate the flow of information.

General Manager National Ben McDevitt says the AFP expected a lot of flights back to Australia in the

At the height of the investigation, in excess of 120 Australian law enforcement personnel worked on Operation Alliance in Bali

“The AFP will continue to assist the Indonesian National Police in the investigation, as well as assisting in the preparation of evidence for any trials.”

hours and days following the bombings with potential witnesses and victims.

“We needed to be able to capture whatever information those people had,” he said.

“We also needed to gather any forensic evidence they might actually be wearing, including residue from the explosives.”

The enormity of the task made the cooperation of all state and territory police forces imperative.

Federal agents and local police services were posted at Australian airports the day after bombing to collect and administer questionnaires from passengers returning from Bali to Australia to help identify any potential witnesses. In the eight weeks following the attacks, 7500 questionnaires were collected, resulting in approximately 450 detailed witness statements.

By the end of January 2003, in excess of 154,000 hours had been spent on Operation Alliance, both in Indonesia and Australia.

#### Early Breakthroughs

An initial breakthrough in the investigation was the identification of the remains of the van used in the Sari Club bombing. Forensic examination by the INP revealed that the chassis number had been filed down to avoid detection. Unknown to the bombers, commercial vehicles registered in Bali carry a second official number on the chassis rail.

In finding this second number, INP investigators were able to identify the vehicle, which led to the registration and ownership of the van, identifying Amrozi as a potential suspect. The identification and arrest of Amrozi by the INP and his subsequent questioning revealed a number of significant facts. It is alleged Amrozi purchased the van and chemicals used in the bombing and attended meetings to plan and discuss the campaign. Amrozi also named his alleged co-conspirators including Samudra, Idris and Dulmatin.


It is anticipated that Amrozi, Samudra, Mukhlas and Ali Imron, along with other key suspects arrested over the incident, will soon face trial in Indonesia for their involvement in the planning and execution of the bombings.

To date, more than 17 suspects have been arrested by the INP in direct relation to the bombings. Investigations are continuing to track down several outstanding suspects. The AFP will continue to assist the INP in the ongoing investigation and in the preparation of evidence for the upcoming trials.

Thirty victim impact statements from Australian victims have been prepared in Australia in the required format for an Indonesian trial, and are to be included in the prosecution case.

#### Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)

It soon became obvious that identifying those killed in the bombings would be one of the most important



objectives for Operation Alliance. Australia provided a DVI team in Bali to assist Indonesian authorities in the recovery and identification of victims. The first AFP members were sent to Bali the day following the blasts, and by Tuesday, 15 October a full Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) team had arrived. By the fourth day, 80 staff comprising pathologists, odontologists, radiologists, forensic experts and police were working on the case. In Bali, the process was the responsibility of the Indonesian authorities, who appointed a commander to oversee both the identification process and the repatriation of bodies to their home countries.

The DVI process aims to establish the identification of every victim by comparing and matching accurate data available before death with post-mortem remains. It is a complex process that requires an extremely high level of certainty before victims can be released to relatives. The identification processes must also comply with established internationally recognised protocols.

The DVI teams in Bali and Australia followed an internationally recognised three-phase process. The first phase involved collecting ante-mortem information such as physical descriptions, photographs of possible clothing and jewellery, fingerprints and DNA samples. The second, or post-mortem information collection phase, involved detailed examination by pathologists, odontologists, radiologists, forensic experts and police of the victim's remains. The third and final phase is the reconciliation of the collected

information. It is only through this process that certainty of identification can be guaranteed. This certainty is needed not only for the victim's families' peace of mind but also for other legal processes and procedures that follow death.

AFP agents in Bali assisted in the mortuary and obtaining ante-mortem information from victims' families as they arrived in Bali. The AFP and state and territory police services co-ordinated the collection of DNA samples in each state. The AFP Forensic Major Incident Room in Canberra and a network of major incident rooms and missing persons' units throughout Australia and overseas supported the work of the team in Bali.

Despite the complicated yet necessary DVI process, the first victim was identified in the week following the bombing and the entire process in Bali complete within four months. The death toll is currently 202, including three bodies that remain unidentified and are in the custody of Indonesian authorities.

Of the 202 people who died there were 88 Australians; two Brazilians; 22 British; two Canadians; three Danes; four Dutch; one Ecuadorian; four French; six Germans; one Greek; 38 Indonesians; one Italian; two Japanese; three New Zealanders; one Pole; one Portuguese; two South Africans; two South Koreans; five Swedes; three Swiss; one Taiwanese; seven Americans and the three unidentified bodies.

At its peak, the Australian DVI team in Bali numbered 80 with staff from all Australian states and the

A fingerprint expert for fingerprint evidence, in a makeshift forensic laboratory at the AFP's Bali headquarters



“Despite the complicated yet necessary DVI process, the first victim was identified in the week following the bombing and the entire process in Bali complete within four months.”

ACT. By the end of the DVI process more than 200 Australian personnel had been deployed to Bali.

It was a truly international effort, with the Australian team working to identify the victims of the bombings, assisted by personnel from Taiwan, Korea, Japan and Sweden.

The majority of the Australian DVI team returned from Bali in February, with a small liaison team remaining in place.

In a traditional Balinese ceremony on 1 March 2003 – followed by a Christian ceremony – all unidentifiable remnants held by Indonesian authorities were cremated.

#### Family Liaison

All Australian victims were identified and repatriated by December 2002 and all remains identified as belonging to Australian victims were repatriated by the end of February 2003.

To help support and provide information to victims and victims' families after the bombing, the AFP set up a Family Liaison Program, which has continued to work with the families affected by the bombings to provide support and assistance during the upcoming trials.

A series of information sessions for Bali survivors, and the family and friends of both survivors and victims are being held around Australia. Run in every state by the AFP national team of Family Liaison

Officers (FLOs), they began in February and will continue until the end of March.

Federal Agent Mick Young from the AFP's counter terrorism group said the creation of a team of national FLOs was a first in Australia and had been based on similar teams overseas.

Federal Agent Young said that before October 2002 there had been no program to meet the needs of an incident such as Bali. Although there are Victim Liaison Officers and/or Witness Assistants in every jurisdiction in Australia, the nature of the Bali attacks had meant there was a need for a national program.

The FLOs aim to keep the lines of communication open between families of victims, witnesses and others affected by the Bali disaster.

“The information sessions have been really well received and well attended with around 60 or 70 people at each,” Federal Agent Young.

“The main aim is to provide information to those affected, including people who may be called upon as witnesses in the prosecutions, which are anticipated to commence in late March.

“We are answering questions about the investigation and opening up the lines of communication. We are addressing any issues or concerns that people may bring to our attention.”

At time of going to press, no dates or venues have been confirmed for the Bali bombing trials.