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Edited Legal Collections Data |
Book Title: Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law
Editor(s): Farber, A. Daniel; O’Connell, Joseph Anne
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN (hard cover): 9781847206749
Section Title: Figures and tables
Number of pages: 1
Extract:
Figures and tables
Figures
3.1 Cycling in a unidimensional issue continuum 95
3.2 Cycling in a multidimensional issue spectrum with asymmetrical
preferences 97
3.3 Stable resolution with multidimensional and symmetrical preferences 98
12.1 Visualizing the optimal stopping problem 407
12.2 Stages of approval regulation game 409
12.3 For longer-developed drugs, drugs sponsored smaller firms are
associated with higher postmarket withdrawal rates 412
Tables
1.1 Condorcet's Voting Paradox 26
3.1 Bailout allocations in two dimensions 96
3.2 Values of p(n, m): proportion of possible profiles without a Condorcet
winner 98
3.3 The Supreme Court and Congress through an Arrovian lens 128
12.1 Time-series analysis of regulatory surprises and next-period drug project
abandonments 411
vii
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ELECD/2010/305.html