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Wahl, Jenny --- "The Economics of Slavery" [2010] ELECD 387; in Bouckaert, Boudewijn (ed), "Property Law and Economics" (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010)

Book Title: Property Law and Economics

Editor(s): Bouckaert, Boudewijn

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN (hard cover): 9781847205650

Section: Chapter 10

Section Title: The Economics of Slavery

Author(s): Wahl, Jenny

Number of pages: 22

Extract:

10 The economics of slavery
Jenny Wahl


Overview
Slavery exists where it is economically worthwhile to those in power ­ that
is, where masters derive either market profits or other sorts of net benefits
from owning slaves. Certain conditions enhance the likelihood that any
given society might hold slaves ­ cheaply obtained supplies of foreigners
(especially ones with features distinct from those of the reigning class),
division of production processes into a series of simple and easily moni-
tored tasks, and well-developed markets that sell specialized commodi-
ties for specie ­ but slavery has flourished in many places, regardless of
religion, climate, or cultural attainments.
Central to the economic success of slavery are political and legal institu-
tions that validate the ownership of other persons. Some slave societies
have considered slavery a part of the natural order of things; others have
viewed slavery as established only by positive law. Regardless of underly-
ing philosophy, slave societies typically craft finely nuanced legal rules that
govern the ownership of other human beings.
In many instances, these laws reveal economic principles at work.
Consider manumission rules. Allowing masters to free slaves at will would
create incentives to manumit unproductive slaves ­ those for whom no one
would pay a positive price. Consequently, the community at large would
bear the costs of young, old, and disabled former slaves. The public might
also run the risk of having rebellious former slaves in its midst. Roman
emperor Augustus worried considerably about this adverse selection
problem and eventually enacted restrictions ...


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