

Deliberative Democracy

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Extract 1: Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Harvard University Press, 1996) 2-3

The aim of the moral reasoning that our deliberative democracy prescribes falls between impartiality, which requires something like altruism, and prudence, which demands no more than enlightened self-interest. Its first principle is reciprocity. The precise content of reciprocity is difficult to determine in theory, but its general countenance is familiar enough in practice. It can be seen in the difference between acting in one's self-interest ... and acting fairly. In many ... controversies ... the possibility of any morally acceptable resolution depends on citizens' reasoning beyond their narrow self-interest and considering what can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with them.

Citizens who reason reciprocally can recognize that a position is worthy of moral respect even when they think it morally wrong ... The presence of deliberative disagreement has important implications for how citizens treat one another and for what policies they should adopt. When a disagreement is not deliberative ... citizens do not have any obligations of mutual respect towards their opponents. In deliberative disagreement ... citizens should try to accommodate the moral convictions of their opponents to the greatest extent possible, without compromising their own moral convictions. We call this kind of accommodation an economy of moral disagreement, and believe that ... it is essential to a morally robust democratic life.

Extract 2: Jürgen Habermas, 'Three Normative Models of Democracy' in *The Inclusion of Others: Studies in Political Theory* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, trans, Polity Press, 1999) 248

Discourse theory works ... with the higher-level intersubjectivity of communication processes that unfold in the institutionalized

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