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Peter Heathcote[1]
This paper examines measures by which Pacific Island Countries (PICs) can reduce the risk of damage to their environment from the transportation of nuclear material carried by ships that transit the Pacific Ocean on passage between Europe and the Far East. There are two major aspects that must be considered:
(i) the reduction of the risk of an accident occurring to the ship or its cargo whilst on passage in the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of PICs; and
(ii) the question of
(a) liability of the shipowner or cargo owner in the event of an incident that results in the release of the cargo into the ocean or the atmosphere causing harm to humans or damage to the environment; and
(b) compensation to those suffering damage therefrom.
This paper is intended to be somewhat provocative in order to stimulate discussion on practical measures that can be taken to reduce the risk of a marine accident, with the resultant leak of radioactive material into the marine environment. This could occur if vessels carrying nuclear material were to transit the Pacific region in a clandestine manner in order to avoid detection if attempts were made to prohibit them. Readers should note that some of the finer legal points have been lightly covered for the sake of brevity and to make for easier reading.
To avoid a discussion of technical questions on the properties of the material being shipped and the mode of shipment, let us assume that the cargo comprises spent fuel rods from nuclear power stations in Japan that have reached the end of their useful life and have to be shipped back to Europe for either recycling or safe disposal, or new or recycled fuel rods from Europe to Japan.
Let us also assume that
(i) the intended vessels have been specially designed to carry this type of cargo;
(ii) the design has been approved by an internationally recognised classification society; and
(iii) the Flag State has issued the necessary certificates for the appropriate size and class of vessel indicating that the vessel’s machinery and safety equipment is sufficient, properly maintained and in good working order (SOLAS, MARPOL, ISM Code, etc.).
It is suggested that because the material to be carried is know as nuclear waste, it connotes in the minds of politicians, environmentalists and even the average citizen that there is something inherently evil about the substance and its movement across the ocean. Nuclear material does contain isotopes capable of contaminating marine and terrestrial life for millennia. Furthermore, there have been a number of incidents and accidents over 40 years of nuclear power generation in several countries,[2] but with proper safeguards nuclear power can be safely harnessed.[3] It is possible that some people connect the word ‘nuclear’ to atomic bombs and think immediately of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Others perhaps think of the testing of atomic weapons on Bikini Atoll in what is now the Marshall Islands; Christmas Island in what is now Kiribati; and Mururoa and Fangataufa in French Polynesia, where recent nuclear testing led to protests from governments and environmental groups within the region.[4] These nuclear experiments, which took place at various times from the late 1940s to the middle 1990s, have left destruction and desolation in the islands, and resulted in health problems for people and genetic defects in their children. People in the Pacific perhaps have a legitimate fear of things ‘nuclear’, given their past experiences, the denial of so-called developed nations of their rights and the insensitivity to their resultant plight. Even the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can lead to catastrophes, such as Chernobyl, and emergencies, like Three Mile Island. However, nuclear power generation is a fact of life in many countries and in some cases has been incident free for more than 40 years. Nevertheless, and perhaps understandably so in the Pacific, the word ‘nuclear’ holds fear for some people. Attempts to allay that fear sometimes evoke emotive reactions. The issue becomes political. Someone is expected to take action, or at least to be seen to be doing something about the problem. As a result, a certain amount of misinformation has been broadcast and some misconceptions have resulted. There has been talk of ‘prohibiting’ vessels from carrying nuclear waste from transiting the Pacific region, although the legal foundation for so doing and the manner in
which it might be effected seem not to have been considered in any degree of detail.
Let us consider two major aspects:
Customary International Maritime Law has long recognised the concept of Freedom of the High Seas. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 recognises the concept of ‘Innocent Passage’. This has usually been assumed to mean that if the passage of a vessel registered in a Flag State is not hostile to the ‘peace, good order and security of a Coastal State’, then the Coastal State is obliged to allow the vessel to proceed on its way through its territorial sea. The concept of innocent passage does not extend to the exclusive economic zone, where States only have the right of exploration and exploitation of the natural resources in this area, and the obligation to manage and conserve them. Merchant ships carrying cargo from one port to another cannot normally be prohibited from this zone. It is moot as to whether the passage of a vessel carrying a cargo that might result in injury to the inhabitants of a Coastal State or its environment should be considered hostile, or at least not ‘innocent’. Vessels carrying thousands of tons of crude or heavy oil through the territorial sea might be seen as potentially damaging to the environment of a Coastal State, but, with adherence to the provisions of certain international maritime conventions, such as MARPOL 73/78, such passage is seen as non-hostile, but rather ‘innocent’. Similarly, vessels carrying hazard-ous and noxious substances in bulk, such as chemicals, gases and other highly volatile and potentially damaging substances, ply their trades through the waters of Coastal States, as long as they satisfy the requirements of internationally accepted conventions that stipulate the conditions under which a vessel carrying such a cargo is deemed to be ‘safe’, and therefore its passage deemed ‘innocent’. Vessels that do not comply with the provisions of these international conventions may be deemed to be unsafe, but again the international law on the matter is not determined. Vessels that load hazardous cargoes in developed States would seem to have to satisfy the conditions of not only the Flag State, but also those of the Port State in which the cargo was handled, or risk being detained by the Port State maritime authorities.
To prohibit a vessel from entering or transiting the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of a PIC on a voyage from Europe to Far East Asia, unless its passage was inherently hostile to the Coastal State, might be in contravention of the generally accepted principles of international law and the UNCLOS Convention. So perhaps PICs are not on particularly firm ground in ‘prohibiting’ the passage of a vessel carrying nuclear waste (or any other particularly hazardous cargo), unless the vessel itself was patently unsafe or unseaworthy, and has been found to be so by a competent technical body or authority. Alternatively, if the vessel itself was certified safe and seaworthy, one would expect that the Coastal State would have to prove that there was a high-probability inherent risk of damage occurring from the passage of that vessel through its territorial sea before prohibition could be sanctioned. However, there is some authority for the proposition that a
State, when it becomes aware that its activity creates the risk of significant harm to another State, should consult, inform or notify the other State. An extension of this concept will be developed further.
Given that there is still fear that a vessel casualty (grounding, standing, foundering or collision) might result in the release into the sea or the atmosphere of the cargo being carried, what precautions can a Coastal State take that are within the bounds of international maritime law? While there is no firm legal basis for so doing, a Coastal State or a group of States whose waters lie on the route of a proposed passage may request the co-operation of the Flag State or Port State in which the vessel is loading the nuclear cargo to ensure that certain measures be taken by the shipowner or the cargo owner to reduce or eliminate some of the risks of a maritime casualty occurring. These measures may include:
(i) the submission of a comprehensive passage plan that avoids all known navigational hazards by a certain distance;
(ii) warranties by the Flag State that the vessel has been constructed to certain internationally accepted standards and that an internationally recognised classification society has certified that the vessel has not only been built to those standards, but has been maintained ‘in class’;
(iii) verification that the vessel has been constructed in a manner suitable for the carriage of nuclear waste according to special, more rigorous criteria;
(iv) confirmation that all the vessel’s equipment is adequate for the voyage, recognising the special risks. This may require the duplication of certain components of a vessel’s systems, such as two main propulsion engines, emergency generators, redundancy of navigation and communication systems, and additional capability for crucial items such as steering gear, thrusters, towing hawsers, firefighting and lifesaving equipment. These requirements would include the installation of dual Differential Global Positioning Systems (DGPS), satellite communications systems, Global Maritime Distress and Safety, Systems (GMDSS), electronic charts, ARPA radar, and so on.
The vast majority (up to 95% by some reckoning) of accidents at sea occur as a result of the human factor. This can result from improper crew and officer training, lack of experience, inadequate supervision, fatigue, lack of communication between multi-national crew, failure of management to establish, implement and monitor safe practices and any number of other reasons. In order that the properly designed and equipped ship can carry out its mission in a safe manner, the crew will have to be adequate in number, and properly trained to understand and operate all the sophisticated equipment. While adherence to international standards, such as STCW-95 is generally considered adequate for the standards of training, certification and watchkeeping seafarers and the operational practices on board an average ship, there may be justification for a requirement of higher professional standards for officers and crew on board a ship carrying a potentially dangerous cargo. The cargo is not in itself dangerous if it is maintained in its properly sealed canisters or other containers, but if the ship itself were to become a marine casualty, then the cargo may be released from its proper containment and represent a hazard. Thus, one might argue that all the officers should have the highest level of qualification, several years experience at sea, particularly in that (type of?) ship, and even be subject to certain non-invasive/non-intrusive tests to determine their ability to carry out their duties in a satisfactory manner at all times, but especially before taking over the watch.
Materials such as spent fuel rods are usually required to be packaged in a manner that is safe for transport.[5] Invariably the nuclear power station is some distance from the port. The material has to be safely contained, often in ceramic or glass-lined, tube-shaped, stainless steel canisters built to specific internationallyrecognised requirements, before it can be delivered to the land transportation necessary to take it to the port. Often the tractor-trailer or train carrying the nuclear waste will have to travel through densely populated areas. The inhabitants of these areas must be assured and satisfied that the material is safely contained for this mode of transport. Special measures must be taken during the loading and unloading of these cargoes and the cargo must be properly secured within the ship’s hold before the vessel is allowed by the competent authorities to proceed on the voyage. The carriage of dangerous goods in packaged form is dealt with in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 1974) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78). SOLAS 1974 refers to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, a comprehensive five-volume set that specifies how dangerous goods should be packaged, placarded, stowed and segregated for the carriage by ships at sea. These and other specific requirements for nuclear materials should be followed and enforced.
Any voyage to any destination should begin with a passage plan. Passage plans can vary in detail from merely laying off a ‘course to steer’ on a chart; to calculating the rate and direction of tide and current in any location; to calculating whether the passage through a particularly narrow channel will take place in daylight or at night. Passage plans can stipulate that known hazards be avoided by a specific margin, such as 20 nautical miles from any reef or underwater obstruction. A detailed passage plan can be worked up for a voyage from Japan to Europe and vice versa, depending on the planned route and speed of vessel. This passage plan could be forwarded to the governments of States through whose waters the vessels carrying the nuclear waste may pass, and approval or modification to the passage plan could be allowed from nautical/shipping experts from these States. The passage plan would have to avoid areas where sea-mounts and underwater volcanic activity are prevalent and areas that are poorly charted, lacking sufficient hydrographic information to ensure a safe passage.
Weather is a major consideration in determining the vessel’s speed, but can be even more important when tropical depressions, (hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, depending on the region) are likely to be encountered. Many ships have been lost without a trace when caught in the throes of a tropical revolving storm. With the advent of weather satellites, meteorological forecasting has become much more reliable. Weather routing services are available to advise the master on the optimum route to minimise time on passage and fuel consumption. Local weather forecasts can be received in plain language or printed out on a variety of Navtex-type receivers.
Reporting of vessel position and situation could be required to be made to Coastal State shore radio stations at frequent intervals, or additionally, the vessel in question could be required to be equipped with a transponder that would indicate its identity and position in a real-time sense. This would assure Coastal State authorities that the vessel was being operated in accordance with the submitted (and approved?) passage plan.
Since certain elements of the depleted fuel rods can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons, by far the greatest danger to a cargo of nuclear waste or similar radioactive substance would seem to be acts of piracy, terrorism, or hijacking for the purposes of extortion.[6] This would certainly jeopardise the safety of even the most carefully thought out voyage planning. Vessels carrying nuclear material tend not to use the Suez Canal, the shortest and most direct route. Whether the authorities have banned such vessels from using the canal (the right of innocent passage does not apply to a canal, although it does apply to international straits) or whether shipowners have deliberately chosen to avoid a region that has endured political uncertainty, tension, sporadic hostilities, terrorism and outright war during the last 70 years is not certain. The same precautions could be said for the avoidance of the Malacca, Sunda and other international straits connecting the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea where piracy is on the rise. Thus, it would seem that the position of the vessel carrying nuclear waste, and the security situation on board should be known at all times to the authorities in those States through whose waters the vessel is sailing. This can be achieved by mandatory reporting by the ships at predetermined intervals (at the end of every four-hour watch?) and/or by the monitoring of the signals from the transponder which are frequently updating the position of the ship.
After the Braer incident off the north coast of Scotland in 1993, where a tanker experienced engine failure and was driven ashore in severe weather spilling about 85,000 tonnes of North Sea crude into the sea around the Shetland Islands, recommendations were made by the Donaldson Inquiry that an ocean-going salvage tug be stationed at strategic locations around the British Isles to take into tow any vessel that was experiencing main propulsion failure and was standing into danger of stranding or foundering. It is not an unreasonable requirement that a tug having sufficient power and bollard pull be standing by the vessel carrying the nuclear material during the course of transit through the various maritime zones of a PIC. A further precaution could be the escorting through the maritime zones by one of the 22 Australian-supplied Pacific Patrol Boats in the region. The detailed passage plan would indicate the estimated time of arrival of the vessel’s planned entry into the exclusive economic zone of a Coastal State. This information could be released on a ‘need-to-know’ basis to avoid the unwanted presence of observers or even pirates. Care should be taken that a flotilla of escorting vessels does not interfere with the safe navigation of the vessel they are escorting.
While selecting the best vessel, a highly qualified crew, redundancy of equipment and plenty of spares, adequate cargo packaging and stowage, and proper passage planning will go a long way towards ensuring a safe voyage with little or no danger of the nuclear material being released into the atmosphere or into the ocean, a good management team always prepares for the worst, before, not after, an emergency happens. By doing this, measures can be taken in advance to provide for assistance (towage, air-lifting of spare parts, etc., should it be required), and plans can be made of action to be taken in an emergency resulting in damage the ship and/or the cargo, and mitigation measures to contain the cargo, if necessary.
Much has been written about the ‘precautionary principle’[7] to protect the environment, but it is submitted that all the above measures should satisfy the emerging (?) principle and ensure the safe passage of a vessel carrying nuclear waste through the waters of PICs.
Generally speaking (and there are exceptions), under the provisions of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, if a laden tanker (or other vessel constructed or adopted for the carriage of oil in bulk when actually carrying oil) causes pollution damage by contamination from oil being discharged or escaping from the ship, then the owner is liable for such pollution damage so caused. This is a strict liability offence in the sense that no negligence has to be proved. However, the owner is only liable for damages resulting up to a certain amount, which is determined in relation to the size of the vessel. Simplifying the process for the sake of brevity, if the shipowner wishes to limit his liability for the damage, he must pay the sum for which he is liable into court. Then, the court will determine the merit of the damage claims and if proven, pay damages out of this fund. No other action can be taken against the owner, his employees, or the ship. The reason that the shipowner is allowed to limit his liability for damage resulting from a particular incident is that, since the maximum financial extent of the exposure is known, the owner can obtain insurance. The underwriter then has only to determine the probability of the damage occurring and calculate a premium accordingly. If the owner could not limit his liability, then no insurer would underwrite the risk since the quantum was incalculable. Those suffering damage would have to bring action against the shipowner who would have arranged his affairs into one-ship companies, the only asset of which was now breaking up on the rocks.
(h) Compensation to those suffering damage
The fund that the shipowner establishes may not fully compensate all those who have suffered damage from the escape of oil from the ship. Since the shipowner is not the only one profiting by the transportation of oil from one place to another, the international maritime community, through IMO, constituted another Fund (under the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992) where revenues are generated by a levy on receivers of crude or fuel oil in excess of 150,000 tons annually. If the shipowner is deemed not to be liable because he falls under one of the exemption clauses or if the fund established by the shipowner is insufficient to meet all the legitimate claims, the Fund will pay out damages to those whom the court has found have justified their claims.
Generally speaking, the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions cover damage arising from incidents involving the spillage and subsequent damage resulting from the discharge or escape of certain specific types of oil. A new International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 1996, (HNS) provides a Liability/Compensation scheme for those suffering damages caused by the spillage of chemicals and other substances covered by Annexes I and II of MARPOL, 73/78, as well as dangerous, hazardous and harmful substances in packaged form covered by the IMDG Code, and liquefied gases. The HNS Code is based on the system covered by the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, but goes further inasmuch as it covers not only pollution but also risks of fire and explosion. It also introduces strict liability for the shipowner and a system of compulsory insurance, evidenced by certificates of insurance. Additional cover is provided by contributions from cargo owners.
There are international conventions governing civil nuclear liability, but the majority of them provide compensation in the case of a nuclear accident, notably the Convention of Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960, (the Paris Convention) and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963 (the Vienna Convention). Generally speaking, that liability is channelled to the operator of a nuclear installation, limitations are placed on that liability, and Contracting Parties undertake to ensure that operators have compulsory insurance. There is also a Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, (the 1971 Brussels Convention), but although it entered into force in 1975 and there are 14 Contracting Parties, no PICs are Parties. The main purpose of this Convention is to exonerate any person transporting nuclear material who might be held liable by virtue of an international convention in the field of maritime transport for damage caused by a nuclear accident if the operator of a nuclear installation is liable under the Paris or Vienna Conventions. However, the jurisdiction of the courts is generally restricted to those of the Party in whose territory the accident occurs, although for accidents occurring at sea it will have to be determined whether or not it is the sending or receiving operator who is liable. Furthermore, only persons who suffered damage in the territory of a contracting Party, or national of a Contracting Party to the Paris and Vienna Conventions who suffered damage whilst on or over the high seas, could recover. Furthermore, these Conventions do not cover damage to the environment or economic loss resulting from nuclear damage. So, although there are some international agreements concerning the carriage of nuclear material, none seem to have applicability or offer recourse to PICs.
What is required, it seems, is a new convention that deals specifically with the carriage of nuclear or other radioactive (and ultrahazardous?) material that specifies to what extent the shipowner is liable (in finite terms so that he may obtain insurance coverage) and to what extent the exporter and importer should be liable for the excess. Although it is recognised that it may be more difficult to prove exposure to radiation than it is to prove oil contamination on fishing gear, it is believed that even those difficulties could be overcome. In any event, it would provide a much more secure regime for potential victims than that which is in place at the present time.
There has been much talk about prohibiting vessels carrying nuclear waste from transiting through the marine zones of PICs. Article 58 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, states that in the exclusive economic zone, all States enjoy the freedoms referred to in Article 87 (Freedom of the high seas) including the right to navigate through those waters. As long as the vessel is not contravening Articles 210 (Pollution by dumping) or 211 (Pollution from vessels) it is difficult to find any grounds to support the concept of prohibition of a vessel that is carrying nuclear waste, that would be free to transit were it carrying any other cargo. Although the term has been used in the literature, there is no finite definition of ‘ultrahazardous material’, and in any event, nuclear material comes in different forms with different properties. An attempt at prohibition may well be unlawful. Whilst States have an obligation to avoid causing harm to other States[8] and have a duty to notify and consult with affected countries,[9] it is not clear that failure of the Flag State to notify the Coastal State of the planned passage of a vessel will entitle Coastal States to prohibit vessels from transiting their Territorial Sea, let alone their Exclusive Economic Zone.[10]
If the Coastal State(s) were to unilaterally declare a prohibition from its marine zones, how would it enforce this situation? Most PICs have no naval vessels except small patrol boats provided by Australia under the Pacific Patrol Boat Programme. Some of these vessels carry small calibre mounted weapons and small arms. That might be sufficient to deter a vessel from passing through a Coastal State’s waters, but the same threat does not seem to deter some East Asian fishing vessel skippers from illegal fishing in those same waters. Furthermore, most PICs have difficulty in finding vessels lost at sea or intercepting vessels known to be carrying illegal immigrants, let alone find a vessel which is intending to transit the waters of the vast Pacific Ocean in a clandestine fashion. One would have more chance of finding a needle in a haystack.
If, through mere coincidence, the vessel carrying nuclear waste was discovered, then how would the vessel be apprehended? Would the Patrol Boat risk a shot across the bows? This was done with great effect when a fishing vessel attempted to escape arrest in one PIC. However, the use of weapons against a vessel carrying a cargo that would be hazardous if unleashed from its special containers might cause the type of damage that the whole exercise was attempting to avoid. Alternatively, the vessel might be boarded, but this might lead to evasion and potential stranding, or collision between the two vessels, again resulting in the very situation that was supposed to be prevented. So, realistically, the nations of the Pacific have no real way of detecting and preventing a determined master of a vessel from exercising his right to freedom of navigation.[11]
Furthermore, if such unilateral action were to be taken, it could possibly void any contract of insurance that the shipowner had taken out to compensate third parties who had suffered damage from any release of the cargo, since the exception clauses usually do not cover acts of war, aggression or incidents of a catastrophic and unforeseen nature.
We are not talking about the shipment of toxic waste from a developed country (that is trying to get rid of something hazardous, which it does not want in its own backyard) to an developing country, which through ignorance or desperation, hopes to make some money storing (hiding?) it. Nor are we talking about the importation of nuclear material into the region for industrial use. Neither are we talking about the testing of nuclear weapons, or even access to nuclear armed and/or nuclear powered ships. We are merely talking about the transportation of a cargo that is moving from one developed country to another developed country where the most stringent of standards (existing) are enforced. Therefore most of the international or regional conventions dealing with the transboundary shipment of waste are inapplicable. This is not to say that PICs should surrender before the battle commences. It is respectfully submitted that the rules of engagement and the trophy at stake should be carefully analysed to ensure that the modus operandi is appropriate to ensure the best outcome possible.
If a fanner had a field of corn and people on one side of the field wanted to get to the other side, the wise farmer would make a small footpath through the field and put up a sign requesting that all people keep to the footpath. An unwise fanner would put up a sign saying, ‘No trespassing’. People would still have to get from one side of the field to the other, but they would trample all the corn of the unwise farmer, whereas they would respect the request of the wise fanner to keep to the footpath he had left unplanted. While merchant ships roam all over the Pacific on various routes, they do no damage nor present any threat. However, it is submitted that vessels carrying nuclear waste should be required to follow the footpath. In other words, they should be allowed to transit the area, but subject to some reasonable conditions that are negotiated, agreed, monitored and enforced to ensure a safe transit on a planned and monitored voyage. It is also submitted that efforts should be made to develop a liability/compensation regime for damage resulting from the release of nuclear waste into the water or atmosphere along the lines of the Civil Liability/Fund Conventions, or even the HNS Convention. This would have greater credibility and acceptance, especially if PICs were part of the process. It may just result in a Convention to which PICs would be prepared to become Contracting Parties.
[1] Regional Maritime Legal Advisor, Pacific Community Secretariat, Suva.
[2] The most notable and devastating disaster took place when engineers at the reactor deliberately flouted the normal safety procedures.
[3] Perhaps the ultimate storage of nuclear waste is a more serious problem than transportation of nuclear material by sea.
[4] There continue to be doubts about the safety of the abandoned underground test area, despite assurances from the French government and ‘experts’ in the field.
[5] The International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships is set to become part of SOLAS Chapter VII on 1 January 2002, following the amendments to SOLAS 74 at the 71st session of the MSC - FAIPLAY, 17 June 1999, p. 19
as reported in Current Awareness Bulletin, vol. xi, no. 7, July 1999, published by IMO Library Information Services.
[6] Greenpeace has challenged the right of specialist shipping company, Pacific Nuclear Transport, to use armed ships to transport nuclear fuel from Britain and France to Japan - Lloyd’s List, 16 July, 1999, p. 16 as reported in Current Awareness Bulletin, vol. xi, no. 8, August 1999, published by IMO Library Information Services.
[7] See for example, J. M. Van Dyke, ‘Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of Radioactive Materials’, Ocean Development & International Law, vol. 27, pp. 379-397, 1996.
[8] For example, the Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards, 1905, 1938 (1941)
[9] For example, the Corfu Channel Case (United
Kingdom v. Albania) [1949] I.C.J. Reports 4, where Albania was held to have the duty to disclose the presence of mines in the channel, even though Albania itself did not place the mines.
[10] For a more comprehensive debate, see Van Dyke and Currie, The International Law Relating to Shipments of Ultrahazardous Radioactive Materials and Strategies and Options to Protect the Marine Environment, 18 February, 1997, apparently unpublished copy.
[11] However, legal experts have warned that the decision to arm two British merchant ships, the Pacific Pintail
and Pacific Teal, carrying nuclear fuel could risk the vessels being branded ‘pirates’ and being impounded - Lloyd’s List, 24 July, 1999, p. 1 as reported in Current Awareness Bulletin, vol. xi, no. 8, August 1999, published by IMO Library Information Services.
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