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Ships have always needed to take on ballast at certain times in order to maintain essential seagoing properties. Originally the ballast consisted of bricks, stone, iron and other substances, but after the introduction of iron- and steel-hulled ships, seawater was used. But when the water was taken on board, local life forms were scooped up as well. Many of these survived inside the ship until they were pumped back into the sea as the voyage neared its end.
Although this was first recognized as long ago as 1903, when a mass occurrence of an Asian phytoplankton alga was discovered in the North Sea, the full extent of the problem did not become apparent until much later in the century.
In 1990 IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) set up a working group to consider the problem and the following year the Committee adopted guidelines for preventing the introduction of unwanted aquatic organisms and pathogens from ships’ ballast water and sediment discharges.
In 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) also recognized the ballast water threat. IMO continued its work, and in 1993 the IMO Assembly adopted resolution A.774(18), which was based on the 1991 guidelines. An updated version was adopted in 1997 as Assembly resolution A.868(20), Guidelines for the control and management of ships’ ballast water to minimize the transfer of harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens. One way of preventing the problem is by exchanging ballast water in mid-ocean, where marine organisms are not so common as they are closer to land. However, this needs to be done very carefully, and in 1997 the MEPC and IMO’s Marine Safety Committee (MSC) issued a joint circular containing guidance on safety aspects relating to the exchange of ballast water at sea.
IMO is now looking into ways of introducing mandatory requirements concerning ballast water. In June-July 1999 the MEPC met again to consider the issue. A working group reviewed a number of key issues based on the current proposed draft regulations, with progress being reported in achieving consensus on the content of certain draft regulations. However, a number of important issues and aspects remain open for further consideration, including:
• the preferred approach to application – whether the globalised approach, the designation of Ballast Water Management Areas, or other approaches;
• development of a range of standards, e.g., for evaluation and acceptance of new ballast water management and control options;
• development of a regionalisation concept; and
• the extent of application of the provisions to some categories of vessels, such as fishing vessels, pleasure boats, etc.
The overall outline of a draft legal instrument was prepared and some draft text was developed, but the Committee agreed that preparation of the instrument was not sufficiently advanced to be able to propose to the IMO Council (which meets prior to the Assembly in November) the holding of a diplomatic conference to adopt an instrument in the next biennium (2000-2001).
The issue will remain a high-priority item in the work programme, and the Committee agreed that the Working Group on Ballast Water should continue its work at the next session, due to be held in the spring of 2000.
Options for introducing the proposed regulations include:
• a new Annex to MARPOL 73/78; and
• a completely new convention on ballast water management, under which the terms for entry into force would be determined by a conference, instead of having to comply with existing terms established by MARPOL 73/78.
Current options for preventing the spread of harmful aquatic organisms in ballast water include exchanging the ballast water in deep ocean, where there is less marine life and where organisms are less likely to survive. Other options include filtration and thermal, chemical, and radiation treatments of the ballast water en route to kill the living organisms.
An IMO focus paper on the ballast water issue – Alien Invaders – Ballast Water Hitch Hikers – is available from the Information Office of IMO. The paper can also be found on the IMO website at www.imo.org under the Focus on IMO section.
Courtesy: IMO News
The Commonwealth agency Environment Australia (EA) has outlined its intention to make a major impact in marine environmental management.
‘A new framework encompassing economic, social and environmental interests will be introduced under Australia’s Oceans Policy,’ said David Kay, Assistant Secretary of EA’s Marine Group.
‘The environmental performance of the fishing sector will be increasingly scrutinised,’ he told the Outlook 2000 commodity forecasting conference in Canberra.
The Commonwealth’s new powers involving the marine environment flow from an agreement between the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers last year. Under them, future fisheries management arrangements will be required to demonstrate ecological sustainability. Using its Oceans Policy, EA would also remove commercial marine species’ blanket exemption from wildlife export controls, David Kay said.
Exemptions valid for five years would be granted for individual species if that species and the fishing operation involved were assessed as demonstrably ecologically sustainable. These assessments would be made during the next two years. Current exemptions would continue in the meantime.
But the Oceans Policy’s main thrust would be an integrated planning and management regime for Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
This would require the integration of commercial interests and conservation requirements in a series of regional management plans, each based on a marine ecosystem.
Although not intended to deliver property rights, the process would ‘provide greater certainty about fisheries resources available for exploitation and the conditions for access’, EA’s Outlook paper said.
The new ecosystem approach recognized that existing fisheries management based on political or geographic boundaries might not be effective for species across their entire range. Under the new regime, fisheries management agencies would be expected to give effect to agreed planning outcomes.
There was sufficient community concern to warrant this approach to achieving sustainability through both environmental impact assessment and export controls, Environment Australia said.
Courtesy: Fisheries R&D News
Human error induced by fatigue will probably be the cause if there is ever a major oil spill in the waters of the Great Barrier Reef.
The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority has logged human error as the reason for five of the seven most recent groundings, and an inquiry is currently under way to establish why the 22,000-tonne bulk carrier New Reach hit Heath Reef last May.
The GBRMPA’s marine pollution response officer, Jamie Storrie, has highlighted the human factor in a report on the New Reach grounding to the Federal Environment Minister, Senator Robert Hill.
Mr Storrie reported that there had been a number of similar incidents within and adjacent to the Marine Park. Since 1995 there have been three groundings within the Marine Park and three within Torres Strait. They were:
• March 1995: The Carola grounded on South Ledge Reef in the Far Northern Section. No pollution resulted but there was extensive damage to the Reef and the bow of the ship was holed. The vessel was refloated after six hours. The cause was human error. A pilot was on board the vessel but not present on the bridge at the time of grounding.
• June 1995: the Svendborg Guardian grounded on Kurrimine Beach, south of Cairns. The vessel was undamaged and refloated 12 hours later. No pollution resulted. The cause was human error. The grounding occurred outside the compulsory pilotage area and there was no pilot onboard at the time. The bridge was unmanned at the time of grounding and had been unmanned for five hours prior to impact. The second mate had left the bridge and fallen asleep in his cabin.
• July 1996: The Peacock hit Piper Reef in the Far Northern Section and remained aground for eight days. The vessel was refloated with no pollution resulting. Substantial damage to the reef occurred. The cause was human error. A pilot was on board the vessel and present on the bridge at the time of grounding but he had fallen asleep on the bridge.
• June 1997: the Thebes ran aground on Larpent Bank in the Torres Strait. It was refloated and no pollution resulted. The cause was navigation error. A pilot was present on the vessel.
• July 1997: the Dakshineshwar ran aground near Wednesday Island in the Torres Strait. It was refloated with no resulting pollution. The cause was engine failure. A pilot was on board and in charge of navigation at the time of grounding.
• November 1997: The Nol Amber ran aground on Larpent Bank but was refloated with no pollution. The cause was navigation error. A pilot was on board and in charge of navigation at the time of grounding.
Apart from the grounding of the Dakshineshwar all incidents resulted from human error. Bridge and shipboard management practices in particular were contributing factors with all the Marine Park groundings.
The three groundings within the Marine Park need to be placed within the context of more than 12,000 shipping movements through Great Barrier Reef waters in the period since 1995.
In October 1991 mandatory pilotage was adopted for all vessels longer than 70m and all loaded oil, chemical and liquefied gas carriers. These classes of vessels must carry a licensed pilot from Cape York to Cairns Roads or when using Hydrographers Passage. Mr Storrie reported that the introduction of compulsory pilotage reflected the navigational difficulty of the two areas selected and government’s concern for the protection and conservation of the Great Barrier Reef.
‘There are three pilotage companies operating within the Marine Park. Two companies provide services for the entire reef, whilst a third provides a specialist service for Hydrographers Passage,’ he said.
‘The function of a pilot on board a ship is to provide information and advice to the master of the ship and to assist the master and the ship’s navigating officer to make passage through the pilotage area or areas for which the pilot is engaged.
‘The pilot is not liable for any advice affecting the navigation of the vessel which results in damage or loss, provided that advice is given in good faith and was not reckless in intent. The master is at all times responsible for the conduct of the vessel.
‘Australia has been instrumental in attempting to consolidate Bridge Management Systems onboard ships – that is, developing a management system whereby the pilot and ship’s crew work together as a team to ensure the safe navigation of the ship.’
Courtesy: Reef Management News
China is reported to have laid out ‘the welcome mat’ for pirate fishermen by refusing to participate in a worldwide effort to control the rampant trade in illegally caught Patagonian toothfish. The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) is calling on toothfish importers and countries to refuse to accept toothfish from China. The Patagonian toothfish fishery is managed by The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). CCAMLR made a last-ditch effort to regain control of the Patagonian toothfish fishery last year by adopting a catch documentation scheme (CDS), which took effect May 7, 2000. The goal of the CDS is to track the international trade in toothfish and ultimately close the markets for illegally caught fish. All shipments of toothfish must be accompanied by a valid catch document detailing when, where, and how the fish were caught.
CCAMLR was negotiated as an integral part of the Antarctic Treaty System, not as a stand-alone agreement. China is not a member of CCAMLR and is not required to participate in the scheme. However, CCAMLR has contacted non-member nations that participate in the toothfish trade and encouraged them to participate in the CDS. China’s participation in the trade has steadily increased in recent years with the majority of its exports going to the United States and Japan, both CCAMLR members. ‘Japan and the U.S. consume over 90% of all toothfish,’ said Beth Clark of ASOC, ‘so we are urging both governments to close their ports to toothfish from China.’
Appearing on menus as Chilean Sea Bass or Antarctic Sea Bass, a single toothfish can be worth as much as $5.00/kilogram to pirate fishers. This payoff has drawn pirate fishers to the Southern Ocean in a high-seas ‘gold rush’ in search of this little-studied fish. Illegally harvested toothfish account for 50-80% of the total trade, worth an estimated $500 million. Pirate fishers have driven toothfish to commercial extinction in just two years of fishing in the waters surrounding Crozet Island in the Southern Ocean. In addition, pirate fishers take no measures to prevent the accidental hooking and drowning of endangered albatross and petrels.
More information is available from Mark Stevens, Fisheries Campaigner, Antarctica Project/Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, web site: http://www.asoc.org.
Courtesy: Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MarStudies/2000/21.html