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Commentary by the Australian Centre for Maritime Studies
On 27 June 2000, the Government announced the most extensive public consultation process ever undertaken on defence and security issues with the release of the Defence Review 2000: Our Future Defence Force – A Public Discussion Paper.
Individuals and groups were invited to make their views on the issues raised in the Public Discussion Paper known to the Community Consultative Team by forwarding written submissions, using the feedback facility on the Discussion paper web-site, or attending the open sessions being conducted around Australia by the consultation team. The following is the text of the submission by the Australian Centre for Maritime Studies to the Consultation Program.
The Public Discussion Paper Defence Review 2000 seeks to outline the issues which require to be considered in developing specific capabilities to ensure the defence of the nation and its national interests into the future. It identifies the uncertain strategic outlook, the present absence of identifiable threats and the emergence of regional instability. And it is against this background that options for providing defence capabilities are developed.
From the viewpoint of the Centre it is contended that the departmental views as espoused in the ‘Green Paper’ are too narrowly focused and omit, inter alia, considerations of national security in its broadest sense as well as the complexities of the maritime setting of the Australian nation. National security must be presented as a whole-of-nation issue and a whole-of-government responsibility. Any government-sponsored discussion of defence policy which appears in the public domain must be considered in the wider national security context so that Australia’s aspirations and intentions are not misunderstood within the region. Therefore while the outcome of defence reviews should lead to a particular force structure it is important to present those intentions as part of our national desire to promote peace, stability, and economic well-being of the nations in the region of our strategic interest. To this end it is important for our neighbours to understand the non-aggressive nature of our nation. Because we are a major trading nation, the development of a benign security environment brings direct benefits in the form of greater prosperity and commerce.
‘Sea blindness’ has been a weakness in every strategic defence review carried out in the past three decades. Simple geography shows that Australia is a major land mass located within three great ocean systems. Furthermore Australia is, uniquely, the only continental land mass which comprises a single nation State. Our oceanic environment links us to the littoral and island nations of the Indian Ocean, the archipelagic and island nations of the Pacific, the countries of East Asia, the land masses of North and South America and the Antarctic. The oceans provide that essential highway which sustains our trade and our economic well-being.
As part of our wide ocean environment Australia has the third largest Exclusive Economic Zone in the world comprising 8.6 million square kilometres compared with our land mass of 7.8 million square kilometres. It presents the nation with a management problem of major dimensions. As a maritime nation we are challenged with the task of developing the offshore resources of the Australian EEZ (AEEZ). Australia’s marine industries contribute around $30 billion a year to the national economy or eight per cent of gross domestic product.
That task also includes broad ocean surveillance coupled with control and defence of the whole AEEZ which also includes the resource rich Australian Antarctic EEZ which lies distant in violent and largely uncharted waters. (Australia claims a significant part of the Antarctic continent and its maritime zones. The uncertainties of Antarctic sovereignty in this environment and the increasing pressure on its living and non-living resources are creating considerable challenges for Australia.)
In this connection it is a matter of concern that the Defence Discussion Paper makes no reference to Australia’s Ocean Policy arrangements set up in late 1998 to provide strategic planning and management of our ocean domain. Security of our ocean domain in situations short of war is a continuing vital national task and a component of both Oceans Policy and national security. The conduct of such operations within the AEEZ is a continuing feature of the ADF’s operational profile involving:
• reconnaissance and surveillance;
• patrol and response within the AEEZ;
• search and rescue;
• disaster relief;
• departmental cooperation with Fisheries, Customs and Immigration; and
• hydrography and oceanography.
Present indications are that these demands on the ADF will increase in the foreseeable future.
It is not for a paper like this to discuss the merits or otherwise of a national coastguard to provide the infrastructure and resources necessary to provide control and protection of our sovereign EEZ rights. It is essential, however, to ensure that the efficacy of current arrangements is routinely reviewed with a view to developing over time more proficient arrangements so as to enable the Government to respond to changing circumstances. Defence involvement in Oceans Policy planning is thus integral to national security and Defence planning.
Other nations within our region also have large EEZs which under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea they are obliged to manage. The development of policies and issues relevant to EEZ management and control thus provide a range of vehicles by which Australia can engage with other nations on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Issues common to littoral and island states in which Australia is well placed to provide leadership as well as marine-based resources are:
• delineation of sea boundaries
• resolution of sea boundary disputes
• archipelagic issues including passage rights
• sustainable yield fisheries management within EEZs
• sustainable yield high seas fisheries management including illegal unregulated and unreported fishing
• offshore oil and gas development, including security considerations
• illegal immigration
• piracy
• coastal state control of foreign flag vessels
• environmental issues such as pollution, especially heavy metal pollution, marine pest control, ballast water dumping
• hydrography and chart production
• Antarctic management
• education across the range of marine professions
• search and rescue
• disaster relief including environmental disasters (oil spills)
• cooperation across the range of IMO developments
These are all issues common to the heritage of mankind. When one considers the millions of people within our region living within say 20 kms of the sea their wellbeing is dependent on access to the sea and its resources. The orderly and sustainable development of marine resources in the Indo-Pacific ocean basins represents a security challenge which must be resolved if current tensions involving such things as sea boundaries, protection of oil rigs, fishing rights, piracy, are to be contained and the rule of law, international and national, complied with.
Therefore Australia can correct its ‘sea blindness’ in part by committing to a policy of engaging in a pro-active way with our ocean neighbours in any of these areas of maritime enterprise. Specific defence-related activities such as surveillance, intelligence exchange, and policing, as well as technical assistance and education across the range of offshore activities all contribute significantly to national security and become vehicles for building trust and understanding between nations.
By these means Australia is able to shape its strategic environment and provide a counterpoise to countries such as India and China which are currently extending their spheres of influence beyond traditional limits.
Although Australia, through inept national policies coupled with union obduracy over the past 50 years, has no significant merchant marine, we are a major provider of raw materials to the world, and as a major trading nation have a vital interest in ensuring that mercantile trade is not disrupted. This is also true of our major trading partners – Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, USA and EU, and increasingly India and the Middle East.
The continuance of uninterrupted maritime trade is vital to the economic well-being of all these nations and Australia. The need to develop links with these nations to ensure the protection of SLOCs in the event that some ‘Nasser’ should arise on the scene suggests that Australia should be pro-active in promoting a regional SLOC security agenda. Anti-piracy measures are a related issue.
The geography of Australia and its ocean environment dictate the fact that Australia’s defence must be ocean-based with an evolved maritime strategy central to the nation’s defence strategy. Control of our ocean environs and the sea-air gap should be the principal element of any Australian defence strategy. Australia’s armed forces – land, sea based, and air – need to be designed to achieve that measure of sea control necessary to guarantee that the Australian mainland, its islands, and its sea approaches can be defended. While these forces may be deployed for the protection of the mainland and the sea approaches they can also be deployed for regional engagement.
The concept of regional engagement as a means of promoting regional security should be a central feature of national security strategy, with the object of creating a benign regional security outlook. Increasingly it has been shown forces deployed in this role should be sea-based, as this does not involve third parties whose neutrality may be compromised if facilities such as airfields are needed to support a particular operation. Maximum flexibility in terms of manoeuvre thus becomes a feature, which in itself is an important political consideration. Land, sea, sea-based air, and air forces all comprise components of forces cast in the regional engagement role. Furthermore it has been shown that on occasions such forces deployed in a timely manner may not need to be committed, their presence enabling a diplomatic outcome to be achieved. This capability, moreover, assists in shaping the strategic environment.
Deterrence as an element of national security has been a feature of Defence policy since the 1970s with the acquisition of the F111 strike aircraft. It remains a central feature to this day and is relevant to the future.
Long-range missiles possess the capability to provide the national deterrent into the future. This element of force capability may be air-based as at present, or launched from submarine or surface ships. While their underwater environment provides submarines with natural protection, surface ships equipped with this weaponry have particular advantages of flexibility, sustainability, diplomatic input and graduated force.
While conceptually central to any defence policy consideration, in reality the need to repel invasion of the mainland is remote. Furthermore, were this to happen one would have to ask where Australia’s foreign policy and national security policy went wrong. Control of the sea-air gap and our surrounding oceans so as to deny the use of the sea to any potential aggressor is central to securing the integrity of the mainland. Sea-based forces and land-based air forces would meet this role, supported by highly mobile land forces, noting that these would be essentially the same forces that are structured for the more distant regional engagement roles, and sea control of the ocean environment.
It is not the place of a paper like this to identify the numbers and types of ships aircraft or weapons needed for the defence task. However without the means of gathering and processing intelligence, together with supporting communications and command systems, the ability to dominate the battlespace and to win will be denied. Particular emphasis is therefore required to ensure our forces have the information needed to successfully control situations short of war, and to prevail should hostilities break out. In view of our oceanic environment, space-based, land-based, and under-sea based facilities, coupled with collaborative data from allies, should form the backbone to the intelligence and information systems. This information ‘umbrella’, extending well into the oceanic environment, should provide the necessary intelligence required for exercising control of the AEEZ in peace time, in periods of tension, as well as when hostilities break out. It would also contribute towards developing confidence-building bilateral maritime links with regional countries and island states within our ocean domain.
Relevant to the communications/intelligence ‘umbrella’ is the need to continue to foster strong links with the United States so that our forces can inter-operate with US units bilaterally or in coalition with other countries. Forums established for promoting and developing inter-operability with the US (and NZ) should be central to coordinated defence planning.
The ‘Green Paper’ is considered to have major shortcomings in not addressing wider national security issues and placing defence policies in that context. This is an oversight of significance particularly when seen in the context of Australia’s relations with our near neighbours. The failure to address Australia’s Oceans Policy as an integral element of security and defence policy is a serious oversight, particularly in terms of shaping our strategic environment.
‘Sea blindness’ is a feature of the Green Paper which ignores the maritime nature of our geography: the White paper must correct this deficiency.
Australia’s ocean setting must be central to any national security strategy of which the Australian EEZ, the third largest in the world, is but a part.
Security and control of the AEEZ involving the ADF in situations short of war will be a continuing and increasing task into the future.
The many diverse UNCLOS issues which we share with the littoral and island nations of the Indian and Pacific oceans provide vehicles for promoting national security through cooperation and engagement. Australia should be pro-active and lead.
UNCLOS issues affect millions of people who are dependent on the natural resources of the sea, and unless some order is injected into the international scene the likelihood of conflict involving ocean resources seems inevitable at some stage.
Likewise Australia should be pro-active in promoting cooperation in the area of security of SLOCs recognising that the economic well-being of Australia, as well as our major trading partners is more than ever dependent on SLOCs.
Defence strategy should be a truly maritime strategy based on the concept of sea control of our ocean environment, of which the sea-air gap is but a part.
Force structure should be shaped for regional engagement involving land, sea and air based forces which are characterised by political flexibility and freedom to manoeuvre.
Deterrence, comprising missiles launched from air, submarine and surface ship platforms, should continue to be a feature of Australia’s force structure.
Invasion is remote and, although it is the most serious contingency, it would be wrong to structure force specifically for mainland defence.
Intelligence and information gathering with attendant communications and command systems is essential for enabling our forces to dominate and win. This supporting infrastructure is equally relevant to peacetime control of AEEZ, the Australian Antarctic EEZ, and as a vehicle for cooperation with nations in our region under a variety of UNCLOS projects relevant to closer regional engagement.
The value of the defence alliance with the US is vitally important to Australia across the range of activities but especially in the fields of communications and intelligence.
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MarStudies/2000/25.html