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Harry A. Kersey, Jr.[1]
In his recent Maritime Studies article discussing indigenous fishing rights in Australia, Rodney Dillon, a member of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) noted,
Other Western nations (e.g. Canada and New Zealand) have provided for the recognition of indigenous sea rights and have, to the best of my knowledge, duly compensated these people.[2]
While this brief assessment is correct, it does not tell the entire story. The Crown’s recognition of Maori fishing rights in Aotearoa/ New Zealand and the resulting compensation set in motion a very complex struggle within Maoridom that remains unresolved to this day.
The current legal and political conflict over distribution of Maori fisheries assets must be viewed in the context of a growing reaffirmation of Maori treaty rights during the last quarter century. In 1840 the British Crown and over 500 Maori chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi which is recognized as the founding document of New Zealand. For the ensuing 135 years the Crown – which in New Zealand became synonymous with a Pakeha (Caucasian) dominated government – consistently ignored Maori rights to their ‘Lands and Estates Forests and Fisheries and other properties’ as guaranteed in Article II of the Treaty.[3] Then in 1975, responding to a Maori political and cultural resurgence that resonated with the Civil Rights movement in the United States, the Third Labour government passed the Treaty of Waitangi Act establishing a quasi-judicial Waitangi Tribunal to hear contemporary and future cases arising from alleged breaches of the treaty. With Labour again in control, the act was amended in 1985 giving the Tribunal retrospective jurisdiction over cases back to 1840, which included the most egregious violations of both the letter and spirit of the Treaty.
Historically, little consideration had been given to Maori fishing rights under the Treaty. Previous statutes assumed that Maori customary usage was limited to subsistence fishing. Then the Crown passed the Fisheries Amendment Act (1986) that adopted a quota management system (QMS) as a tool to protect the nation’s rapidly dwindling marine resources. Quotas allow holders to catch the total amount of any species that might be safely caught in a quota management area (QMA) at any time; moreover, these were individually transferable quotas (ITQs) that could be reassigned by sale, lease or license, and thus were very valuable instruments. However, by this act the Crown appropriated a property right without consultation or consideration that Maori might have a prior claim under the Treaty of Waitangi.[4] A number of iwi (tribes) and the New Zealand Maori Council objected that the act violated their Treaty rights and the courts halted implementation of the quota issuing process until an accommodation could be arranged.
Two Waitangi Tribunal reports played a significant role in shaping the Maori position.[5] The Muriwhenua Fisheries Report (1988) redefined the historical nature and extent of traditional Maori fishing practices, showing they were highly sophisticated and had extended far off shore. Additionally, the Tribunal released findings from its forthcoming Ngai Tahu Fishing Report (1992) affirming that the large South Island tribe had been unjustly deprived of fishing rights off its coastline by actions of the Crown that were inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. The Tribunal eventually proposed a negotiated settlement with Ngai Tahu. The New Zealand Law Commission also published a report in 1989 supportive of Maori fishing rights.
Armed with this material Maori put together a strong team to negotiate with the Crown. It included Tipene O’Regan of Ngai Tahu, Robert Mahuta of Tainui, Matiu Rata from Muriwhenua, and Sir Graham Latimer of New Zealand Maori Council (NZMC), all of whom represented groups with litigation pending against the Crown.[6] Although initially hampered by lack of a clear mandate for their actions until a national hui (meeting) was called, the Maori team negotiated the best deal possible under the circumstances. An interim settlement act passed in 1989 assigned Maori 10 per cent of the quota – they had sought 50 per cent – plus NZ$10 million to establish a Maori fishing industry. This package came to be known as Pre-Settlement Assets (PRESA).[7] The assets were to be held by a Maori Fisheries Commission pending a plan for allocating them to the tribes. This interim agreement received court approval and allowed the QMS to be implemented. Nevertheless, many Maori remained dissatisfied with anything less than 50 per cent of the quota and felt the negotiators had abandoned their mandate. Others saw the establishment of a Maori Fisheries Commission as infringement on tribal autonomy. Because Maori did not receive the 1989 settlement enthusiastically, the Crown and Maori negotiators continued meeting to see if they could achieve a QMS that would meet both conservation requirements and the principles of the Treaty.
When the National Party returned to power in 1990 it inherited the fisheries issue. By early 1992 the possibility of moving toward the Maori goal of 50 per cent quota ownership presented itself when Sealord Products Ltd., which owned 26 per cent of the quota, came on the market. Negotiators urged the Crown to purchase the corporation for Maori, but a political decision was made to buy just half, thereby forcing Maori into a partnership with Brierleys Ltd., an international holding company headquartered in Singapore, which acquired the other half. Half of the corporation was Maori-owned, half owned by Brierleys but subject to Maori oversight. Subsequently the Japanese firm Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. secured Brierley’s interest in Sealord.
Beginning in 1990, as an interim measure the Fisheries Commission started leasing quota to the tribes at preferential or discounted rate. This was done to promote Maori participation in the fisheries industry, and so iwi organizations could realize income from the fisheries settlement until such time as allocation occurred. The iwi could either on-lease the quota to companies at market rate and make a profit, or fish the quota themselves. Since 1993-94 the quota has been apportioned on a coastline/population formula that benefited tribes with large coastlines. The leasing methodologies were substantively tested in court proceedings in 1993 and 1996 and found to be lawful.[8]
The Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act of 1992 had the Crown provide NZ$150 million to purchase half ownership in Sealord’s 26 per cent of the fisheries quota for Maori. In addition, Maori would be able to purchase 20 per cent of any new species quotas established. These became known as Post Settlement Assets (POSA).[9] The Act also established a broad-based Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission/Te Ohu Kaimoana (TWFC) to oversee the assets and formulate a plan for their eventual distribution to the tribes. With effective control of Sealord’s 26 per cent in addition to 11.5 per cent already held in PRESA, some 37.5 per cent of New Zealand fisheries quota worth approximately NZ$170 million came under Maori control. This settlement resulted from hardball political negotiations between the Crown and Maori leaders representing the iwis. But there was also a struggle within Maoridom itself over the direction to take. The Act was challenged in court and before the Waitangi Tribunal but its essential provisions were upheld. In 1993, the first 12-member Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (TWFC) board was appointed and included three members of the original Maori negotiating team – O’Regan, Mahuta, and Latimer – with O’Regan serving as Chairman.[10] Only one of the original board members was a Pakeha.
The TWFC’s most difficult issue became allocation of fishing quotas among various Maori claimants. Before introducing the 1992 fisheries Act the Crown insisted that Maori negotiators have authority to bind the Maori people – their Treaty fishing rights would be extinguished and court cases ended – and that the settlement was to be accepted for the benefit of all Maori. Accordingly, a number of hui were held at which the settlement was endorsed but not without concerns over losing access to the courts and Waitangi Tribunal to pursue tribal treaty rights on fishing. Nevertheless, the act in its final form empowered the TWFC to distribute both the pre-settlement and post-settlement assets.[11]
The TWFC determined that fisheries assets would be distributed solely to traditional tribal groups. But there was a fundamental disagreement among those iwi whose territory had extensive coastline and large inland iwi or those with small coastlines over a distribution formula. In broad terms, the former wanted distribution based solely on the amount of coastline an iwi controlled, while the latter wanted a formula based on size of population; moreover, both groups were opposed to sharing with urban Maori – although the 1992 Act stated that assets were for the benefit of all Maori. Tribes claimed the right to all fishing resources under the Treaty’s Article II guarantee of their rangatiratanga or chiefly rights. In response, a coalition of urban Maori authorities made a claim for distributive justice based on their citizenship rights guaranteed by Article III of the Treaty. They argued that limiting distribution only to iwi could not give effect to the overriding purpose of the settlement, which was to benefit all Maori, and sought in various fora to be recognized as iwi for purposes of the fisheries distribution.
As Sir Tipene O’Regan, a strong advocate of iwi Treaty rights, summarized the issue,
It’s worth bearing in mind that the whole argument for the fisheries rights that we took through the courts with such vigor and strength was entirely based on the treaty right in fisheries. It was entirely based on the Article II right to the interests in the sea in the waters offshore from your tribal coasts … the Crown has an absolute duty of protection of the Article II rights under the Treaty. And I would think that will provide fertile ground to force the Crown to realize that it cannot solve its Article III equity problems by not only condoning but legislating the theft of Article II rights to do it.[12]
In 1997 the TWFC published a Proposed Optimum Method for Allocation Consultation Document in which only those iwis recognized by the Commission received quotas and other assets.[13] Under this model the quotas for inshore species would be allocated according to the length of an iwi’s coastline; quotas for deepwater species would be allocated 60 per cent according to coastline length and 40 per cent on iwi population. Thus the model was heavily weighted in favour of coastal iwi that would receive a majority of the quotas. There was no quota allocation for urban Maori. The New Zealand courts had found that they should not be considered iwi in the meaning of the Treaty of Waitangi. An appeal taken to the Privy Council in London in 1996 was referred back to the New Zealand courts for further consideration of whether the 1992 act limited distribution solely to iwi; also, did iwi mean only traditional Maori tribes? When the New Zealand courts answered affirmatively on both counts, the Manukau Urban Maori Authority and others again appealed to the law lords. Their final appeal on this issue before the Privy Council was dismissed on 2 July 2001.[14]
From 1993-2000 the TWFC was dominated by strong Maori personalities such as O’Regan, Mahuta, and Latimer who represented competing interests in the clash between coastal and inland iwi over control of the fisheries assets. They also generally took the side of recognized iwi against urban Maori interests. At this point the TWFC controlled over 33 per cent of the New Zealand fishing industry and through astute management had amassed assets in excess of NZ$700 million – a compound growth rate of 8.8 per cent per year – but how would those assets be distributed? The 1997 allocation model adopted by the TWFC was a political bombshell and elements in Labour courted urban Maori with a promise of equitable distribution if they came to power.[15] This was a clear political recognition that over three-quarters of Maori live in urban areas.
Labour won the 1999 national election and, true to its promise, appointed a new Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission in late 2000; several staunch defenders of the pending allocation model including O’Regan and Mahuta were ousted while urban Maori received increased representation.[16] The new TWFC was charged with developing an acceptable allocation scheme by 2002 – just in time for the national elections. This was immediately challenged by the Treaty Tribes Coalition, which threatened a suit to have the 1997 allocation model immediately implemented. In April 2001 the new chairman, Shane Jones of Muriwhenua, stated his position that the TWFC should not distribute the quotas to individual iwis – rather the commission should hold most of the accumulated assets and distribute dividends instead. This would require changing the 1992 Act and provoke furious resistance from the tribes with large coastlines. The Minister of Maori Affairs, Parekura Horomia, subsequently announced that allocation of the fishing quotas to tribes remained a high priority for his office.[17] Although the recent Privy Council decision upheld the New Zealand court ruling that urban Maori are not iwi, no one believed that politically potent urban Maori would accept that as the final word in the matter – especially as New Zealand, following the lead of most Commonwealth nations, prepares to discontinue using the Privy Council as its court of last resort. Urban Maori leaders John Tamihere and Willie Jackson, both then Members of Parliament, called upon the Crown to immediately introduce legislation mandating an equitable allocation of fisheries assets among all Maori.[18]
The fisheries allocation model promised to be one of the most fractious Maori issues confronting Labour as it faced the 2002 election and threatened to split the Maori vote. However, Prime Minister Helen Clark avoided that potential pitfall when a ‘snap election’ was called for 27 July 2002. But more than the fisheries issue prompted Clark’s action. Opinion polls had shown that Labour would get well in excess of 50 per cent of the vote and more than enough seats to rule without having a coalition government. Clark’s party garnered the highest number of parliamentary seats but not enough to rule alone. With Labour safely – but narrowly – returned to power in a coalition government, the TWFC introduced its new allocation model on 14 August 2002, stating that after much deliberation and compromise the board members had accepted it unanimously. Interestingly, for the purposes of settlement the TWFC combined all Maori into 58 iwi, and its Ahu Whakamua/Report for Agreement[19] set out major points of the new model; these include:
1. All inshore Quota to be allocated to iwi through a coastline formula. Inshore Quota is defined as fishstocks at depths down to 300 meters. (Value $158.5 million)
2. All deepwater Quota to be is to be allocated to iwi through a 75 per cent iwi population, 25 per cent iwi Coastline formula. Deepwater Quota is defined as those fishstocks caught at depths greater than 300 meters. (Value $132.5 million)
3. Cash held by the Commission to be allocated as follows:
• $20.7 million to be allocated to iwi according to population.
• $2.8 million to assure that all iwi receive at least $1 million in Quota and cash from the settlement.
• $20 million to establish a Putea Trust available to urban Maori who are not affiliated with an iwi.
• $26 million to the Te Ohu Kai Moana (Maori name for the TWFC), a new organization replacing the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, for a fisheries research and development fund and transitional programs.
4. A new corporate structure called Aotearoa Fisheries Limited will be formed consolidating Sealord and other Maori owned enterprises. The corporation will issue income shares 80 per cent to iwi by population and 20 per cent to Te Ohu Kai Moana. The company will be required to pay a dividend of 40 per cent Net Profit after tax to owners of these income shares. (Value: $349.5 million)
5. Chatham Islands iwi will be allocated quota on the basis of a separate fishery for a 2000 mile zone around the Chathams. All inshore quota will be allocated to the Chathams, and all Deepwater Quota allocated 50 per cent to Chathams iwi and 50 to other iwi on a population basis.
6. Commercial Freshwater Fisheries quotas will be brought into QMAs, and a special working group will address fisheries development and new programs for Maori.
Before the document could be made public, however, a High Court injunction against release of the model brought by the Treaty Tribes Coalition had to be overturned at the urging of TWFC and the Crown. Chairman Shane Jones then announced that there would be a seven-week period during which the commissioners would meet with iwi around the country to get their input before making a final decision to implement the model’s provisions. He called for careful consideration and open debate on the proposal and no further lawsuits,
The debate is no longer between Maori and Crown, rather it has become Maori against Maori, tribe against tribe. We need as a people to make hard but overdue decisions and not run from the consequences.
However, Jones also warned that if consensus could not be achieved the Commission would ask the government to set the model into law, he hoped for 65 per cent majority support,
But the most important thing is closure … we would prefer it, if Maori could agree among themselves. If that is impossible, it could be availed through a legislative settlement.[20]
Perhaps with this in mind, draft legislation was included in the Ahu Whakamua/Report for Agreement issued for the consideration by iwi. The Minister of Maori Affairs expressed the government’s pleasure that the commission had achieved the goal of reaching an allocation model within two years time, and the time for a final report was extended until November 2002.
The immediate response of Ngai Tahu was to walk out of the first hui held to discuss the proposed model, although the iwi’s spokesman denied their delegation was trying to sabotage the meeting; they felt the main points had already been made and wanted to study the document in detail before giving a formal response, so they left the meeting. On 19 September a rival model for allocating Maori fisheries assets based on a 50/50 coastline-population formula was introduced by The Iwi Forum, a group backed heavily by Ngai Tahu, Ngati Porou, and Ngati Kahunguna and claiming support of 60.3 per cent of 78 iwi. Under the Iwi Forum plan Ngai Tahu would receive almost $100 million of fisheries assets while under Ahu Whakamua the tribe would receive $86.3 million. Rankled that the TWFC’s proposal did not give iwi direct control of their shares or allow them to sell off their shares, the Iwi Forum proposed allocating all shares in Aotearoa Fisheries Limited directly to iwi on a population basis.[21] That is directly at variance with the commission’s proposal that Te Ohu Kai Moana retain control of all shares and pay dividends to iwi.
The seven-week consultation period ended on 27 September 2002 and over 100 submissions were received. Speaking for the Iwi Forum, Harry Mikaere announced that in addition to distribution shares of Aotearoa Fisheries to iwi, his group wanted to split deepwater quota on a 50-50 coastline/population basis rather than 75-25 as recommended by the TWFC report. Shane Jones, although discounting the Iwi Forum’s claim of having majority support for its plan, announced on 12 October that the commission would meet with major South Island dissenters to see what could be worked out (both sides made exaggerated claims for the percentage of tribes supporting their positions). Nevertheless, the chairman remained adamant that the plan for allocating quota and forming Aotearoa Fisheries would go through with only minor refinements.
A major breakthrough in the impasse came when the chairman announced on 23 October that the ‘Lake Tribes’ of the interior North Island would support the settlement.[22] The two tribes were promised NZ$20 million – virtually all of the funds set aside for fisheries research and development – to develop their freshwater fisheries if they agreed to support the commission model. They did, and the commission claimed 91 per cent agreement on the plan that would be forwarded for government action. As a sop to the opposition the Fisheries Commission agreed to an iwi-initiated review of the settlement plan in 12 years.[23] This was trumpeted as a concession from the commission’s original position that there should be no review before 25 years and that to be initiated by TWFC rather that the tribes, but it was more a procedural than a substantive change. In sum, the coastal tribes appear to have won none of their major points; furthermore, some tribes seem ready to abandon the Iwi Forum and accept large cash settlements. The only chance of derailing the allocation model would be litigation which neither side claimed to want, especially after the press reported that as much as NZ$17 million had already been spent on lawyers fees over the preceding ten years.[24] The Iwi Forum announced that it would take a wait-and-see attitude and work with TWFC to revise the model. That notwithstanding, as the year 2002 ended well-known Maori attorney Donna Hall was threatening a suit on behalf of urban Maori and the NZMC, while Sir Tipene O’Regan suggested that Ngai Tahu would go to court even if they were alone in challenging the Fisheries Commission.[25]
When no report was submitted to the Crown by the end of February 2003, the Iwi Forum began to complain about delays. Fisheries Commission officials responded that the report had been held up due to various ‘legal issues.’ To further cloud the issue, early in 2003 the Waitangi Tribunal found that the Crown had violated Maori treaty rights in its plan for allocating newly created aquaculture management areas (AMAs). The government was attempting to promote a highly profitable new aquaculture farming industry, and the Maori wanted their share. The TWFC claimed that Maori should be allocated 20 per cent of any coastal aquaculture farming areas under provisions of the 1992 ‘Sealord deal.’ According to Shane Jones the settlement stipulated that Maori would receive 20 per cent of any new species under the quota system, and the aquaculture leases were tantamount a new species quota.[26] As usual, a few iwi held that 20 per cent was not enough and some even claimed 10 per cent of existing marine farms. To the extent that allocation of 20 per cent of the new aquaculture leases to Maori might come at the expense of Pakeha companies that made sizable initial investments to develop this marine industry, it threatens to become a very divisive issue. It remains to be seen if the Crown will seek to achieve a comprehensive settlement with Maori over this issue as well.
The Fisheries Commission released its revised allocation model to iwi on 7 April 2003, giving them 20 working days to study it. ‘This model has been knitted together through much discussion and hard work,’ declared Shane Jones, ‘If one stitch is undone the entire creation could unravel. Maori are too close to achieving resolution for that to occur.’[27] Two days after the proposed model was released NZMC lawyer Donna Hall announced her intention to seek an injunction preventing implementation of the allocation plan. She claimed that urban Maori would benefit little from a deal meant to benefit all Maori, to which Jones responded,
The legal situation is that the settlement was entered into between the crown and the tribes. However, in recognition of political circumstances within Maoridom, the model provides an opportunity for the growth of an urban fund.[28]
Subsequently, Jones met with NZMC chairman Sir Graham Latimer to dissuade him from filing suit. There is evidently a split on the board of NZMC over bringing suit, while the Iwi Forum seems more inclined to attack the allocation scheme when it reaches the parliamentary select committee stage. The TWFC planned to submit the latest allocation model – He Kawai Amokura – to the Fisheries Minister on 9 May. On the day prior, Donna Hall, acting on behalf of several small tribes, sub-tribes and individuals (NZMC was supportive but not a plaintiff), sought a court injunction to prevent the commission from presenting its plan to the government; the High Court in Auckland dismissed the action and urged the plaintiffs to negotiate with the Crown. However, the court did not rule out future intervention in the case. Hall stated that she would appeal all the way to the Privy Council if necessary. Nevertheless, on 9 May 2003 the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission presented to the Crown its long-awaited plan for distributing Maori fisheries assets. The government had 30 days to review the model, consider the decision making process, and see if the draft legislation included in the report is suitable. Fisheries Minister Peter Hodgson stated, ‘The Government aims to introduce legislation to Parliament in the next few months, once it has agreed on the allocation model.’[29]
On 7 June, two days before Hodgson was to submit the model to Parliament, Ngai Tahu filed a claim at the High Court in Wellington challenging the model after its representatives were unable to meet with government officials. Ngai Tahu leader Mark Solomon stated,
This is an issue that should concern all New Zealanders not just Maori. Others may be tired of the ongoing fisheries saga but it will not go away or be solved simply by the Crown choosing to ignore property rights guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi, which is the founding document of this nation.[30]
Despite this legal maneuver, Minister Hodgson accepted the proposed fisheries model and sent it forward for parliamentary action.[31] No doubt the political struggle will continue in that venue.
In Aotearoa/New Zealand the substantive legal rights of indigenous Maori people to control a fair share of maritime resources have been established through findings of the Waitangi Tribunal as well as legislation enacted by the Crown. The struggle today is primarily between iwi with large coastlines defending their perceived Treaty of Waitangi rights, and populous tribes claiming an equitable distribution of the fisheries assets accumulated during a highly profitable decade of operation. Moreover, the claims of urban Maori have been addressed – obviously not to their satisfaction, but they are prepared to compromise – by provision of a multi-million dollar development fund available to meet their needs. Although there remains a threat of litigation, allocation of assets appears more likely than at any time since 1992 – primarily because the Crown wants to see the issue resolved and Maori are generally tired of the legal wrangling and delay.
During the late 1990s, Maori fisheries became a major factor in a burgeoning New Zealand economy. A recent study prepared for state-sponsored Te Puni Kokiri (Ministry of Maori Development) argues that Maori are no longer a drag on the national economy.[32] It identifies a ‘Maori Economy’ (broadly defined as assets owned and income earned by Maori both corporately and individually) that is no longer a subset of the New Zealand economy, but rather a subset of the international economy.[33] With earnings today of some NZ$1.9 billion,
The Maori economy … is more exposed to international trade than even the most open economies in the world… This exposure is largely driven by the fishing, forestry and agriculture industries.[34]
The proposed model would create a centralized and powerful Maori fisheries corporation with significant leverage and influence in the world seafood industry. It is entirely possible that the Maori paradigm – securing legal rights to marine resources and exploiting them to achieve economic and social development – would prove equally viable for other indigenous peoples in the South Pacific. And Maori themselves should enjoy an incredible burst of renewed prosperity when their fourteen-year internecine struggle over the fisheries assets finally comes to an end.
[1] Harry Kersey is Professor of History at Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, Florida, where he specializes in American Indian and Immigration studies. In 2000 Kersey was a Fulbright Senior Scholar in New Zealand conducting research for a comparative study of indigenous sovereignty among the Maori and American Indian tribes. He returned in 2002 as a Fulbright Senior Specialist attached to the Treaty of Waitangi Research Unit at Victoria University, Wellington.
[2] R Dillon, ‘Seeing the Sea: Science, Change and Indigenous Sea Rights,’ Maritime Studies 123, March-April 2002, p. 16.
[3] C Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi, (Oxford Press, Auckland, 1987, p. 258.
[4] M Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-Determination, Oxford Press, Auckland, 1998, p. 149.
[5] Durie, op. cit., p. 153.
[6] Durie, op. cit., p. 155.
[7] Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission (TWFC), Ahu Whakamua/Summarising the Report for Agreement, August 2002, p. 2.
[8] Tangaroa, Newsletter of the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, no. 67, August 2002, p. 8.
[9] TWFC, loc. cit.
[10] Durie, op. cit., p. 161.
[11] Durie, op. cit., p. 165.
[12] Interview with Sir Tipene O’Regan, 23 May 2000, OHInt-0475/03, National Library of New Zealand, Wellington. O’Regan was knighted in 1994.
[13] TWFC, Proposed Optimum Method for Allocation of Consultation Document, TWFC, Wellington, July 1997.
[14] Privy Council Appeal No. 67 of 2000, Manukau Urban Maori Authority and Others v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries, and Privy Council Appeal No. 68 of 2000, Reuben Brian Perenara v. Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission. Judgment of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, Delivered 2 July 2001.
[15] ‘Landing the Big Fish’, Sunday Star-Times, 14 May 2000, C1-2.
[16] ‘O’Regan out as fisheries power shifts’, INL Newspapers, 23 August 2000. ‘Fresh faces on Fisheries Commission get their orders’, New Zealand Herald, 23 August 2000.
[17] ‘Minister green-lights Maori Fisheries proposal’, INL Newspapers, 9 April 2001.
[18] ‘Setback for urban Maori’, INL Newspapers, 3 July 2001.
[19] TWFC, Ahu Whakamua/Report for Agreement, TWFC, Wellington, August 2002.
[20] ‘Iwi await fisheries progress’, New Zealand Herald, 13 August 2002.
[21] ‘Tribes push for rival model of asset allocation’, New Zealand Herald, 17 September 2002.
[22] ‘Deal puts lid on bitter Maori fishery row’, New Zealand Herald, 23 October 2002.
[23] ‘Fish accord backed by 91pc of tribes’, New Zealand Herald, 21 December 2002.
[24] ‘Commission reaches $700m deal’, New Zealand Herald, 30 November 2002.
[25] Correspondence, Tipene O’Regan to Harry Kersey, 5 December 2002.
[26] ‘Sea farming in iwi sights’, New Zealand Herald, 31 March 2003.
[27] ‘Fisheries Commission sends proposal to iwi’, New Zealand Herald, 7 April 2003.
[28] ‘Maori Council plans fisheries challenge’, New Zealand Herald, 9 April 2003.
[29] ‘Fisheries report marks a remarkable day’, New Zealand Herald, 9 May 2003.
[30] ‘Ngai Tahu takes legal action against fisheries settlement’, INL Newspapers, 7 June 2003.
[31] ‘Hodgson gives nod to $700m fishery model’, New Zealand Herald, 9 June 2003.
[32] New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), Maori Economic Development/Te Ohanga Whanaketanga Maori, NZIER, Wellington, 2003.
[33] NZIER, op. cit., p. 13.
[34] NZIER, op. cit., p. 15.
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