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CMDR Sharon Daniels RANR,[1], Elizabeth Barber[2] and James Warn[3]
The measures indicating that a naval vessel is ready for a mission are currently perceived to include input and output performance indicators that relate to crew and vessel readiness. The psychological dynamics of crew behaviour, perceptions and compatibility levels on a particular vessel are ignored to a large extent in the determination of levels of mission readiness. This paper reviews the performance indicators used in the military in terms of readiness to achieve the desired outcome of mission readiness. It explores the importance of including the neglected area of crewing dynamics at a psychological level to determine the level of mission readiness, as well as the changing dynamics that impact strongly on the sustainability of mission readiness.
‘Only by using appropriate measurement tools can we determine how to improve. It is most important that we are able to measure our performance.’[4]
There is a dearth of research that specifically evaluates the contribution of naval crew and vessel readiness to mission readiness. This paper explores the current performance indicators associated with crew readiness and vessel readiness. The impact of both these readiness factors on mission readiness is then analysed. Although performance measures for vessel readiness may imply that the vessel is ready for a mission, and similarly performance measures for crew readiness may imply that the crew are ready for a mission, it does not necessarily imply that the mission readiness levels are up to the required standard. If it were possible to put this into a mathematical equation of Mission Readiness (MR) equals Crew Readiness (CR) plus Vessel Readiness(VR) then our paper would simply read: MR ≠ CR + VR. At present the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) perceives that: CR + VR = MR.
Our paper explores this contention. We concentrate on the crewing dynamics because we argue that different crewing dynamics impact not only on crew readiness but are an important consideration in developing and sustaining vessel readiness. Both forms of readiness are vital as both impact significantly on mission readiness. We assert that crewing dynamics are neglected in terms of:
• the length of time a crew member spends at sea (PERSTEMPO);
• the length of time that a vessel is operationally deployed (OPTEMPO);
• perceived psychological ownership of vessel;
• equipment;
• personal space;
• crew cohesion;
• gender balance; and
• team leadership abilities.
Consequently, this paper reviews the currently used definitions of performance indicators used in the military, particularly as there are a number of levels at which performance is measured, in terms of readiness to achieve desired outcomes. Some performance indicators that are applied to naval platforms to assess mission readiness are also discussed. The conclusions reached suggest areas for further research on naval readiness criteria, including for example, the impact that crewing readiness has on the sustainability of vessel readiness.
A performance indicator is a scale used to measure the level or degree of the results of human, program or machine action.[5],[6],[7],[8] A performance indicator typically measures outcomes of throughput. Indicators in behavioural science measure attributes of behavioural acts or processes.
Typically, total force readiness has been defined in terms of the entire military force’s ability to conduct itself in peacetime operations, under terrorist threat or in a theatre of war[9],[10],[11],[12],[13]. Total force readiness tends to fluctuate with Government levels of expenditure. For example, prior to 1997 tight budgetary constraints restricted the United States Department of Defense (DoD) and especially the readiness of the United States Navy (USN).[14]
In terms of group or collective human behaviour, a performance indicator should directly reflect the behaviour that facilitates it.[15]
Generalization of relationships among measures of team performance and mission effectiveness should, be restricted to contexts having similar core characteristics of the mission context.[16]
Crewmembers are being replaced to some extent by computer hardware and software. Operational concepts now involve exacting innovative collaboration between systems and users.[17] Hence ‘…performance should always be viewed as a result of collaboration among people in the context of tool using.’[18] Xiao and Mackenzie stress the relevance of group indicators whilst others purport the value of both individual and group performance indicators.[19],[20]
Performance indicators in industry and organisations can manifest as the number of products produced, services provided, sales made, profits and losses, or share prices and dividends.[21],[22]
A crewing environment does not readily reflect this concept of output performance. Using outputs is problematic for evaluating the performance of crews when prevalent environmental factors impinge on such outputs. Various competitive team sports enable indexation of team performance from outputs such as line honours, races won or prize money collected.
Performance measures and indicators quantify the output of the defense program for key measures associated with providing a ready force and preparing for the future.[23]
The number of illegal fishing and/or immigration vessels detained, captured, or apprehended defines the outputs for Australian maritime disciplinary and policing forces. Further investigation shows these events are subject to seasons, weather, surveillance and security information, and political and opportunistic variables. Such performance measures do not then provide reliable and valid information about crew performance levels, nor do they account for deterrent effects.
Territory captured, ships and targets destroyed, body counts and prisoners taken have been the manifestation of military effectiveness over the centuries. These tangible measures, often reported in the literature, lack credibility and validity. Such measures can be inaccurate because they are prone to intelligence and PSYOPS (psychological operations) warfare influences, or simply not fully available. Hence the military and their researchers have tended to use combat or operational readiness as a measure of effectiveness.[24],[25],[26]
Most maritime measures of crew readiness provide input measures of counts of crew-members, medical status, individual skill level, and hours of training. These tangible and quantifiable input measures are important but they do not cover the output measures. Capability and effectiveness are frequently disregarded as output measures in the research. In reality, crews conduct work-ups and undertake operational readiness evaluations (OREs), which assess their collective competencies (i.e. crew readiness). The OREs are perceived as outcome measures. They are indicative but do not provide sustainable measures of crew readiness. They do not include the improvements that are expected to occur or not occur within times of action.
There is scant research into crew readiness and its relationship to deployment length at sea. However, anecdotal trends indicate that crew readiness is dependent upon land-based and shipboard training, PERSTEMPO, morale, cohesion, and command relationships.
As a deployment wears on…bonds develop among the crew as a result of continued teamwork and group accomplishments, and…these bonds are the building blocks on which readiness is established.[27]
Deployment length and operational intensity can have negative impacts as well.
Crew behaviour is influenced by psychological factors (e.g. social identity, psychological ownership, and cohesion), and would be expected to result in differing degrees of crew performance as measured by current performance indicators. These performance indicators measure crew readiness. For example for a fleet to sail in convoy and execute manoeuvres requires collective behaviour from a number of ships’ companies to facilitate sailing in a safe formation. Hence, safely sailing a particular course in convoy without incident is an example of a Navy performance indicator.
Readiness in the military environment is multi-dimensional, and is difficult to measure objectively as, over time, the dimensions interact. A comprehensive definition of military readiness is multi-factorial and includes unit and joint readiness. Much criticism and debate have been directed to the fleet readiness level.[28],[29],[30]
For the purposes of this paper, readiness will be confined to the unit (i.e. vessel) level, which is defined as ‘The relationship between the tasks assigned to a unit and its ability to perform those tasks’[31] Readiness has been achieved when the required resources (e.g. funding, training, infrastructure, equipment, and personnel) are sufficient for the unit, the vessel and crew to produce to the standards required. Our argument is that there is more to readiness than skills training, and funding. The essential glue binding these pre-existing factors together is the commander’s ability to enable readiness to occur, through attention to people’s confidence, attitude, decisiveness, and endurance.
Failure to stand ready, results in breakdown of emotional and physical performance, which ultimately reduces mission capability.[32]
How a force develops its members’ attributes to perform missions in contingency environments is critical. Few articles have paid attention to these essential components.[33] One exception has been the research by Kenny, 1999 into personnel variables that predict naval readiness.[34] These include skill grade, time onboard, performance evaluation, time in grade, time in service, accumulated sea time, gas turbine plant experience, underway time, engineering, and ship experience. This research found that readiness measures previously used in the USN were pertinent to a particular moment in time and were not predictive of future readiness. These results were confined to the ship’s engineering departments and no conclusive evidence of the relationship between these variables and readiness was found.
Operational readiness is defined as
the probability that a given system will be available (ready for use) when demanded, where the time of demand may be some unpredictable period of emergency.[35]
USAF research was conducted to predict mission capability using mathematical modelling that included the following variables: personnel, environment, PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO, aircraft reliability and maintainability, funding, aircraft operations and logistics operations.[36],[37]
Many of these factors apply in a maritime environment. The main issues that undermine fleet readiness are shortages of personnel and lack of spare parts.[38] These issues do not however consider manning policies or the psychodynamic variables involved.
In the maritime environment a major factor in defining performance is a vessel’s readiness, which is defined as ‘the degree to which a unit is capable of performing the wartime mission(s) for which it is organised, designated or tasked.’[39] These currently used measures of vessel readiness usually focus on materiel readiness.
In addition, improved technology can monitor a ship’s materiel readiness in the ideal world where a ship is ‘high tech’ and minimum manned.[40] Maintaining readiness then becomes an expensive business and in reality
instead of readiness standards setting the rules for what resources should be made available, available resources determine actual readiness standards.[41]
Figure 1: Model of Mission Readiness
Currently, naval performance in terms of readiness translates as the degree to which personnel, units, vehicles, aircraft, ships, and weapons are ready (i.e. trained and equipped to a certain standard) to undertake a mission. Further, mission readiness is perceived to occur when the vessel and the crew are both capable of safely carrying out their purpose or objective
to a pre-determined standard. The missing elements include the synergistic effects of the crew with the vessel, OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. The interaction of crew and vessel readiness is depicted in Figure 1, and includes the crew and vessel antecedents that impact on mission readiness. Of particular importance are the dynamic influences of PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO that via crew and vessel readiness can influence levels of mission readiness.
The total unit of vessel and crew readiness needs to be considered in any evaluation
that assesses overall performance. The cumulative effects of OPTEMPO, training, leadership and other human psychological factors, have been blamed for numerous shipping accidents[42]
Castro & Adler, 1999 highlighted the importance of OPTEMPO on unit readiness.[50]
In the RAN, the staff of the Sea Training Group assesses the Minimum Level of Operational Capability (MLOC). This involves harbour training and system checks, before transiting
to sea to shake down to achieve minimum standards of safety, and work up to achieve the operational capability required.[51]
The RAN has a somewhat ‘black and white’ approach to readiness. Mission capability is perceived as either capable or incapable. Where a vessel is not mission capable in terms of vessel materiel condition, training, or crew performance, it does not deploy. The USN takes a more segmented approach to readiness. Ships are considered ready for specific tasks on a graded scale and not necessarily the complete range of maximum capability.
The contribution that human factors (i.e. crew) make to the materiel readiness of a vessel and ultimately mission readiness and safety, is therefore worthy of further research. In the context of the impact of crewing strategy, little research has been conducted on the materiel condition of a vessel. Anecdotal data
suggests that the crewing strategy can greatly impact on material readiness.[52] For example, in the multi-crewing environment, where there is a lack of psychological ownership of the vessel, poor stewardship can result in reduced concern for and care of the materiel condition of the vessel.
A comprehensive definition of military readiness is multi-factorial and includes unit and joint readiness. Mission readiness, is a combination of vessel capability and crew readiness. The contribution that human factors make to the materiel readiness of a vessel and ultimately mission readiness and safety are therefore of great importance.
Unfortunately, little can be concluded from the current use of performance indicators based predominantly on inputs and nebulous outcomes. Consequently, navies around the world universally rely on the definition of readiness as defined by Crane in 1984.[53] Little did this Masters student realise how important his work was to become. It is limited to crew readiness as a more definitive measure of team performance, rather than vessel or mission readiness.
Ships that are not fully mission capable are less useful in war and pose safety concerns. Anything that diminishes a ship’s capabilities may keep it from completing routine missions or may require costly repairs.[54]
Beland and Quester claim that the human factors that contribute to vessel readiness (performance indicator) are experience and skill of the mariners themselves. Given that the materiel condition of ships (i.e. vessel readiness) is influenced by the experience of crew members with the vessel and crewing configuration, it is posited that crewing strategies would also influence vessel readiness, depending on the crew’s length of time together and time onboard. How the crew develops as an effective team, and how they gain experience with the vessel will impact on the materiel condition of the vessel and its capability.
Two other pieces of research provide support for this notion. Firstly, familiarity with each other in an air traffic control crew engenders cohesion, supportive helping behaviours and increased performance.[55] Secondly, crews on large oil tankers wanted to spend more time with the one vessel, rather than be rotated from vessel to vessel, to enhance job satisfaction with ship’s husbandry and maintenance.[56]Together these two findings give some support the notion that a single crewing strategy for vessels might increase vessel readiness and therefore mission capability.
Factors contributing to crew readiness (i.e. degree of manning in terms of under- or over- configuration requirements on Australian maritime vessels) require consideration. This type of performance indicator, even though appropriate for measuring degree of vessel readiness across different classes of vessels, fails to consider the age of the vessel, its life stage, mission and operational limitations.
It is therefore posited that crewing strategies would also improve vessel readiness, depending on the crew’s length of time together and time onboard. Likewise, in terms of vessel readiness, high crewmember turnover and lack of experience together and lack of experience at rank levels will adversely affect vessel readiness. Thus having considered the performance indicators that can impact directly and indirectly on mission readiness it is concluded that the human factors should be given more prominence.
[1] HMAS Cairns, email sharon@cairns.net.au.
[2] School of Business, University of NSW at the Australian Defence Force Academy, email e.barber@adfa.edu.au.
[3] School of Business, University of NSW at the Australian Defence Force Academy, email j.warn@adfa.edu.au.
[4] DJ Shackleton, VADM Chief of Navy’s Intent, (October 2000). Retrieved 23 September 2003, from http://www.navy.gov.au/reserves/reserveNews/Reserve_News_October_2000_Vol7_No9.pdf.
[5] AUSAID, ‘Evaluation of Australian Government funded NGO projects in Africa’, Quality Assurance Series, no. 25, 2000, 92 pp.
[6] LR Elliott, SG Schiflett & MA Dalrymple, Modeling the decision making process and performance of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) weapons directors. Paper presented at the Symposium on Collaborative Crew Performance in Complex Operational Systems, Edinburgh, UK. 1998, 13 pp.
[7] WF Associates. Metrics, 2003. Retrieved 1 February 2004, from http://www.wfassociates.com.au/docs/ met1_a_ch1.htm.
[8] TJ Williamson & AE Delsante, ‘The issues associated with residential energy performance assessment tools to be used in evaluating alternative solutions’, Report for the Department of Building Codes Board. No. BCE Doc 02/027, Adelaide, Australia, 2002, 49 pp.
[9] R Anderson & S Stienlieb, Issues Related to DOD’s Difficulty in Correcting Unified Commanders Readiness Deficiencies. Paper presented at the 70th Military Operations Research Society, Fort Leavenworth, June 2002.
[10] CA Castro, & AB Adler, ‘OPTEMPO: Effects on soldier and unit readiness’, Parameters, vol. 29, no. 3, 1999, pp. 86-95.
[11] K Green, ‘What the best damn Navy in the world is for: Defending America’s interests’, Vital Speeches of the Day, vol. 63, no. 19, 1997, pp. 585-588.
[12] AW Johnson, SA Oliver, ED White & MA Arostegui, Forecasting Readiness: A Regression Analysis. Paper presented at the 70th Military Operations Research Society, Fort Leavenworth, June 2002.
[13] ME Vinson, ‘Structuring the army for full-spectrum readiness’, Parameters, vol. 30, no. 2, 2000, pp. 19-32.
[14] SC Truver, ‘Fleet review, budget squeeze blurs the long-range vision’, Jane’s Navy International, vol. 101, no. 5, 1996, pp. 28-37.
[15] LS Ginsburg, ‘Factors that influence line managers’ perceptions of hospital performance data’, Health Services Research (Feb. 2003).
[16] Elliott et al., op. cit., p. 4.
[17] SS Kirschenbaum, Evaluating concepts of operation for team/system collaboration. Paper presented at the Symposium on Collaborative Crew Performance in Complex Operational Systems, Edinburgh, UK, 1998, 9 pp.
[18] Y Xiao & CF Mackenzie, Collaboration in complex medical systems. Paper presented at the Symposium on Collaborative Crew Performance in Complex Operational Systems, Edinburgh, UK, 1998, p. 5.
[19] A Felstead, Multi-crew workload issues onboard the Nimrod MR2 and Nimrod MRA4. Paper presented at the Symposium on Collaborative Crew Performance in Complex Operational Systems, Edinburgh, UK, 1998, 9 pp.
[20] RE King, JD Callister & PD Retzlaff, Assessing operators’ potential for collaboration in complex systems. Paper presented at the Symposium on Collaborative Crew Performance in Complex Operational Systems, Edinburgh, UK. 1998, 3 pp.
[21] DL Gladstein, ‘Groups in context: A model of task group effectiveness’, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 29, 1984, pp. 499-517.
[22] SA Kirkpatrick & EA Locke, ‘Direct and indirect effects of three core charismatic leadership components on performance and attitudes’, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 81 no. 1, 1996, pp. 36-51.
[23] W Cohen, Annual report to the President and the Congress (Appendix J), Washington, Department of Defense, 1999, p. 4.
[24] J Griffith, COL, ‘Multilevel analysis of cohesion’s relation to stress, well-being, identification, disintegration, and perceived combat readiness’, Military Psychology, vol. 14, no. 3, 2002, pp. 217-239.
[25] SA Oliver, AW Johnson, ED White & MA Arostegui, ‘Forecasting Readiness’, Air Force Journal of Logistics, vol. 25, no. 3, 2001, pp. 1-40.
[26] B Shamir, E Brainin, E Zakay & M Popper. ‘Perceived combat readiness as collective efficacy: Individual- and group-level analysis’, Military Psychology, vol. 12, no. 2, 2000, pp. 105-119.
[27] RG Backhaus, ‘We can be ready in peacetime’, United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, vol. 127, no. 7, 2001, p. 2.
[28] L Troshinsky, ‘Corps says V-22 readiness confusion caused by using one system for OPEVAL, another for press’, Navy News & Undersea Technology, vol. 18, no. 6, 2001, p. 1.
[29] L Troshinsky, ‘Force protection, non-deployed readiness lacking in age of terrorism’, Navy News & Undersea Technology, vol. 19, no. 5, 2002, p.1.
[30] SC Truver, ‘The US Navy in Review’, United States Naval Institute, Proceedings, vol. 127, no. 5, 2001, pp. 78-85.
[31] C Dahlman & D Thaler, ‘Ready for war but not for peace: The apparent paradox of military readiness’, in Z Khalidzad & T Shapiro (eds), Strategic Appraisal: United States Air and Space Power in the 21st Century, Rand Corporation, 2002, p. 445.
[32] DA Furst, MAJ, ‘Readiness: A commander’s responsibility’, Air Force Journal of Logistics, vol. 36, no.2, 2002, p. 15.
[33] Washington Consulting Group, Individual and family readiness for separation and deployment: Results from the 1992 DoD surveys of officers and enlisted personnel and military spouses, DMDC Report No 97-003, Washington, 1997.
[34] JM Kenny, Predicting naval readiness based on personnel variables. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Pennsylvania State University, 1999.
[35] JJ Coleman, & IJ Abrams, ‘Mathematical model for operational readiness’, Operations Research, vol. 10, no. 1, 1962, p. 126.
[36] Oliver et al., op. cit.
[37] J Garamone, ‘Optempo, Perstempo: What they mean’, American Forces Information Service, 1999. Retrieved January 27, 2004, from http://www.defenselink.mil/ news/Aug1999/n08181999_9908181.html.
[38] S Foote, ‘Navy operations pose challenge to fleet readiness’, Defence Daily, vol. 202, no. 16, 1999, p. 1.
[39] JR Crane, Ship Readiness and Personnel Attributes in (DD 963) Spruance Class Ships. Unpublished Masters Dissertation, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1984, p. 7.
[40] S Ray, S Garing & R Strebel, PRO/A, ‘An intelligent associate for maintaining platform readiness with reduced manning’, Ship Control Systems Symposium, Proceedings, vol. 1, 1997, pp. 611-625.
[41] Dahlman & Thaler, 2002, p. 475.
[42] ABC Online, Cargo ship runs aground in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef, 2002. Retrieved 17 November 2002 from http://abc.net.au/cgi-bin/common/print friendly.p1?http://abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s634371.htm.
[43] BBC1, Inquiry into warship accident, 2002. Retrieved 17 November 2002 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ world/asia-pacific/2115229. stm.
[44] L Brandon, Master Sgt. ‘Optempo tied to helicopter crash’, Airman, vol. 43, no. 5, 1999, p. 12.
[45] R Guthrie, 2001, The Story of the S-51 Accident. Retrieved 17 November 2001 from http://www. geocities.com/Heartland/7282/story.htm.
[46] S Hook, Fire on board the small passenger Vessel Seastreak New York, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C. 2002, pp. 1-34.
[47] National Transportation Safety Board, Fire on Board the Small Passenger Vessel Seastreak, 2001, http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/ 2002/MAR0204.htm
[48] G Regan, The Guinness Book of Naval Blunders, Guinness Publishing Ltd., Great Britain, 1994.
[49] R Scott, ‘Naval Forces, Accident Inquiry Points to ADI and the RAN’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, vol. 31 no. 6, 1999, p. 63.
[50] Castro & Adler, op. cit.
[51] Australian Maritime Doctrine, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2000, p. 78.
[52] S Daniels, LCDR, Human Aspects of Alternative Crewing Strategies for the Replacement Patrol Boats: A Psychological Study: Patrol Boat Force Element Group Discussion Paper, Royal Australian Navy, 2001, pp. 1-43.
[53] Crane, op. cit.
[54] RW Beland & AO Quester, ‘The effects of manning and crew stability on the material condition of ships’, Interfaces, vol. 21 no. 4, 1991, p. 112.
[55] E Smith-Jentsch, K Kraiger, J Cannon-Bowers & E Salas, Familiarity breeds teamwork: A case for teammate-specific competencies. Naval Air Warfare, Center Training Systems Division, Orlando, FL. Unpublished manuscript, 2001.
[56] RL Helmreich, JA Wilhelm & TE Runge, Motivation, Organization and Satisfaction Aboard Ship. Paper presented at the Seventh Annual Maritime Industry Symposium, California Maritime Academy, Vallejo, California, 1981.
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