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Richardson, Michael --- "The Threats of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia" [2004] MarStudies 31; (2004) 139 Maritime Studies 18

• The Threats of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia

The Threats of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Michael Richardson^[1]

Where do piracy and terrorism intersect, if at all? Southeast Asia is a good place to consider this question because pirate attacks on ships and terrorist activities are serious security problems in the region. Although both pre-date Al-Qaeda’s devastating strike on the United States in September 2001, their existence has become the focus of much greater concern since then. The US and Singapore fear that terrorists could seize control of an oil, gas, chemical or ammonium nitrate tanker and use it as a mass casualty weapon in a maritime version of the 9/11 attacks.

Over a quarter of the world’s trade and half its oil go through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. These two adjacent straits are the shortest route for most shipping between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The waterway is about 960-kilometres (600 miles) long but the two-way shipping channel narrows to not much more than one kilometre wide in several places and could be closed, at least temporarily, to ships in an accident or terrorist strike.

Malaysia and Singapore line one side of the Malacca and Singapore straits. Indonesia is on the other side. As an international waterway, the straits are open to free transit by the world’s shipping. But much of the straits are narrower than 24 nautical miles and thus fall within the territorial waters of the three coastal states. Divided and jealously guarded jurisdiction enables pirates based in Indonesia to strike in Malaysian or Singaporean waters and cross back into Indonesian waters without fear of hot pursuit.

Annually, over 50,000 vessels involved in international trade, or an average of about 140 a day, transit the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the traffic is growing. Many of these ships carry inflammable, explosive, toxic or polluting cargoes that could be of interest to terrorists. This worries shipping companies, seafarers and regional governments, including China, Japan and South Korea, that depend on unhindered passage and safe navigation through these shallow and increasingly congested chokepoints for most of their seaborne trade, including their vital oil imports. It also worries the US which sends warships, including aircraft carriers, from its Pacific Fleet through the straits to reinforce its military presence in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf – the source of most of the world’s exportable oil. Canada, too, deploys its navy to the Gulf through the Malacca and Singapore straits.

Attacks on ships and their crews by pirates are also a concern. Of course, the problem of piracy is not new. It has a history in Southeast Asia that stretches back centuries. What distinguishes piracy past and present is that the contemporary skull and crossbone operators can, and increasingly do, exploit modern technology and weapons to attack seagoing vessels in a way that serves as a signpost for terrorists.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in London, which is part of the International Chamber of Commerce based in Paris, compiles statistics on incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships around the world. In fact, very few are acts of piracy which, under international law, is treated as a universal crime that only occurs on the high seas beyond any state’s territorial waters and can therefore be suppressed by any state or military power. Some officials and analysts, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, claim that redefining maritime crime in the Malacca Strait as piracy is intended to undermine their sovereignty and jurisdiction, and pave the way for outside maritime powers to impose their will on coastal states and enforce new rules in straits used for international navigation.

A substantial number of incidents reported to the IMB involve thefts from ships when they are underway but close to land, or in port, either tied up at dockside or anchored in a harbour. The value of goods and money stolen is seldom more than a few tens of thousands of US dollars and is often much less. Most other crimes against ships and crews – including theft of cargo, the hijacking of vessels and seizure and ransoming of crew – also occur within national jurisdiction, meaning within a country’s internal waters, territorial sea or archipelagic waters.

But this is not to minimise the seriousness of the problem and since the crimes are generally referred to in the media and elsewhere as piracy, I will continue to use the word. Indeed, many crimes against ships and their crew, even some of the more serious ones, almost certainly go unreported because captains, owners and operators want to avoid costly delays in port while investigations are carried out. They also want to avoid higher premiums that may be imposed by their insurers.

The IMB, which operates a Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, reported last February that the number of attacks worldwide in 2004 was 325, down from the 445 recorded in 2003, but well over three times the 90 cases reported a decade earlier in 1994 when there were no fatalities. Today, assaults are becoming more violent. A total of 30 crew members were killed worldwide in 2004, up from 21 the year before.

Many of the most serious attacks are in Southeast Asia. The IMB, shipping industry and law enforcement sources confirm some disturbing trends that have intensified in the region this year. Those preying on shipping are becoming better armed and organised. They sometimes have satellite phones and can eavesdrop on the communications of ships they are targeting. Automatic assault rifles, like the M-16 and AK-47, are commonly carried and fired. Rocket-propelled grenades and hand grenades have reportedly been brandished in several attacks this year.

Indonesian waters are the scene of more attacks than anywhere else. Last year, 93 incidents were reported. While this is less than the 121 in 2003, it still accounts for over a quarter of the global tally. Another 37 attacks took place in the Malacca and Singapore straits. The hijacking of vessels – mainly slow-moving tugs, barges and small tankers with low freeboards that are relatively easy to board while underway – and the kidnapping of their officers and crew for ransom, are on the rise.

More alarming still, Southeast Asian pirates in the past few weeks have turned their attention to much bigger prey. At the end of March, they boarded a 26,000-tonne Japanese-owned bulk carrier in the Malacca Strait off Port Klang, Malaysia, held the master and crew at gunpoint, took all the cash from the vessel’s safe and then fled. On 8 April in the Singapore Strait, pirates tried, unsuccessfully, to board a China-owned bulk carrier of just over 38,000 tonnes. Just three days earlier, on 5 April, in the same area, the Japanese-owned tanker Yohteisan – a leviathan of almost 150,000 tonnes laden with 2 million barrels of oil – reported an attempted boarding to the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur. In the midst of a heavy rainstorm and poor visibility in the late afternoon, the captain of the Yohteisan, a Very Large Crude Carrier or VLCC, said that he had been surrounded by seven small craft that looked like fishing boats and that people from them had tried to board the tanker at its stern. They were prevented from getting onto the vessel when the captain increased its speed.

Where do the Southeast Asian pirates come from, who may be behind them and why are their activities so difficult to stop? The waters in and around the Malacca and Singapore straits are an ideal hunting ground for maritime criminals. There are plenty of tempting, easy-to-strike targets. At least until recently, the risk of being caught has been low, especially in Indonesia where law enforcement agencies are chronically under-resourced and sometimes corrupt. The maritime borders between Indonesia and Malaysia, the two largest states that line the waterway are porous and criss-crossed regularly by fishing vessels and other small craft. The Indonesian side of the straits is a maze of jungle-clad islands, mangrove swamps and river inlets that provide ideal hiding places for criminals using fast small craft.

Some alleged pirates have been captured and prosecuted in Malaysia and Indonesia. For example, Malaysian marine police said last month they had arrested seven Indonesians from the Riau islands who were suspected of carrying out a series of attacks on vessels in various parts of the straits, including Malaysian waters. In March, Malaysian police detained four Thais and a Malaysian whose fishing vessel was thought to be one of three that earlier in the month had seized a Japanese tugboat as it towed a barge through the Malaysian side of the Malacca strait and kidnapped the Japanese skipper and chief engineer and a Filipino third engineer. The three hostages were released unharmed in southern Thailand six days after they were taken captive. The Japanese company that owned the tugboat said that the total bill for freeing the hostages, travel costs and compensation for failing to deliver the barge as contracted, amounted to about $US480,000. Shipowners often pay ransom amounting to tens of thousands of dollars to recover their captured crew members.

But nearly all those arrested for piracy in Southeast Asia in recent years appear to be footsoldiers, not masterminds. The former may be unemployed seamen, fishermen, villagers or military personnel wanting to supplement their meagre incomes. But behind some of the pirates who hijack ships and cargo and ransom crew are said to be well-organised crime syndicates.

What is being done to improve security in the Malacca and Singapore straits and what are the prospects for more effective international cooperation to curb piracy and deter a terrorist attack on shipping or sea lanes?

In July 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore launched what they described as coordinated patrols of their respective sections of the Malacca and Singapore straits. Indonesia allocated seven naval vessels and Malaysia and Singapore five each for a total of 17 warships. A hotline linking the three naval command centres on Batam island, Indonesia, Lumut in Malaysia and Changi in Singapore was set up and merchant vessels were reportedly given the radio frequencies used by patrolling naval vessels so that they could call directly for help.

However, the coordinated surveillance does not seem to have reduced the reported levels of maritime crime in the area. The IMB recorded 37 attacks in the straits in 2004, despite the intensified operations of the three navies in the second half of the year. About a dozen attacks have been recorded in the first four months of 2005 – about the same rate as last year. One result of this lack of security has been the emergence this year of a number of private companies, some of them based in Singapore, that offer armed security escorts through the straits for vessels fearing pirate attacks.

Because of concerns about protecting national sovereignty, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore stopped short of mounting joint patrols in each others’ waters or permitting the right of hot pursuit of suspect craft across the maritime boundary of one country into the waters of another. Still, Indonesia has not ruled out the future formation of a joint naval patrol force with Malaysia and Singapore.

The coordinated patrolling was the region’s response to increasing pressure from outside users of the straits for more effective action to safeguard security in the vital waterway. There have been several further developments that suggest there is now a better consensus among the three littoral states about how to improve security in the Malacca and Singapore straits and how to involve major users and international agencies in this process. One was the conclusion in Tokyo last November of the ReCAAP, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. Significantly, it was endorsed not just by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the other seven members of ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations), but also by six other Asian countries – China, Japan, South Korea, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The aim of the accord is to enhance the capabilities of participants to combat piracy.

Singapore, Japan, Laos and Cambodia became the first four states to formally adhere to the agreement. They did so on 28 April. Once six more of the participating states sign, the ReCAAP, which is a Japanese initiative, will enter into force and a new Information Sharing Centre will be set up in Singapore run by an executive director with a staff of up to a dozen from member countries. The centre will facilitate rapid communication and information exchanges between the member countries. It is also designed to improve the quality of statistics and reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region.

Cooperation between the three coastal states and major user states could be further enhanced when they meet at a high level for the first time in September in Jakarta at a conference on improving security in the Malacca and Singapore straits to be co-hosted by Indonesia and the International Maritime Organisation, the United Nations agency responsible for safety of shipping at sea.

What does the continuing spate of pirate attacks in Southeast Asian waters portend? It shows, of course, that it is relatively easy for armed raiders to take control of merchant ships, particularly smaller ones, when the ships are unarmed and there are no friendly naval, coast guard or police vessels close enough to protect them. The pirates are becoming bolder. They are now turning their attention to much bigger ships. While there is no indication that terrorists might team up with pirates, the deputy commander of the US Coast Guard, Vice-Admiral Terry Cross, said on a recent visit to Malaysia that ‘the pirates might be showing the terrorists where opportunities exist.’

Piracy itself a menace to shipping and safe navigation. Even when pirates board just to steal, they sometimes leave the crew tied up or locked in cabins while they make their escape. The vessel will continue on its way with the bridge unattended until one or more crew members can break free. Meanwhile, there is a serious risk of collision or grounding in the narrow and crowded shipping channels of the Malacca and Singapore straits. And it is often impossible for law enforcement agencies to know whether a ship has been seized by pirates or terrorists.

How could terrorists take control of a ship? Would they collaborate with pirates or criminal gangs involved in the robbery or hijacking of vessels? I think it is more likely that the Al-Qaida network would use its own ships, or its own agents to take control of a vessel, for a major maritime terrorist attack. This would give the organisation better control over any operation. Otherwise it would have to rely on people from outside its circle of zealots, whom it might not be able to trust. Moreover, for pirates, and any criminal syndicates behind them, a serious terrorist attack would be bad for business-as-usual because it would almost certainly lead to a crackdown that would make future maritime crime more difficult.

^[1] Michael Richardson is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies in Singapore. This paper was presented at the ‘Maritime Security Challenges in the Asia Pacific Region in the Post-9/11 Era’ held in Victoria, BC, Canada, 6-7 May 2005.