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The rather pedestrian title veils a rather frightening view of what the author believes drives Japanese defence policy makers both conceptually and strategically. Graham argues that ‘the sea lane issue demonstrates long-term continuity in Japan’s strategic geography’ that ‘transcends its “experiment in constitutional pacifism”.’ Indeed he paints a picture of a Japan led by decision-makers who perennially perceive Japan as a resource-poor island surrounded by a hostile international environment and therefore dependent on the sea not only for its prosperity but for its very survival. In this context, perhaps the book’s subtitle ‘A Matter of Life and Death?’ is more appropriate.
What is frightening is that this is the type of thinking that generated the infamous Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere strategy and its horrific consequences. And if the author’s analysis is correct, Japan, ‘unleashed by a fading alliance with the US’ could well attempt to expand its military (principally naval) influence all along what it perceives to be its vital sea lanes in Asia. This would in turn put it in direct competition and perhaps inevitable conflict with a China that is building a blue-water navy for the same purpose, as well as with indigenous states that have not forgotten their treatment during Japan’s last adventure in Asia.
A question not explicitly answered by the book is which of Japan’s sea lane security policies are meant to further this goal as opposed to being contrived to justify contentious aspects of Japan’s assertive changes in its defence posture and in Japan-US alliance policies. The author argues that the two are inextricably linked and that the latter (and thus to a degree, the former) has been heavily influenced by navy to navy links with the United States. I would add that Japan’s slow but steady expansion of its naval capacity and geographic coverage – from protecting sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles, to willingness to logistically support the US Navy in the event of trouble in the Taiwan Strait, to providing refuelling and intelligence support for the US Navy in the Iraq war, to offering assistance in anti-piracy efforts in Southeast Asia – may also be a hedge against a day when Japan may have to face an assertive China in maritime Asia more or less on its own.
This book is based on the author’s dissertation at Australian National University and is written like one. It is methodical and well documented but rather turgid. It is divided into nine chapters, each with a convenient conclusion, and a concluding chapter that summarises the foregoing and tries to tie it all together.
Specifically the book addresses two questions:
• ‘How has Japan’s vulnerability to the disruption of its sea lanes defined its perceived security imperatives and choices in defence and alliance policy since 1940, particularly in terms of decision-makers’ responses to changing strategic circumstances?’ and
• ‘How has Japan’s vulnerability to SLOC disruption been used instrumentally, as a rationale to legitimise politically or constitutionally problematic military activities in the post-war period?’
The author concludes ‘that the strategic imperative of SLOC security has remained essentially consistent over time for Japan despite its shifting threat perceptions. However, material strategic calculations alone are insufficient to explain policy responses linked with sea lane security in the post-war period. Political advantages associated with the instrumental use of SLOC security has led decision makers at various levels, in both Japan and the United States, to employ such concerns to justify contentious aspects of defence and alliance policy.’
Chapters 1 and 2 provide the empirical and contextual setting for the following six chronologically-organised chapters that follow. These explore Japan’s sea lane security pre-1945 (Chapter 3), 1945-1977 (Chapter 4), and the late Cold-War period from the late 1970s to 1990 (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 analyses Japan’s sea lane diplomacy in Southeast Asia from the early 1970s to 2004. Chapters 7 and 8 focus on Japan’s security and defence policy in the post Cold-War era, including an examination of Japan’s perceived security threats to its sea lanes including piracy and terrorism as well as its concerns regarding China.
In more detail, chapter 1 profiles Japan’s import dependence. Chapter 2 defines the concept of sea lanes in classical theories of sea power. Chapter 3 explains how Japan’s opening in the mid-1800s and rapid industrialisation led to dependence on maritime transportation. Chapter 4 explores Japan’s sea lane security from 1945 to 1977 through defeat, occupation, and the Cold War, and their effect on its government’s approach to security. Chapter 5 examines the decision-making process that elevated sea lanes in Japan’s defence policy making and in its alliance with the United States. Moreover it traces the use of sea lane defence as an argument to strengthen the alliance and as justification for modernising the SDF, as well as the expansion of its geographic defence ‘boundaries’. Chapter 6 reviews and examines the effectiveness of Japan’s diplomatic efforts to maintain the security of the sea lanes. Chapter 7 evaluates the evolution of Japan’s sea lane security since the collapse of the Soviet Union ended its main raison d’etre.
Chapter 8 focuses on Japan’s perception of its potential contemporary military threats, particularly that of China and North Korea. It argues that Japan’s fear of China’s rise and expanded geographic influence has underscored the continuing necessity of sea lane defence and prompted the geographic and functional expansion of its military capabilities. Such exaggerated fears could prompt dangerous moves by Japan in the ongoing confrontation with China in the East China Sea. Indeed,
according to Graham the primary motivation for Japan’s defence policy is essentially fear – fear of isolation from its resources, either through competition or the maritime hostility of a competing power.
This leads to the question of whither Japanese security policy? Could this primordial fear eventually lead to Japanese military assertiveness? Unfortunately the book ends just where this important question arises. The ending paragraphs do offer the author’s glimpse of possible future Japanese actions. For example he postulates that the ‘logistical difficulties of sustaining long-range operational deployments could prompt diplomatic efforts to secure staging arrangements in Southeast Asia’ like those of United States. He also projects a more active role for Japan in the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative – actions which could trigger a violent response from North Korea or China. The author also suggests that Japan’s ‘sealane defense could be revived as a rationale to expand Tokyo’s territorially defined defense interests along a vast maritime arc linking Japan via Southeast Asia, to the Gulf’.
This is clearly a book for realists and believers in the classical role of seapower. Japan may be a special case in this regard. However I would have liked to have seen included an analysis of the possible institutional and other systemic constraints on the worst scenario. These might include the reactive strategies and policies of China, India and Southeast Asian states, as well as the attitudes and actions of Japan’s domestic polity and the effects of changing energy and military technologies.
Mark Valencia[1]
[1] Mark Valencia is a maritime security specialist based in Hawaii. A slightly different version of this review was first published in the Far Eastern Economic Review. It is republished with the permission of the author.
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MarStudies/2006/15.html