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Increased levels of compensation became available for victims of oil pollution from oil tanker accidents on 3 March 2005 with the entry into force of the 2003 Protocol establishing an International Oil Pollution Compensation Supplementary Fund.
The Fund supplements the compensation available under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC) and the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND), with an additional, third tier of compensation. Participation is optional and is open to all States which are parties to the 1992 Fund Convention.
The total amount of compensation payable for any one incident is limited to a combined total of 750 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR) (just over US$1,145 million) including the amount of compensation paid under the existing 1992 CLC/Fund Convention.
With the entry into force of the 2003 Protocol, IMO has substantially enhanced the compensation available under the 1992 Convention.
It is expected that the increased compensation should put an end to the practice of pro-rating of payment of claims, which, although it has been unavoidable, has led to criticisms of the 1992 Convention.
The 2003 Protocol will apply to damage in the territory, including the territorial sea and the Exclusive Economic Zone of a Contracting State.
Annual contributions to the Fund will be made in respect of each Contracting State by any person who, in any calendar year, has received total quantities of oil exceeding 150,000 tons. However, for the purposes of the 2003 Protocol, there is a minimum aggregate receipt of 1,000,000 tons of contributing oil in each Contracting State.
The Assembly of the Supplementary Fund will assess the level of contributions based on estimates of expenditure (including administrative costs and payments to be made under the Fund as a result of claims) and income (including surplus funds from previous years, annual contributions and any other income).
The 2003 Protocol currently has nine Contracting States. The entry into force requirements were ratification by at least eight States who have received a combined total of 450 million tons of contributing oil.
IOPC Funds website: www.iopcfunds.org
Courtesy IMO News, no. 1, 2005
A seminar on maritime security measures for non-SOLAS vessels was convened at IMO Headquarters in May 2005 by the Japan International Transport Institute. The purpose of the seminar was to help place issues in sharper focus and enable moves towards a common approach to them.
As comprehensive and far reaching as they are, the maritime security measures adopted by IMO in 2002 apply formally to only one sector, albeit an extremely broad one, of the wider maritime community. Because they were adopted as amendments to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, by definition they apply only to ships that come under the auspices of that convention – essentially passenger ships, cargo ships of 500 gross tons and above that are engaged in international trade, and mobile offshore drilling units.
Although this means that nearly 100 per cent of the world’s international merchant fleet is covered, Governments attending the 2002 Conference were very well aware, at the time of adopting the new measures, that the hundreds of thousands of vessels all over the world that are not covered by the SOLAS Convention nonetheless had the potential to pose a significant security threat. At the same time, therefore, the Conference adopted a resolution encouraging Governments to tackle the problem, and it was in that context that this meeting was held.
In his opening address to the meeting, IMO Secretary-General Efthimios E. Mitropoulos referred to the host of different factors that combine to make establishing effective security measures for non-SOLAS shipping a difficult and complex challenge. The immense diversity of the sector in terms of vessel ownership, different vessel types with a multitude of specific or general purposes, in terms of trading patterns and port facilities used, often compounded by the absence of a formal structure of registration and inspection, suggests that a solution that works in one part of the world may not necessarily meet the requirements of another.
He said, ‘The threat of terrorism is not receding. Moreover, we, in the world of shipping, have to consider issues that reach far beyond the immediate consequences of any terrorist attack, however horrific they may be. We have already taken great steps, under the auspices of the SOLAS Convention, towards addressing the question of security for international shipping and are expanding our work to also cover shipping lanes of strategic significance and importance, such as the Malacca Strait. But even a small ship, used strategically and in the right location, at the right time, could have a major disruptive effect on human life, the environment and local, regional and even international trade – so, finding ways to tackle successfully the security question for non-SOLAS shipping is not just a desirable addition to the work already undertaken, it is a vital and necessary component of it.’
Courtesy IMO News, no. 2, 2005
The United States has signed two new agreements to combat terrorism and crime in international waters and to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
The US ambassador to the United Kingdom, Robert Holmes Tuttle, signed on behalf of the United States two treaties augmenting the UN Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), according to a State Department announcement on 17 February 2006.
The new agreements, negotiated over a three-year period, will create a new international framework for boarding vessels and for interdiction of dangerous individuals and deadly cargos. The United States is urging other SUA parties to sign and ratify the two new protocols as soon as possible.
SUA originally was adopted in response to the 1985 terrorist hijacking of the Italian-flag cruise ship Achille Lauro, which resulted in the murder of a disabled American passenger.
In the wake of 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States has led an effort in the International Maritime Organization to strengthen further existing agreements as part of the global effort against terrorism.
The State Department said that the new agreements will strengthen international cooperation against the use of ships to undertake criminal activities or terrorist attacks, transport terrorists or smuggle WMD or related cargo.
The following is the text of the State Department announcement:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
February 17, 2006
MEDIA NOTE
U.S. Signs the Protocols to the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)
Today, Ambassador to the United Kingdom Robert Holmes Tuttle signed on behalf of the United States two treaties amending the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) and its related protocol on Fixed Platforms. After September 11, the international community, recognizing the urgent need for a more effective international regime to combat maritime terrorism, asked the United States to lead the effort to update the SUA Convention and Fixed Platform Protocol. These treaties were originally adopted in response to the 1985 hijacking of the Italian-flag cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of an American passenger.
After more than three years of intensive negotiations in the International Maritime Organization, parties adopted the new Protocols establishing important new international terrorist crimes and significantly strengthening our tools to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The treaties create an international criminal framework for combating, on the high seas, the use of a ship to undertake a terrorist attack or to transport terrorists or cargo intended for use in weapons of mass destruction programs. They also create a new international framework for boarding ships carrying items of proliferation concern and for interdiction of the items.
The new Protocols, when they enter into force, will add to the 12 already existing U.N. counterterrorism conventions and will be an important tool in the worldwide fight against terrorism and proliferation.
We strongly encourage all Parties to the SUA to sign and ratify the two new Protocols as quickly as possible.
In a significant development, January 2006 witnessed two important events for the Indian Navy. At the operational level, the Indian Navy commissioned its UAV Squadron, Indian Naval Air Squadron (INAS) 342 comprising 12 Israeli-built Herons and Searcher Mark II, Headquarters, Southern Naval Command at Kochi. According to Admiral Arun Prakash, ‘After three years of intensive flying trials, we are now among the pioneers in the esoteric art of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) operations at sea. INAS 342 is going to be an asset, which will enhance our maritime domain awareness manifold.’
The UAVs were first inducted into the Indian Navy in early 2003 and formed part of the Intensive Flying and Trials Unit. The Indian Navy is one of the first to operate the UAVs over the sea in a tropical environment. Israel is now operating UAVs for maritime patrol and the United States is also experimenting with these. Naval planners the world over are convinced that UAVs are ideal for this job. The UAVs can be operated from any shore location and can be controlled from specially equipped ships. They can carry out reconnaissance hundreds of miles out at sea.
On the diplomatic front, the Indian Navy conducted the MILAN 2006. Naval personnel from several South East Asian countries participated in the naval exercises organised at Port Blair, in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. India has been hosting these biennial meetings with participants from Bangladesh, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore and Sri Lanka to foster closer cooperation among navies of countries in the Indian Ocean region. Milan 2006 also witnessed Myanmar shed its ‘self-imposed maritime isolation’ and dispatch UMS Anawyahta to Port Blair to participate in the event.
In their presentations, the Indian Navy announced that it has the capacity and capability to provide maritime support to the Malacca Straits littorals in keeping the Straits free of piracy and terrorism. Indian Navy’s 15 warships (eight utility landing craft, four amphibious landing ships and three fast attack craft) permanently based at Port Blair can be mobilised to join the littorals. So far the Indian Navy has had only bilateral cooperation and is now looking at multilateral cooperation for the safety and security of Malacca Straits.
Interestingly, the above events are closely related. In September 2005, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand launched the ‘Eye in the Sky’ initiative and commenced coordinated air patrols over the Malacca Straits. Under the initiative, the Malacca Straits littorals make available two maritime aircraft each to patrol the Straits. The aircraft patrol the waterway and do not cross over to the airspace of the other participants.
In 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore had launched coordinated sea patrols in the Malacca Straits. This was in response to the April 2004 US led Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) that envisaged deployment of Marines and Special Forces troops on high-speed boats in the Malacca Straits to combat terrorism, proliferation, piracy, gun running, narcotics smuggling and human trafficking in the area. Malaysia and Indonesia had reacted to RMSI and had noted that the US should get permission from regional countries for such an initiative as it impinged on their national sovereignty. However, Singapore, a close US ally, had favoured the initiative, which never came to fruition.
New Delhi has watched with great interest the maritime security developments in the Malacca Straits. It is conscious of the sensitivities of the regional countries that are apprehensive of extra-regional navies and would do anything to stop them from staking a claim in regional security. The regional countries now acknowledge the lack of capacity and capability to maintain continuous air surveillance in the Malacca Straits. None of the littorals has a large fleet of maritime patrol aircraft to provide a 24 x 7 surveillance over the Straits. Also there are no UAVs in their inventory.
It is in this context that the newly commissioned INAS 342 fits the bill. For very long duration operations, there is a need to have an appropriate mix of both manned and unmanned maritime patrol platforms. These will have to be integrated into additional sensors on aerial early warning and signals intelligence aircraft. Besides, getting information from multiple sources is the trend, and Malacca Straits littorals should think of themselves as trendsetters in this field.
An increasing number of maritime agencies are using pilot-less surveillance aircraft to patrol territorial waters, offshore oil and gas platforms and pipelines and aid in other maritime security missions such as countering human trafficking, drug smuggling and illegal fishing. UAVs could be very valuable force multipliers to enhancing security in the Malacca Straits as these platforms can provide a real or near-real time tactical picture at sea and with some sensors they can detect irregular maritime activity.
It must be mentioned that the close proximity of the Andaman and Nicobar islands to the Straits of Malacca makes India part of the Malacca Straits Security System and provides a valid case for the patrolling of the Straits by the Indian Navy. Here is an opportunity for the Indian Navy to offer support to the Malacca Straits littorals by way of its UAVs. These platforms can be integrated to the regional maritime air patrol effort and provide a more useful and comprehensive common picture for Total Maritime Domain Awareness (TMDA). As regards challenges from technical and procedural inter-operability and doctrinal and language diversities, the solution lies in joint exercises, training and enhanced navy-to-navy contacts. Clearly, the long-term trend is towards cooperative maritime security.
Vijay Sakhuja
The Australian National Internships Program (ANIP) was established at the Australian National University in 1993, and currently involves about 90 students per year. The Program is open to Australian and overseas students from a variety of disciplines and universities; some are graduands but the majority are undergraduates. The core of an ANIP internship is a placement for 11 weeks, either with a Member of Parliament, a parliamentary committee, a government department, a peak industry body, or a major community organisation.
The Sea Power Centre - Australia (SPC-A) is currently hosting an ANIP intern, Mr Jonathan Herington. Mr Herington’s research report – provisionally titled ‘Biological Threats to Australia’s National Security: Implications for Navy’s Tasks and Capabilities’ – will focus on the challenges presented to the RAN by disease outbreaks and biological weapons within our region. Currently, there is little open-source literature on the ability of defence forces, particularly navies, to respond to disease and biological weapons threats. This report will detail the current disease-based threats to Australia’s security, the potential approaches to combating such threats, and the potential implications for the RAN’s future tasks and capabilities.
Mr Herington will review the literature to assess the most likely natural and unnatural biological threats. He also plans to conduct interviews with key stakeholders to evaluate potential responses to these threats.
The Institutional supervisor for the intern is the Director of SPC-A, Captain Richard McMillan, CSC, RAN, and the academic supervisor is SPC-A’s Deputy Director Research, Mr Andrew Forbes.
Contributions to or inquiries about this research project should be directed to Mr Andrew Forbes, via telephone (02) 6127 6507 or e-mail andrew.forbes1@defence.,gov.au.
Dr Gregory P. Gilbert has commenced a major research project for the Sea Power Centre - Australia (SPC-A) to examine fundamental understandings of sea power in non-western cultural traditions from ancient times to the present day.
Australian concepts of sea power have tended to be Anglo-centric, and the RAN has had difficulty recording and applying alternative non-western maritime traditions. By examining the broadest aspects of maritime strategy, it is hoped that the assumptions underlying modern perceptions of sea power will be highlighted.
Dr Gilbert’s initial focus is on ancient Egyptian sea power, as it is not only the earliest non-western maritime tradition, but also one where the evidence reveals both similarities and differences in approach when compared with modern maritime operations. Subsequent phases of the project are currently envisaged to include studies of various Persian Gulf, Indian Subcontinent and East Asian sea power strategies.
The research project will support successive reviews of RAN doctrine and will ultimately develop original and complex concepts that may influence how the RAN operates in the future.
Dr Gilbert is a Research Officer in the SPC-A. A former naval design engineer, he is also a specialist in the archaeology and anthropology of warfare.
Contributions to or inquiries about this research project can be sent to Dr Gilbert via e-mail gregory.gilbert1@defence.gov.au.
On 26 December 2004, a major earthquake off Sumatra and a series of secondary earthquakes throughout the Andaman and Nicobar Islands caused many simultaneous tsunamis that radiated around the Indian Ocean. The tsunamis arrived as huge surges of water that powered over the coral reefs to smash onto the land, resulting in enormous loss of life and destruction of property. Immediately following the tsunami, many in the local community and volunteers organised beach and reef clean up activities to minimise damage to the coral reefs from debris (sediment and rubble).
The new report, Status of Coral Reefs in Tsunami Affected Countries: 2005, concludes that the major threats to the coral reefs of the Indian Ocean continue to be from human activities, such as over-fishing, deforestation and climate change. These are far more damaging to coral reefs than the tsunami. The report calls for:
• the establishment of a tsunami early warning system;
• capacity building in integrated coastal management;
• improved fisheries management and coral reef monitoring;
• the establishment of more marine protected areas;
• careful reparation and rehabilitation of tsunami damage; and
• development of stronger national oceans policies.
Damage to the coral reefs in the Indian Ocean was patchy, site dependent and heavily influenced by local environmental conditions such as coastal bathymetry and damage on land. Most of the damage to coral reefs resulted from sediment and coral rubble thrown about by the waves, and smothering by debris washed off the land. Coral reef damage was greatest in Indonesia, Thailand, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and Sri Lanka. Within the affected areas, there was 30 per cent damage in Indonesia and 13 per cent severe damage in Thailand. There was little damage to coral reefs in countries further away from the source of the tsunamis because much of wave energy had dissipated. Most of the coral reefs of the region escaped serious damage and will naturally recover within five to 10 years providing that effective management is implemented to reduce damage from human activities. A small number of coral reefs were significantly damaged and may take 20 or more years to recover; and they may not return to their previous structure.
Mangroves and coastal forests afforded the most protection to infrastructure on the land and probably reduced the loss of life in these areas. The coral reefs absorbed some of the tsunami energy, thereby possibly providing some protection to the adjacent land. Damage to mangroves was highly variable, ranging from little damage in many areas, such as Thailand, to the destruction of entire forests in some areas, such as Aceh province, Indonesia. Replanting of mangrove forests will be important to assist recovery. Seagrass beds were largely unaffected in the region as a whole, although some areas were either eroded or smothered by sediments. For example, in the Pulo Aceh islands, seagrass beds were seriously damaged which may affect the dugongs in the future. Again, in the Aceh region, coconut trees were uprooted and turtle nesting beaches completely destroyed; in India, many such beaches were seriously eroded.
Courtesy UN Atlas of the Oceans
The High Seas Task Force released its final report Closing the Net on 3 March 2006. The report identifies key measures that Task Force members will begin to implement immediately to address illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, while seeking to engage a wider group of like-minded countries and organisations. It also proposes measures that it will endeavour to implement in collaboration with the wider global community to achieve more comprehensive solutions to this problem.
The Task Force was a group of fisheries ministers and international NGOs working together to develop an action plan designed to combat illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing on the high seas. In an era of overfished fish stocks and substantial excess fishing capacity, (IUU) fishing, especially on the high seas, is recognised as a major threat to the long term sustainability of the world’s fish stocks. It is widely recognised that a coordinated, concerted and comprehensive approach is required on the part of governments and the international community to ensure sustainable resource use on the high seas and protection of the marine environment.
At both national and international levels, significant work has been undertaken to improve fisheries management regimes and close known loopholes. The past decade in particular has produced a large number of measures aimed at combating IUU fishing, including a number of international legal instruments adopted through the United Nations and its specialised agencies as well as at the regional level through regional fishery management organisations. Despite these measures, IUU fishing does not appear to have been significantly reduced. Indeed, the prominence of IUU fishing coincides with a significant expansion in high seas fishing capacity in recent years, which has in turn led to an increase in high seas fishery capture rates. As one problem is identified and solved the problem reappears in another form elsewhere. It is evident that flexible operating structures and highly mobile fishing fleets enable IUU operators to move rapidly from areas of depletion to target other fish stocks, a phenomenon which is currently visible in relation to Patagonian toothfish and tuna stocks.
IUU fishing is a serious global problem. It is increasingly seen as one of the main obstacles to the achievement of sustainable world fisheries. Recent studies put the worldwide value of IUU catches at between USD 4 billion and USD 9 billion a year. While USD 1.25 billion of this comes from the high seas, the remainder is taken from the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal states.
IUU losses are borne particularly by developing countries that provide over 50 per cent of all internationally traded fishery products. Significantly, losses from the waters of sub-Saharan Africa amount to USD 1.4 billion a year – roughly equivalent to a quarter of Africa’s total annual fisheries exports. IUU fishing therefore imposes significant economic costs on some of the poorest countries in the world where dependency on fisheries for food, livelihoods and revenues is high. Moreover, it effectively undermines recent efforts by these countries to manage natural resources as a contribution to growth and welfare.
IUU fishing respects neither national boundaries nor international attempts to manage high seas resources. It thrives where weak governance arrangements prevail and is further encouraged by the failure of countries to meet their international responsibilities. It puts unsustainable pressure on fish stocks, marine wildlife and habitats, subverts labour standards and distorts markets. IUU fishing has proved stubbornly resistant to recent international attempts to control it. Its persistence is due both to economic incentives (fuelled by demand, overcapacity and weak governance) and by the lack of global political resolve to tackle its root causes.
At its broadest, illegal fishing takes place where vessels operate in violation of the laws of a fishery. This can apply to fisheries that are under the jurisdiction of a coastal state or to high seas fisheries regulated by regional organisations. Unreported fishing is fishing that has been unreported or misreported to the relevant national authority or regional organisation, in contravention of applicable laws and regulations. Unregulated fishing generally refers to fishing by vessels without nationality, or vessels flying the flag of a country not party to the regional organisation governing that fishing area or species. Unregulated fishing can also relate to fishing in areas or for fish stocks where there are no conservation and management measures in place.
One of the key difficulties has been to ensure political leadership in support of internationally agreed targets and other initiatives similar to those contained in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the 2001 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing (IPOA-IUU). This perception of the problem was recognised by the Ministers and other participants who attended a meeting of the Round Table on Sustainable Development at the OECD held on 6 June 2003. The response of a group of fisheries ministers from Australia, Chile, New Zealand, Namibia and the United Kingdom was to establish a Ministerially-led task force on illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing on the high seas.
The High Seas Task Force was formally launched on 1 December 2003 by Elliot Morley MP, the Minister for Environment of the United Kingdom. The intent was to use a series of expert panels to identify the legal, economic, scientific and enforcement factors which permit IUU activity to thrive and then determine the key points of leverage that can brought to bear at national, regional and global levels to in order to minimise the incentives to carry out IUU fishing on the high seas.
The work was undertaken by carefully selected specialists. The Task Force identified a set of priorities among a series of authoritative proposals for confronting the challenges of IUU fishing on the high seas. The end result is a pragmatic and prioritised action plan that is both analytically sound and politically feasible and will act as a vehicle for improved decision-making.
The full report of the High Seas Fishing Task Force is available at: http://www.high-seas.org/.
The East Asian Seas (EAS) Congress 2006 promises to be an exciting and comprehensive capacity-building event as more partners express their commitment. Organised by PEMSEA and the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) – PR China together with the Hainan provincial and Haikou city governments, the event will bring together the in-depth experience and knowledge of various experts and international organisations on sustainable coastal and ocean management. To date, the EAS Congress has gained the support of 41 partner organisations and 47 Advisors and Committee Members.
The organisations that have shown support are:
1. Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission
2. Asia Pacific Forum of Environmental Journalists
3. Asian Fisheries Society
4. Centre for Marine Environmental Research and Innovative Technology, City University, Hong Kong
5. China Institute of Marine Affairs, China
6. Coastal Management Center
7. Department of Sustainability and Environment, Victoria, Australia
8. East Asia Response Pte. Ltd.
9. Foundation for Environmental Education
10. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations - Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific
11. GEF Small Grants Programme
12. GEF/UNDP/IMO Global Ballast Water Management Programme
13. Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts and Islands
14. Global Environment Facility
15. Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities Coordination Office, UNEP
16. International Maritime Organization
17. International Marine Project Activities Centre
18. International Ocean Institute
19. International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association
20. Korea Environment Institute, RO Korea
21. Korea Maritime Institute, RO Korea
22. Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute, RO Korea
23. Marine Aquarium Council
24. Marine Environmental Emergency Preparedness and Response Regional Activity Centre of the Northwest Pacific Action Plan
25. Marine Stewardship Council
26. Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Indonesia
27. Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, RO Korea
28. Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia-Pacific
29. Nippon Foundation
30. Ocean Policy Research Foundation
31. Plymouth Marine Laboratory
32. IAEA/ Regional Co-operative Agreement Regional Office
33. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
34. State Oceanic Administration, China
35. Thailand Environment Institute
36. United Nations Development Programme
37. UNEP/East Asian Seas Regional Coordinating Unit
38. UNDP/GEF Project on Reducing Environmental Stress in the Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem
39. Victorian Coastal Council, Australia
40. Wetlands International
41. The World Bank
More are expected to confirm their support in the months leading up to the Congress in December 2006.
Furthermore, a good number of the partner organisations have expressed their solid commitment to organise the various workshops and seminars as Co-Convenors. International organisations, programs and projects representing the UN, NGOs, multi-lateral financial institutions, government departments, environmental institutions, and the academe will be managing different sessions during the International Conference. Each organisation will share their expertise on issues and topics based on the seven sub-themes of the Congress: Sustainable Ocean and Coastal Development, Coastal and Ocean Governance, Ecosystem-based Management, Eco-labeling and Certification, Coastal and Maritime Safety and Environmental Protection, Economics and Finance and Management-related Science and Technology.
The Ocean Policy Research Foundation (formerly Ship and Ocean Foundation) and the Global Forum on Ocean, Coasts and Islands are among those who recently confirmed their participation in the Congress.
The OPRF through the OPRF Chairman, Mr. Masahiro Akiyama and OPRF Executive Director, Mr Hiroshi Terashima, informed PEMSEA of their interest to co-convene a workshop and seminar sessions on ‘Securing the Ocean.’ The OPRF believes that the EAS Congress could provide a good opportunity to promote further discussion and follow-up on the Tokyo Ocean Declaration.
Global Forum on Ocean, Coasts and Islands Co-chair, Dr Biliana Cicin-Sain, also expressed willingness to co-convene a session on ‘National Coastal and Ocean Policy.’
These sessions will be participated by leading authorities, experts and decision-makers who are expected to provide valuable information on the current state of ocean management or governance and experiences in the governance of coasts and oceans within and outside the region, as well as the ongoing initiatives and future direction of ocean affairs.
Further information on the Coastal and Ocean Governance Theme and other Congress activities can be found at www.pemsea.org/eascongress. Questions and comments on the Congress can be sent to congress@pemsea.org.
Courtesy PEMSEA Press Release
The Ocean Policy and Research Foundation (OPRF) recently submitted to the Japanese Government a proposal for a 21st Century Ocean Policy. The proposal indicates a significant development in Japan’s keenness to further strengthen the country’s ocean governance.
The proposed policy is a comprehensive policy that aims to provide a strong legal foundation for the integrated development and management of Japan’s coastal and marine environment. The proposal was developed in response to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Agenda 21, as well as Japan’s recognition of the need to address the emerging issue concerning of the marine environment.
The proposal includes the following main elements:
1. On Becoming a True Oceans State: The Need for a Comprehensive Ocean Policy;
2. Ocean Policy Objectives;
3. Enacting a Basic Ocean Law;
4. Establishing an Administrative Organ; and
5. Management and International Harmonization of the Nation’s Expanded Ocean Territory:
• Building a framework for management of the EEZ and continental shelf.
• Establishment of a security policy for the oceans.
• Promotion of marine protection, conservation, and restoration.
• Promotion of ocean resources development that is respectful of ecosystems.
• Strengthening initiatives for creation of ICZM.
• Promotion of disaster prevention and reduction.
• Provision of information resources for ocean governance.
• Promotion of research, education and outreach.
The proposed policy is currently going through the passage of approval by the Cabinet and eventually the Diet (Japan’s Parliament). The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is at the forefront of pushing for its swift approval.
The development and submission of the proposal for a 21st Century Ocean Policy for Japan is an essential first step for the country’s intensified commitment towards the sustainable development of Japan’s marine environment. It is also seen as a good example to encourage other countries in the region to pursue an integrated policy for oceans governance.
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