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Carolin Liss[1]
In the past few years, an increasing number of Private Security Companies (PSCs – also sometimes referred to as Private Military Companies, PMCs) has emerged and is offering and conducting maritime security services in the Malacca Strait. These companies offer services in addition to security provided by the littoral states and their government agencies. This paper explores the role of private companies in securing vessels, ports and offshore energy installations in the Malacca Strait and suggests that current national regulation and oversight of PSCs operating in this area is insufficient and needs improvement.
The first part of the paper provides a brief overview of companies operating in Southeast Asia, with particular focus on those which are active in securing the Malacca Strait. It discusses why PSCs are employed to provide additional security in the Malacca Strait and briefly examines the nature of work these companies conduct in this important waterway. The following section discusses current arrangements in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to regulate the operations of PSCs, arguing that these initiatives are often insufficient. It also explains why regulation of PSCs by the littoral states, rather than by international bodies or from within the privatised security industry, is of importance. The paper concludes by arguing that improvements regarding oversight and regulation of PSCs are crucial to ensure that such companies are a viable supplement to government efforts to protect national waters, shipping lanes and other maritime assets.
We live in an increasingly privatised world. Privatisation of state sector industry and enterprises, the expanded scope of private education, the supply of utilities such as water and electricity by private companies, and private healthcare are only a few examples of the growing impact of privatisation on our daily lives. This trend of privatisation has also extended to military and security services. While outsourcing of military services is hardly a new phenomenon, in the past fifteen years, a new kind of ‘private military actor’ – the PSCs – has risen to prominence. PSCs are private business companies, offering a vast menu of military and security services, ranging from logistics support, risk analysis, training of military units, and intelligence gathering, to the protection of assets and people in conflict zones. PSCs are today also actively involved in securing shipping lanes, maritime installations and ports. Given that Southeast Asia is home to important sea-lanes and straits, including the Malacca Strait, PSCs are increasingly employed to provide maritime services in this region.
Private companies offering these maritime services are not new to Southeast Asia, with a number of companies that are active today having worked in the maritime security business in the region for decades. An example is Glenn Defense Marine (Asia), which was established in 1946 and has offices in cities across the region. However, the majority of companies presently operating in the maritime sector in Southeast Asia emerged after the end of the Cold War, with their number increasing sharply since 11 September 2001. While these companies are part of the worldwide process of privatisation of military and security services, they also emerged in answer to changes in the (maritime) security environment in Southeast Asia, which created a crucial niche for PSCs to offer a wide range of services. Indeed, while terrorism, separatism, as well as fraud, piracy and other criminal activities have existed in Southeast Asia for decades, perception of maritime security changed with the end of the Cold War as more importance was placed on non-traditional security issues. However, it was the September 11 terrorist attacks in the USA that triggered the implementation of new security measures affecting waters and ports in Southeast Asia. With a heightened fear of a major maritime terrorist attack, governments began to look at the world’s oceans with grave concern, resulting in the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code and other new safety and security regulations in the maritime sector. With increasing concern about maritime security, the demand for services addressing the various security threats also rose. Yet, government authorities and agencies have often been unable to provide security, training and technical security equipment on the scale sought by the maritime industry since September 11, or as is required today as part of new security regulations, such as the ISPS code. As a result, a growing number of PSCs emerged offering maritime security services.
Many PSCs offering maritime security in the Southeast Asian region are part of, or linked to, either larger PSCs or transnational corporations outside the security industry. While many of the larger companies operating in Southeast Asia are based in the USA and Great Britain,[2] a number of them have in recent years established branch offices in Southeast Asia. One example is Hart, which has opened an office in Singapore. Moreover, a number of smaller companies have been established in the region, such as Background Asia, with headquarters also in Singapore. Many companies active in maritime Southeast Asia only consist of a limited number of permanent staff, an office and an impressive presence on the Internet. They hire additional personnel and acquire equipment on a case-by-case basis, once a contract with a client is signed, which allows the companies to run their business with limited expenses and capital.[3]
Information provided by companies about their backgrounds, the companies themselves and the services they have conducted in the past, as well as information about the people they hire if required, is usually sparse. The majority of PSCs operating in the maritime sector seem to be founded and staffed by ex-military or ex-law enforcement personnel, with the credentials and reputation of the company often linked to the past military experiences of its founding members and employees. Therefore, most companies advertise to employ former members of elite Special Forces from around the globe, with ‘vast experience’. Whether or not this experience is in the maritime sector or related to the services and tasks they are now employed for by the company – including, for example, knowledge about the vulnerabilities of a ship or oil rig – is often unclear.
While some companies, such as the London-based company Yacht-Secure Ltd, specialise in the protection of specific assets, most companies offer services for a wide range of types of facilities, focusing largely on the protection of ports, underwater assets, offshore energy installations and their supply chains, fishing grounds and a large variety of vessels, including (slow moving) merchant vessels, large fishing boats, cruise ships, tugs and navy vessels visiting foreign ports. In order to guarantee the safety of these often foreign assets, a large variety of specific services are offered by PSCs, ranging from risk assessment to crisis management.[4] While not all companies offer all services, almost every company offers assistance with security plans and risk analysis consulting services. Most companies, however, also offer more active services which can be divided into two categories. The first category is comprised of services aimed at the prevention of attacks. These include the tracking of commercial vessels, protection of fishing grounds, guarding of offshore energy installations or ports, the employment of plain-clothed PSC personnel or (un)armed guards on ships or on noticeable escort vessels, as well as the training of seafarers and law enforcement and military personnel. The second category of services focuses on crisis and post-attack/ incident response. Services include the investigation and recovery of hijacked or missing vessels and stolen cargoes, negotiation in cases of kidnapped crew or employees, hostage rescue after negotiations have failed and first aid and evacuation assistance in emergencies or accidents. Overall, the services offered address threats posed by smugglers, fraudsters, pirates and terrorists and prepare companies for accidents or natural hazards.
A large percentage of PSC operations in the maritime sector in Southeast Asia are conducted in the Malacca Strait, for a variety of reasons. The Malacca Strait is one of the busiest waterways in the world. Each year more than 60,000 merchant vessels transit the strait, which connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. Tankers carrying oil from the Middle East to countries such as China and Japan, which rely heavily on imported oil, are just some of the vessels passing through the strait each day. Despite efforts by the littoral states to secure shipping in the Malacca Strait, pirate attacks on merchant vessels and fishing boats still occur in this waterway. Furthermore, because of its global importance as a transit route, the straits have since the September 11 terrorist attacks been identified as a potential target for a maritime terrorist attack. Due to this (perceived) heightened level of threat, security of vessels in this area is of concern for some ship and cargo owners, particularly those whose vessels have experienced pirate attacks in recent years or those owning vulnerable or very valuable cargo.
Oil, gas and mineral resources are also found in the Malacca Strait area, with both onshore and offshore energy installations in operation. Companies extracting oil, gas or other natural resources depend on offshore platforms or terminals along the coast from which the extracted goods are shipped around the world. Many oil/gas fields in the Malacca Strait area are located in economically underdeveloped or politically volatile areas, some with ongoing armed conflict. The exploitation of resources, such as those located in Aceh, where the GAM was until recently active, therefore requires efficient security arrangements.
Overall, security in the Malacca Strait remains an issue because members of politically motivated groups, including members of the GAM who did not find alternative employment, as well as criminal gangs are active in the vicinity of the waterway. The marginalisation of parts of the population and persistent poverty in a number of places along the Malacca Strait, such as the Riau Archipelago, Indonesia, are conducive to the existence of radical politically motivated groups[5]
and the occurrence of criminal activities. Such criminal activities include, for example, pirate attacks, conducted by opportunistic sea robbers as well as organised pirate gangs which hijack vessels or kidnap crew. Even though these conditions also exist in other parts of Southeast Asia, vessels transitting the Malacca Strait are particularly vulnerable because ships have to slow down to pass through the narrow strait. Furthermore, the fact that the Malacca Strait is governed by different countries enhances the difficulty of securing this waterway.
As the littoral states have so far not been able to successfully address security threats in the Malacca Strait, ship- and cargo-owners, underwriters, and oil and gas companies have, in recent years, hired PSCs to protect their assets, particularly from the threats of piracy, sabotage and terrorism.
The role played by PSCs in the Malacca Strait is twofold. First, statements, reports and risk assessments produced by PSCs regarding security in the Malacca Strait have increasing impact on decision-making processes of governments and businesses, as well as the formation of opinion in the public sector. PSC personnel, for instance, participate in conferences concerned with security of the straits and PSC reports regularly find their way into the mainstream media. Risk assessments concerning the Malacca Strait conducted by PSCs also impact decision-making processes of key operators in the maritime industry such as insurance company underwriters. The most prominent example is the decision by the Joint War Committee (JWC) – a body constituted of members of the Lloyds Market Association and the International Underwriting Association, which represents the interests of the London marine insurance community – to include the Malacca Strait in its ‘Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils Listed Areas’ in 2005. This decision was based on an assessment by Aegis Defence Services Ltd. a London-based PSC managed by its shareholders, among them, its Chairman and CEO, Lt-Col. Tim Spicer.[6]
This new classification of the Malacca Strait had an impact on the insurance premiums ship owners are required to pay when their vessels transit the strait, and, hence, had significant consequences for the maritime industry. Representatives of the shipping sector as well as regional governments have consequently challenged the decision[7]
and Lloyd’s removed the Malacca Strait from the list of sea lanes with a war risk rating about one year after the rating was imposed, stating that security in the strait had improved.[8]
Second, and more importantly for this paper, a number of companies provide services in the Malacca Strait that are in the realm of militaries and local law enforcement agencies. Background Asia, for example, has supplied escort vessels for tankers, and the Australian based PSC Counter Terrorism International (CTI) has provided protection for a tug and a vessel, with the latter departing from an oil rig and travelling through the strait.[9]
PSC employees conducting such kind of work are often armed with firearms, making regulation and oversight of such PSC operations an important issue.
Given that PSCs are already active in the Malacca Strait (and other waters in Southeast Asia), regulation and oversight of these companies is a necessity. Generally, PSCs operating in the Malacca Strait need to comply with the laws and regulations set by the states where they provide services. This can be a complex task, especially when merchant vessels or tugs are protected by PSCs, as these vessels not only move between various states and jurisdictions, using the right of innocent passage, but also usually sail under the flag of yet another state.
Some governments have recently voiced their concern about a number of services offered by PSCs to be conducted in regional waters, including territorial waters and EEZs. For example, the publication of a handful of newspaper articles in the Straits Times in April 2005, describing armed PSCs services in the Malacca Strait,[10]
sparked an outcry from Malaysian and Indonesian authorities. Both countries rejected outright the employment of private armed escorts, with the Malaysian Director of Internal Security and Public Order, Datuk Othman Talib, warning that any such vessel found in Malaysian waters would be detained and the crew arrested as either terrorists or mercenaries. They would then subsequently be charged under the Internal Security Act. He also pointed out that any PSC wishing to operate in Malaysian waters had to apply for a permit from the Ministry of Internal Security.[11]
In a 2006 conference paper, Capt. Noor Apandi Osnin from the Maritime Institute of Malaysia stated that so far no licences have been issued to PSCs to operate in Malaysian waters. He further commented that armed PSC escort vessels ‘can be viewed as impinging on the State’s sovereignty’ and their activities, licensed or unlicensed, may set a historical precedent for other ‘foreign forces ... to enter and control the Strait.’[12]
When asked about their operations in the Malacca Strait, PSC employees from various companies have stated in interviews with the author that in most cases the Indonesian and/or Malaysian authorities are informed about planned operations, either through a liaison officer or a personal contact. In the process money changes hands and the company receives ‘permission’ to conduct its work, even though not always in writing.[13] Whether these tacit ‘permissions’ carry the same force and authority as official permits, such as mentioned by Datuk Othman Talib, remains open to interpretation. The open debate about the services offered and conducted by PSCs, as well as the different types of ‘permissions’ available, demonstrate the lack of clearly defined and enforced rules and regulation of the PSC industry in Indonesia and Malaysia.
At the centre of the debate as to whether or not PSCs are allowed to operate within Southeast Asian countries or their respective national waters, is that PSCs conduct work that sometimes requires their employees to carry firearms.[14] Rules and regulations regarding the bearing and use of weapons by non-state security personnel, including private companies, vary from country to country. According to Kramer, domestic arms control laws have developed unevenly in the region and
In some countries, the authorities rule by decree, while in others the legal system is well developed. The quality and quantity of arms control laws varies considerably among states within the region. As a result of overburdened law-making structures in some countries, arms control regulations may exist solely as administrative directives, proclamations, or decrees rather than as formal legislation.[15]
It is therefore difficult to establish with certainty which laws or regulations are relevant in Southeast Asia for the often foreign-based PSCs, particularly so because the privatisation of security in its current form is a comparatively new phenomenon.
The question of legal control in regard to armed PSC services is of particular importance in regard to the Malacca Strait because such work is currently conducted in this area. The debate about the character of the official permits for PSC operations in Malaysian and Indonesian waters outlined above suggests that there are discrepancies between official requirements and the actual working practices of PSCs in the Malacca Strait. The legal framework governing the use of arms by PSC personnel in Malaysia and Indonesia is equally difficult to determine. Both countries have domestic laws that regulate the use of arms by their citizens and non-citizens, which include, particularly in Indonesia, harsh penalties for illegal possession of arms.[16] While PSCs certainly have to comply with such domestic laws, proper channels to apply for a permit linked to national laws for arms control, if they do exist, do not appear to be used by PSCs operating in the area. In fact, operations in which PSC personnel were armed have taken place in Malaysia and Indonesia, with PSC employees indicating in interviews that they often did not bring their own weapons into these countries but obtained them there.[17] Overall, the existence of small arms laws, and the reinforcement of these regulations are a different matter altogether, and in countries such as Indonesia, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, enforcement of gun control laws remains generally limited. However, apart from applying for permits to employ armed personnel in other countries of the region, there are other ways for PSCs to conduct armed services in Indonesia and Malaysia. The Perth based company CTI,[18]
for example, occasionally employs staff from local security companies when operating in the Malacca Strait.[19] The locals hired not only have the required permission to work in the country but may also have additional local knowledge.[20] Other companies have been able to use armed personnel in the Malacca Strait by closely cooperating with local law enforcement agencies, which have provided vessels as well as personnel to assist PSCs in their operations.[21]
Singapore’s laws regulating the use of firearms and other weapons are, in contrast, clearly defined and stringently enforced.[22]
As the representative of the Singapore delegation pointed out at the General Debate of the First Committee on Disarmament meeting in October 2000:
Singapore practises total disarmament within its own borders, so to speak, among its own citizens. Our gun control laws are among the strictest in the world. This is because citizens know that they can rely on the efficiency and impartiality of the police and the judiciary to assure their security against armed lawlessness.[23]
Consequently, with some exceptions,[24]
only agencies linked directly to the Singapore government are allowed to carry and use firearms. PSCs and their personnel also have to comply with these strict regulations. It is therefore very difficult, if not impossible, for a PSC to receive permission for its employees to carry firearms in Singapore, despite the fact that some companies have their headquarters or offices based in the city-state.[25] Hence, employees of Background Asia, for example, are required to disassemble their weapons and lock the ammunition magazines and firing pins in separate locations when in Singapore waters.[26]
The examples discussed above indicate a lack of clear laws and regulations in regard to PSCs, as well as weak or selective enforcement of existing laws in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. The question that arises is whether or not the littoral states of the Malacca Strait are most suitable to regulate PSCs operating in their countries (waters). Indeed, regulation and oversight of PSCs by international bodies or from within the industry may be potential alternatives.
Given the international nature of the work conducted by PSCs, a possible means of addressing the shortcomings in the regulation of PSCs would be for legal oversight and control of the privatised military and security industry to be exercised on the international level. Current international laws, however, are primarily concerned with individual mercenaries[27]
and are generally not applicable to employees of PSCs, as the structure of these companies, their role and the work they conduct differs from mercenary operations. In acknowledgement of the problem of oversight, some steps have been taken within the privatised military industry itself to ensure that PSCs and their employees operate professionally to limit violence. Individual companies, for example, often stress on their websites that their operations are conducted within international law and companies such as Hart have their own ‘code of conduct’ or ‘ethics code’ published on their websites.[28]
PSC operators also stress the strict oversight over their employees and often emphasise the exceptional training and discipline of their staff.[29]
Furthermore, the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA),[30]
an organisation founded by its president Doug Brooks, was established in April 2001 to
promote high standards in the peace operations industry and inform the public and policy-makers about skilled private companies and their contributions to international peace and human security. IPOA is committed to maintaining industry-wide standards to ensure sound and ethical professional and military practices in the conduct of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction activities.[31]
Members of IPOA, among them major companies such as Blackwater, Armorgroup, and Hart,[32]
operate in accordance with the IPOA Code of Conduct. Members therefore (theoretically) adhere to ‘all relevant international laws and protocols on human rights’, work only for ‘legitimate, recognized governments, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and lawful private companies’ and follow other rules concerning transparency and accountability of their operations.[33]
However, while an organisation such as IPOA may be preferable to oversight by an individual PSC over its own operations, independent supervision by an organisation or government without a financial interest in the operations conducted by PSCs would undoubtedly be more objective in its judgement. Furthermore, organisations such as IPOA cannot punish a company which does not comply with the code of conduct, other than to withdraw the company’s membership.
Due to these shortcomings in the international regulation of PSCs and the problematic nature of oversight from within the industry, national control and regulation of PSCs and their operations seems necessary. Indeed, a small number of countries around the world have begun to address this problem. Internationally, South Africa and the USA have, for example, began to established regulatory regimes, and companies operating out of these countries are required to comply with these regulations.[34]
However, the situation becomes more complex and less clear with companies based in other countries, including Southeast Asian nations. For PSC operations conducted in the Malacca Strait, Indonesia and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Singapore, should be responsible to regulate PSCs. Given the current shortcomings in Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s policies regarding PSCs, improvements are necessary. There is, for example, a need for national legal frameworks to be established in these countries which include official permits for armed PSC operations, background checks of PSC personnel and other basic requirements, such as proof of sufficient training in the use of the weapons required of PSC staff. New regulations along these lines, and enforcement of these policies, would make the employment of PSCs less risky for customers as well as local populations and governments of countries where PSC operations take place.
The general lack of international and national oversight of PSCs can result not only in legal, but also in moral and security related problems. Indeed, lax controls allow PSCs to conduct their work more freely and discreetly than in countries with strict regulations in place, and hence create opportunity for less reputable companies to act and operate outside the law, possibly resulting in the excessive use of violence, as demonstrated by the following example.
Talking about a case in which his company provided an armed escort for a yacht in Indonesian waters, a manager of a PSC based in Singapore stated in an interview that the instructions to his employees were clear: ‘Shoot first, ask questions later.’ Anyone approaching the vessel without providing satisfactory identification would be shot at.[35] While there have been a number of attacks on yachts in Indonesian waters which have involved the use of a high level of violence from the attackers, others have been simple hit-and-run robberies conducted by coastal inhabitants, targeting a yacht to steal food and small belongings in times of dire need.[36]
To shoot in these circumstances could be unnecessary, not to mention other incidents in which local fishers may simply approach a yacht out of curiosity with no malicious intent in mind. Equally important, weapons in the hands of guards on a large merchant cargo vessel or a tanker transitting the Malacca Strait can have devastating consequences if handled in a careless or inconsiderate, over-eager fashion.[37]
In fact, representatives of the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners’ Association, the IMO and various other maritime organisations have pointed out that armed escorts in general may escalate an already volatile situation and that a shoot-out on an oil, gas or chemical tanker could prove disastrous. It is therefore of importance that local governments ensure that only reputable PSCs, with sufficiently trained personnel, are allowed to operate in the Malacca Straits.[38]
‘Indonesia Rules out Private Armed Escorts in Malacca Strait’, Bloomberg.com, 2 May 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=aRlpGcMYBSME&refer=asia#, accessed 6 May 2005.
‘Malacca Straits Removed from War Risk List’, Insurance Journal, August 2006, http://www. insurancejournal.com/news/international/2006/08/09/71308.htm, accessed 15 November 2006.
‘Malaysia Warns on Private Marine Security Escorts’, Marinelog.com, 2 May 2005, http://www.marinelog. com/DOCS/NEWSMMV/2005may02.html, accessed 6 May 2005.
Boey, D, ‘Ship Owners Using Hired Guns. Guards Provide Anti-piracy Security for Vessels in Regional Waters’, Straits Times, 8 April 2005, p. 3.
British Association of Private Security Companies, Homepage, http://www.bapsc.org.uk/, accessed 8 May 2007.
Burton, J, ‘Lloyd’s Drops War Rating on Malacca Strait’, 9 August 2006, http://bpms.kempen.gov.my/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7070&Itemid=0, accessed 13 August 2003.
Counter Terrorism International, Homepage, http://www.cti5.com, accessed 16 September 2005.
Duperouzel, A, ‘The Role of Private Security in the Malacca Straits’, Paper presented at the ‘LIMA’ Conference, Langkawi, Malaysia, 2005.
Hart, ‘Hart’s Code of Conduct’, Hart, http:// www.hartsecurity.com/aboutus_codeofconduct.asp, accessed 2 January 2006.
Institute of International Law and Justice, ‘Private Military Companies’, New York University School of Law, http://www.iilj.org/research/PMC.html, accessed 5 January 2006.
International Peace Operations Association, Homepage, http://www.ipoaonline.org/home/, accessed 2 January 2006.
International Peace Operations Association, ‘IPOA Code of Conduct’, http://www.ipoaonline.org/conduct/, accessed 2 January 2005.
International Peace Operations Association, ‘IPOA Members’, http://www.ipoaonline.org/membership/ members/, accessed 2 January 2006.
International Peace Operations Association, ‘Mission Statement’, http://www.ipoaonline.org/about/mission/, accessed 2 January 2006.
Jaeger, T & G Kuemmel (eds), Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2007.
Kramer, K, ‘Legal Controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia’, Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper no. 3, Geneva, July 2001.
Liss, C, ‘Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place? ‘Working Paper no. 141, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, February 2007, http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp141.pdf, accessed 9 March 2007.
Liss, C, ‘Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Dilemma: State or Market?’ Japan Focus, 8 June 2007, http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2444, accessed 22 June 2007.
Malakunas, K, ‘Armed Escorts in High Demand on Sea’, Peninsula, 2005, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/ features/featuredetail.asp?file=mayfeatures102005.xml, accessed 13 May 2005.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, ‘Statement at the General Debate of the First Committee on Disarmament’, 12 October 2000, http://app.mfa.gov. sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,653, accessed 29 December 2005.
Noor Apandi Osnin, ‘Armed Escorts in the Strait of Malacca: A Challenge to Malaysia’s Governance’, Paper presented at the ‘MIMA Seminar on Private Maritime Security: Options for Malaysia’ Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 2006.
Ortiz, C, ‘Regulating Private Military Companies: States and the Expanding Business of Commercial Security Provision’, in K van der Pijl, L Assissi & D Wigan (eds), Global Regulation. Managing Crises After the Imperial Turn, Palgrave MacMillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2004, pp. 205-219.
Schreier, F & M Caparini, ‘Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies’, Occasional Paper no. 6, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, March 2005.
Sethuraman Dinakar & H Maurer, ‘The Jolly Roger Flies High, as Piracy Feeds the Hungry’, Business Week International Edition, 24 May 1999, http://www. businessweek.com/1999/99_21/c3630196.htm, accessed 28 December 2005.
Singapore Customs, ‘Arms and Explosives Licensing Division’, http://www.traderegister.gov.sg/aeb.html, accessed 28 December 2005.
Singapore Government, Homepage, http://www.gov.sg/, accessed 28 December 2005.
Singer, PW, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry, Cornell University Press, Cornell, 2003.
Singer, PW, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’, Brookings Institution (also published in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Spring 2004) 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/singer20040122.pdf, accessed 5 January 2006.
Singer, PW (contributed by), ‘Private Military Firms’, Encarta. Online, 2005, http://encarta.msn.com/ encyclopedia_701702759/Private_Military_Firms.html, accessed 15 December 2005.
Sua, T, ‘For Hire: Guardians of the Sea’, Straits Times, 15 April 2005, pp. H4-5.
[1] Carolin Liss is a PhD candidate at Murdoch University in Western Australia. This paper was originally presented at the Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Security in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, Jakarta, 8-9 September 2007.
[2] These include in Britain, Gray Page Limited, in Germany MarineServe GmbH (MSG), in Israel G.S. Seals, in the USA the Trident Group and in Australia Counter Terrorism International (CTI), to mention just a few.
[3] This is also the case for PSCs offering non-maritime related services. See PW Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatised Military Industry, Cornell University Press, Cornell, 2003, pp. 73-5.
[4] There are also a number of companies that offer a range of technical maritime security products, including electrical fences for vessels and non-lethal weapons.
[5] While radical politically motivated groups do not only emerge in places of economic hardship, widespread poverty can be one reason for the emergence of such groups which can also more easily find recruits and anti-government support in poverty-stricken areas. The theory that relative deprivation can serve as a powerful motivating influence for aggression was developed by T Gurr. For more details see: TR Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press for the Center of International Studies, 1970.
[6] Aegis Defence Services Ltd, accessed 6 December 2005.
[7] See C Liss, ‘Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?’ Working Paper no. 141, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, February 2007, http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/ wp141.pdf, accessed 9 March 2007. C Liss, ‘Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Dilemma: State or Market?’ Japan Focus, 8 June 2007, http://japanfocus.org/ products/details/2444, accessed 22 June 2007.
[8] J Burton, ‘Lloyd’s Drops War Rating on Malacca Strait’, 9 August 2006, http://bpms.kempen.gov.my/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7070&Itemid=0, accessed 13 August 2003. ‘Malacca Straits Removed from War Risk List’, Insurance Journal, August 2006, http://www.insurancejournal.com/ news/international/2006/08/09/71308.htm, accessed 15 November 2006.
[9] D Boey, ‘Ship Owners Using Hired Guns. Guards Provide Anti-piracy Security for Vessels in Regional Waters’, Straits Times, 8 April 2005, p. 3. Author’s Interview with M Martino, Counter Terrorism International (CTI), Murdoch University, Perth, 16 September 2005.
[10] Ibid; T Sua, ‘For Hire: Guardians of the Sea’, Straits Times, 15 April 2005.
[11] ‘Malaysia Warns on Private Marine Security Escorts’, Marinelog.com, 2 May 2005, http://www.marinelog. com/DOCS/NEWSMMV/2005may02.html, accessed 6 May 2005. ‘Indonesia Rules out Private Armed Escorts in Malacca Strait’, Bloomberg.com, 2 May 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=aRlpGcMYBSME&refer=asia#, accessed 6 May 2005.
[12] Noor Apandi Osnin, ‘Armed Escorts in the Strait of Malacca: A Challenge to Malaysia’s Governance’, Paper presented at the ‘MIMA Seminar on Private Maritime Security: Options for Malaysia’ Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 2006, pp. 16, 18.
[13] Author’s interviews with PSC personnel in Europe, Asia and Australia between 2004 and 2007.
[14] Alternatively, PSC employees could carry non-lethal weapons, but this seems not a viable solution at present.
[15] See K Kramer, ‘Legal Controls on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southeast Asia’, Small Arms Survey, Occasional Paper no. 3, Geneva, July 2001, p. 3.
[16] The laws concerned with the control of weapons are too complex to be explained in this paper, particularly as it is unclear how these laws relate to PSCs. For an overview of legal controls in relation to arms in Southeast Asia see Kramer, loc. cit.
[17] Author’s interviews with PSC personnel in Asia and Australia between 2004 and 2007.
[18] Counter Terrorism International, Homepage, http:// www.cti5.com, accessed 16 September 2005.
[19] Author’s interview with M Martino, Counter Terrorism International, 16 September 2005, Perth, Australia.
[20] ibid.
[21] Author’s interviews with PSC personnel.
[22] The Arms and Explosives Act and the Arms and Explosives Licensing Division are regulating the control and licensing of the manufacture, sale, use, export, storage, and possession of arms and explosives in Singapore. The Arms and Explosives Act and any new amendments to the act can be downloaded from the Singapore government website: Singapore Government, Homepage, http://www.gov.sg/, accessed 28 December 2005. Information about the Arms and Explosives Licensing Division can be found at Singapore Customs, ‘Arms and Explosives Licensing Division’, http://www.traderegister.gov.sg/aeb.html, accessed 28 December 2005.
[23] Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Statement at the General Debate of the First Committee on Disarmament’, 12 October 2000, http://app. mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,653, accessed 29 December 2005.
[24] For these exceptions see Kramer, op. cit., and Singapore Government, Homepage.
[25] Author’s Interview with Stephen Weatherford, Glenn Defense Marine (Asia), 28 October 2005, Singapore.
[26] Boey, loc. cit.; Sua, loc. cit.
[27] For a list of relevant international laws see: Institute of International Law and Justice, ‘Private Military Companies’, New York University School of Law, http://www.iilj.org/research/PMC.html, accessed 5 January 2006.
[28] See, for example, Hart, ‘Hart’s Code of Conduct’, Hart, http://www.hartsecurity.com/aboutus_codeofconduct.asp, accessed 2 January 2006.
[29] See, for example: A Duperouzel, ‘The Role of Private Security in the Malacca Straits’, Paper presented at the ‘LIMA’ Conference, Langkawi, Malaysia, 2005.
[30] International Peace Operations Association, Homepage, http://www.ipoaonline.org/home/, accessed 2 January 2006. A similar British association, named the British Association of Private Security Companies, was launched in February 2006. See British Association of Private Security Companies, Homepage, http://www. bapsc.org.uk/, accessed 8 May 2007.
[31] International Peace Operations Association, ‘Mission Statement’, http://www.ipoaonline.org/about/mission/, accessed 2 January 2006.
[32] For the complete list see International Peace Operations Association, ‘IPOA Members’, http://www.ipoaonline. org/membership/members/, accessed 2 January 2006.
[33] See International Peace Operations Association, ‘IPOA Code of Conduct’, http://www.ipoaonline.org/conduct/, accessed 2 January 2005.
[34] Ideally, companies should also be regulated and monitored by the nations in which the actual PSC operation takes place. There is a range of literature discussing the finer points of national and international laws regulating the PSC industry. See C Ortiz, ‘Regulating Private Military Companies: States and the Expanding Business of Commercial Security Provision’, in K van der Pijl, L Assissi, & D Wigan (eds), Global Regulation. Managing Crises After the Imperial Turn, Palgrave MacMillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, 2004; F Schreier & M Caparini, ‘Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies’, Occasional Paper no. 6, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, March 2005; PW Singer, ‘War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law’, Brookings Institution (also published in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Spring 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/singer20040122.pdf, accessed 5 January 2006; T Jaeger & G Kuemmel (eds), Private Military and Security Companies. Chances, Problems, Pitfalls and Prospects, VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2007, pp. 331-455. For a literature list, including material on legal regulation of PSCs of individual countries see Institute of International Law and Justice, ‘Private Military Companies’.
[35] Author’s interview with PSC personnel, 2004.
[36] Sethuraman Dinakar & H Maurer, ‘The Jolly Roger Flies High, as Piracy Feeds the Hungry’, Business Week International Edition, 24 May 1999, http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_21/c3630196.htm, accessed 28 December 2005.
[37] K Malakunas, ‘Armed Escorts in High Demand on Sea’, Peninsula, 2005, http://www.thepeninsulaqatar. com/features/featuredetail.asp?file=mayfeatures102005.xml, accessed 13 May 2005.
[38] If governments in the region want to decrease the spread and influence of PSCs in the Malacca Straits, they will have to successfully address existing security threats and combat other problems which are conducive to the success of PSCs. These include corruption within militaries and law enforcement agencies, the lack of sufficient equipment of government forces to secure national waters, and existing rivalries between countries in Southeast Asia. See Liss, ‘Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?’ and Liss, ‘Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Dilemma: State or Market?’
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