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Barry Patterson[1]
On 28 December 2006 scientists reported the disintegration of the Ayles Ice Shelf on the north coast of Ellesmere Island, located approximately 800 kilometres south of the North Pole.[2] The change in the Canadian ice-shelf, believed to be 5,000 years old and one of six in the region, highlights the evolving nature of polar regions.
This event indicated a changing polar environment which is opening a new strategic frontier for Canada, and potentially also for Australia. Both nations have interests in the polar regions, however, at this stage only Canada has made a deliberate policy decision on how to respond. How Australia reacts to new strategic realities will impact on its options for the future. While major environmental change may take years, or even decades, to manifest, military procurement and broader government policies made before 2010 could determine the extent to which Australia will remain a significant player in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean.
Changing polar conditions may mean that a new strategic environment is likely to emerge for Australia and Canada. This would involve focusing attention on flanks which have previously been considered unimportant due to their inhospitable nature and inaccessibility. At the same time, mineral and energy deposits, and the increase in commodity prices, are likely to transform traditional political perceptions of the resource rich polar regions and increase their relative geo-political value. This has already become evident in the US political debate over the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
Australia is a nation which shares much in common with Canada. It has similar history, demographics, land mass, mineral and energy deposits and governance structures. Australian strategic and defence thinkers may gain insight into successful polar strategies by observing Canada’s sovereignty concerns over its northern areas. It is useful to briefly consider Canada’s current sovereign disputes and recent policy response.
While the Arctic polar region does not have a land mass beneath its polar cap, there are still a number of strategically important littoral islands and archipelagos. These may become increasingly important to transport and resource extraction.[3] The sovereignty of the Arctic regions has long been in dispute, with neither the European Union nor the US recognising Canada’s claims to the north. In 1996, Canada issued a declaration reasserting its sovereign claims to the Northwest Passage. This was the culmination of a number of events, the most significant of which are the events of September 1985, when the US Coast Guard ice breaker Polar Sea used the Northwest Passage to travel from Greenland to Alaska without the permission of the Canadian government. An order was signed in the same month by the Canadian government, specifying geographic areas in the Arctic which it claims.
In addition, Canada warned it would not hesitate to go to the International Court of Justice to reinforce such claims. At the same time, Canada announced the building of the Arctic Polar class-8 ice breaker, designed to travel the Northwest Passage year-round. The building of class-8 icebreakers was eventually abandoned on the basis of financial concerns. Instead, existing icebreakers were refitted. In 2006, as a symbolic act, the Canadian military declared that it would in future refer to the Northwest Passage as Canadian Internal Waters.
Disputes also exist between Canada and the US over the Beaufort Sea, located north of Canada’s Northwest Territories. While the entire sea is frozen over for most of the year, it is considered to hold substantial natural gas and oil deposits. It is thought to be an extension of the Alaskan North Slope and McKenzie River reserves. Like the Northwest Passage, it is suggested climate change and rising oil prices could result in the area becoming viable as an energy producing region. A border dispute also exists between the US and Canada over the Dixon Entrance, part of the heavily used Inside Passage.[4]
As part of its recent election platform Canada’s current Government pledged to actively assert Canada’s sovereignty over disputed territory and budgetary allocations were to reflect such goals. Canadian Prime Minister Steven Harper committed CAD$4.29 billion (US$3.64 billion) over five years to increase Canada’s military presence and capabilities north of the 60th parallel. Expected measures include: the development of a sensor net to monitor submarines and ships in the northern Arctic regions; procurement of three heavily armed icebreakers capable of carrying troops; the construction of Canada’s first deepwater port near Iqaluit;[5] stationing of air assets in Yellowknife[6] and the opening of a new Arctic warfare training facility.[7] Army engineers were recently deployed to examine potential sites. At the same time, Canada continues to develop a northern aerial surveillance system, composed of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
The Canadian response to asserting sovereignty over polar regions, including its recent military procurement, may hold important lessons for Australian strategic thinkers in terms of Antarctica and Australian southern waters. However, the status of Antarctica as a geographic region is unique and bears consideration.
The Antarctic continent is for the most part unoccupied, except for a number of research stations. There are approximately 37 year-round research stations, of which Australia possesses three: Mawson, Wilkes and Casey, around 3,880 km south of Perth, Western Australia. Argentina has the largest and most enduring presence with six stations, while Russia has five. The People’s Republic of China announced on January 2007, the creation of a third Antarctic research station, which is scheduled to start being built on March 1, 2007.[8]
There are two Australian sub-Antarctic bases on Macquarie Island and Heard Island. Australia currently administers over 6,119,818 km2, roughly 42 per cent of the total Antarctic territory. Generally, the total population of Antarctica oscillates between 1,000 and 4,000, depending on the season.
The continent itself is rich in mineral resources such as iron ore, chromium, copper, gold, nickel and platinum as well as having sizable hydrocarbon deposits, primarily oil and coal. Surrounding oceans also possess significant amounts of krill, finfish, and crab. However, 98 per cent of the continent is covered in ice, and is generally inhospitable. Despite the fact that 90 per cent of the world’s fresh water is held in ice on the continent, it is technically the driest place on earth due to almost non-existent rainfall, and is colder than the Arctic due to its continental status, having no oceans to warm its interior.
The entire Antarctic continent also has significant strategic scientific worth. The science of climate change owes many of its breakthroughs and developments to studies conducted in Antarctica. For countries with burgeoning populations and changing agricultural environments, these studies are not just helpful but a matter of national integrity and security. This is certainly the key motivation for nations such as India and China, who are attempting to gain projections on changing environmental factors within their own national areas, allowing them to plan for the future. Similarly, as a polar region the Antarctic is well suited to research in climatological and atmospheric sciences as well as the development of communications, imaging and surveillance. It is conceivable that the polar regions could become a site of geo-political scientific competition, which could yield significant technologies.
The centre piece of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is the Antarctic Treaty itself. For the purposes of the treaty, Antarctica is defined as all land and ice shelves south of 60°S. The Antarctic Treaty was signed by 12 nations on 1 December 1959, and entered into force on 23 June 1961. The treaty effectively secures the continent for purely scientific purposes, and prohibits the militarisation of the continent, although military personnel and equipment are allowed for non-military purposes. Establishment of military bases and fortifications, manoeuvres or weapons testing is explicitly prohibited.
The treaty also prevents renewed assertions of sovereignty, or expanding claims of sovereignty, while the treaty is in force. There are currently seven nations which have outstanding claims to Antarctic territory: Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the UK. Twenty-one of the 28 signatories to the treaty do not recognise these claims to territory, and the US and Russia have retained the right to assert their own claims. Australia, Chile and Argentina also lay claim to a 200 nm Exclusive Economic Zone emanating from their Antarctic territories, although they are the only ones who recognise these claims. It is also important to note that a number of the claims are overlapping, with Chile and Argentina claiming an overlap, and Britain claiming both.
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings occur annually and involve the 28 signatories, known as consultative members, and 17 non-consultative members. Amendments, changes and new regulations to the Treaty System rely on consensus from the 28 consultative members. Additional treaties and agreements are also discussed at these meetings. The Treaty was initially designed to last for a period of 30 years.
While the initial Antarctic Treaty was primarily designed to prevent the militarisation of the continent and to freeze any claims of sovereignty, there was virtually no specific consideration of the strategic importance of its mineral wealth. The 1970s saw a resurgence of interest in Antarctica, particularly during the oil shocks early in the decade, as a potentially new source of hydrocarbons. Numerous governments expressed interest in developing an international legal framework to govern mineral exploitation. This eventuated in the form of the June 1988 Antarctic Minerals Convention.
The Convention initially received unanimous consent, gaining unqualified support from countries such as New Zealand. However, in 1989, Australia and France withdrew support for the Treaty, effectively resulting in its collapse. Both nations declared their intention to ban mining altogether and turn Antarctica into effectively a ‘world scientific park’, rather than attempt to gain agreement on a framework for exploitation. Gradually support was gained from other nations, including Russia, Belgium and Italy who provided Australia with strong backing. Significantly, Malaysia also pushed for a UN resolution supporting the total ban. Opposition came from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand and Chile, primarily on the basis of business concerns.
After much negotiation, particularly with the US, a new treaty was agreed upon, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 1991, otherwise known as the Madrid Protocol. The Madrid Protocol entered into force in January 1998 and implemented a 50-year ban on mining in the Antarctic. It was also during 1991 that the original Antarctic Treaty was reaffirmed by all parties involved, and extended indefinitely.
Australia’s domestic politics played a significant part in its Antarctic policy during this period. Environmental concerns reached an apex in the Australian electorate during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The then Hawke Government’s foreign policy had been predominantly characterised by multilateralism and an involvement in the United Nations as the ultimate multilateral body. The 1990 election saw an election fought on environmental issues, and much of the vote depended on the preferences of the minor parties, such as the Greens and Democrats. Non-government organisations such as Greenpeace were also highly influential in shaping domestic opinion toward Antarctica. Thus Australia not only spearheaded the global consensus on Antarctica, but the government of the day ensured that it harnessed the domestic vote and secured re-election. However, the wording of the Madrid Protocol was also an attempt by Australia to limit the United Nations’ control over the continent. This was significant due to Australia’s un-renounced claims over a significant portion of Antarctic territory.
In 2007, Antarctica is no longer the uninhabited continent it was when the initial Antarctica Treaty was signed in the late 1950s. Representatives from an increasing number of nations are maintaining a continuous presence on the continent. While there is an environmental protection framework in place, there are few rules for the location of bases. In most cases, foreign stations are located scant kilometres from each other. Tourism is rising every year by approximately 15 per cent and, in tandem, a number of infrastructure projects including port and runway construction are underway.[9]
Significantly, Australia’s operations in the Antarctic are also increasing. On 16 August 2006, the Minister for the Environment, Senator Ian Campbell, announced the introduction of a A$43.6 million ($US33.7 million) air link, allowing for greater accessibility to Australian research stations, faster movement of data and a decreased environmental impact associated with such activities in the past. South Africa has also been planning on establishing a similar link. As part of the air link project, Australia has nearly completed a 4km long ‘blue ice’ runway. Longer than any runway in Australia, the link will allow regular intercontinental flights between Australia and Antarctic research bases. The runway would allow a five-hour airlink with Hobart, Tasmania and allow the landing of Boeing C-17A Globemaster III and Lockheed Martin LC-130 Hercules aircraft.
China, India, Belgium, Estonia and South Korea all have plans to add bases to the 59 already present. India, controversially, wants to build a INR250 million ($US5.5 million) base in an area which had been designated construction-free by international consent, due to its environmental status. Despite offers of research cooperation with Australia, India will more than likely commence construction on the base, its third to date. The proposed base would be approximately 10 km from the existing PRC Zhongshan Station and Russia’s Progress-II station. China also plans to invest 500-million yuan ($US63.2 million) into improving existing Antarctic bases, building a third base and upgrading the polar expedition ship Snow Dragon.
Russia is engaged in scientific drilling over Lake Vostok (located beneath Vostok Station), a freshwater lake buried beneath hundreds of metres of ice which has not been exposed to the outside world for thousands of years, and thus is of significant importance to the international scientific community. It is thought that previously undiscovered forms of life may exist within the lake, and fears exist that the Russian drilling may contaminate the lake and destroy its scientific value. This dispute is representative of the difficult consensual nature of Antarctic politics, with little legal framework regulating scientific activity or the international presence on the continent.
The United States has effectively completed a 1450km long $US350 million ‘South Pole Highway’, connecting its McMurdo Station with the Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station. The highway is not paved, but is compacted and smoothed ice, and allows increased and cheaper transportation of equipment between the two bases. It will also assist in the laying of a fibre-optic link between the two stations, known as the South Pole Connectivity Program, in an effort to network US bases. Satellite communication in the Antarctic is problematic due to its polar location. The program is expected to be completed in 2009. The highway project also frees up aircraft, specifically the Lockheed L-130 Hercules (a ski-equipped C-130 variant) for deeper research use, marking an expansion of US research capabilities.
In 2002, a glacial, all-season ice runway was also completed at McMurdo Station, capable of handling military aircraft such as the C-141 Starlifter, C-5A Galaxy and the C-17 Globemaster. These aircraft represent the major operational components of the US’s strategic airlift capability, and in the case of the C-5A and C-17 can move significant assets such as the M-1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT), not that there is any expectation of the use of MBTs in the area.
Thus the strategic importance of Antarctica, and the continuing existence of the ATS in its present form, is dependent on three factors:
• the rate of climate change;
• the changing global economics of hydrocarbon and mineral exploitation; and
• the growth of geopolitical competition in and around Antarctica.
These three factors are interconnected. Exploiting Antarctica for its mineral wealth is prohibitively expensive and operationally dangerous. Ice remains thick over most of the continent and the combined danger of operating in freezing conditions in the already high-risk mining industry makes current exploitation undesirable. The Ice Shelf is, on average, 2.5 km thick and temperatures in the interior are generally -57ºC. The coast is much warmer, and the site of the majority of research stations. Similarly, exploitation of the continental shelf deposits is not viable due to icebergs and other hazards. As in Canada, climate change is slowly changing the face of Antarctica. In January 2002, the Larsen B ice shelf broke away from the Antarctic Peninsula, into the Weddell Sea. The detached ice shelf, which has now disintegrated into smaller pieces, is approximately 200 metres thick and stretches for 3,250 km. This could also facilitate the movement of ground ice into the sea. This event is perhaps the most obvious example of climate change affecting the Antarctic region. Research also shows a warming coastline, but an increasingly cold interior.
From an Australian perspective, any possibility of the dissolution of the ATS and opening of the continent would add another flank to its immediate strategic environment, and extend its strategic and diplomatic interactions. South American nations have traditionally warranted little of Australia’s attention, the main areas of strategic interaction being issues related to drug trafficking and arms control. However, nations such as Argentina and Chile may become important strategic players in terms of Antarctic relations in coming years. Both have proven quite assertive in their claims to Antarctic sovereignty. Like Australia, both lay claim to a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.
Similarly, Brazil, while never officially laying claim to Antarctic territory, has maintained a strong interest in Latin American claims to territory. While not an official government policy, the theory of ‘Sectoring’, or ‘Frontage’, has emerged within the Latin American strategic community, suggesting that Antarctica may be divided along longitudinal lines. Russia and many northern polar nations are taking a similar approach with regard to Arctic claims, and developments in either region regarding sovereign claims may impact the other. This approach is on occasion raised in the UN, however, most nations, particularly Australia, prefer to operate under the ATS. Thus, Latin American interest in Antarctica, partially fuelled by history and colonial assertions, is unlikely to decline.
It is in the development of capabilities for polar operations that Australia and Canada may find common ground for cooperation.[10] Despite their distant locations, both have similar military, economic and geographic interests. Unlike Australia, Canada’s polar concerns are directly related to their existing sovereign territory. Canada does not have a maritime buffer. However, principles of inter-operability, reliable and effective force networking (to create a multiplier effect), communications and surveillance remain the same. At the very least, Australia will benefit from observing Canada’s military response to the changing northern polar environment to better respond to future strategic requirements. Indeed, the rest of this decade will see increased attention given to polar politics by a number of states, regardless of Australia’s actions.
Beginning 1 March 2007, and continuing until 1 March 2009, will be the worldwide effort known as International Polar Year (IPY).[11] This major scientific and environmental occasion will result in increased media and governmental focus on the polar regions. Already funding is being directed toward national scientific and research institutions to engage in further Arctic and Antarctic exploration and research, often with an eye to developing potential new base sites. The 2007-09 IPY is the fourth such event to occur, with the other two other IPY events occurring in 1882-3, 1932-3, and the IPY inspired International Geophysical Year (IGY) occurring in 1957-8.[12] Significantly, the IGY was one of the initial events which led to the ATS due to a collective recognition of the potential for conflict.
It is entirely possible that the upcoming IPY will result in an equally significant change in Antarctic relations again. Whether this results in further, and increased, cooperation, or dissolution of the status quo, remains to be seen.
[1] Barry Patterson is a Research Fellow with Future Directions International Pty Ltd, Perth, Western Australia, Website: www.futuredirections.org.au. This paper is an edited version of a longer article published in the Future Directions International publication Weekly Global Report and is republished with permission.
[2] The actual disintegration occurred almost 18 months earlier, however, no official announcement was made until the event was confirmed.
[3] New research has suggested that by 2040, the Arctic Ocean may be virtually ice-free. While Arctic Sea ice increases and decreases on a seasonal basis, less ice is being refrozen in the winter months. This has implications for other nations that share the arctic sphere, including Russia. Russia also has strategic concerns over the coming changes, relating to a North East Passage.
[4] This is located between Alaska and the western Canadian province of British Colombia. (A dispute also exists concerning Machias Seal Island in the Gulf of Maine.)
[5] Capital of Nanavut, located north-east of Hudson Bay.
[6] Yellowknife is the capital of The Northwest Territories, located on the north shore of Great Slave Lake.
[7] This is likely to be located near the Northwest Passage.
[8] China has launched 22 Antarctic expeditions since 1984 and built two permanent exploration stations. ‘China plans polar station’, ShanghaiDaily.com, 9 January 2007, http://www.shanghaidailycom/article/ ?id=302217&type=National
[9] Tourism in Antarctica has risen from 6,074 visitors in the 1992-93 season, to 26,245 visitors in the 2005-06 season, and is projected to be around 28,826 in the coming 2006-07 season. The dramatic rise in tourism is coupled with the planned voyage of the Golden Princess liner which will transport 3,700 tourists to the Antarctic. The Golden Princess will be the first vessel of its size to travel to Antarctica, being 10 times larger then any other Antarctic tourism vessel.
[10] While the Cold War demanded each nation focus on its immediate area, prior to this there had been a history of shared cooperation between the two. During World War II, almost 9,400 Australian airmen were trained in Canada under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The two nations then contributed significantly to the formation of the United Nations, primarily as a means for middle powers to maintain a voice in international affairs.
[11] The IPY is technically two years to allow for rigorous and comprehensive studies that embrace two annual cycles of both polar regions.
[12] The 1957-8 IGY is often referred to as a de-facto IPY due to its heavy emphasis on polar research.
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