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Henry Xu Ke[1]
The United States has been the dominant military power and the security provider in the Asia-Pacific region. After 9/11, the possibility of terrorist attacks at the chokepoints of sea lines of communication and allegations of terrorism and piracy nexus in the ‘piracy-prone’ Straits of Malacca raised the concern of the world. The United States has led international conferences related to maritime security issues, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asian Security Summits, known as ‘Shangri-la Dialogue’. Many measures regarding maritime security were implemented, such as the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), together with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), which was created by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The United States has offered to help patrol the Straits of Malacca and Southeast Asian waters, but was rejected by Indonesia. In fear of the erosion of national sovereignty, Indonesia was reluctant to cooperate with foreign countries beyond ASEAN in maritime security. However, Indonesia lacks the maritime security capability, or the ‘4Ms’: Money (budget), Manpower (personnel), Machines (ships), Methods (skills and training), and badly needs assistance from foreign countries. Indonesia has been cooperating with the other littoral States of the Straits of Malacca, namely Malaysia and Singapore in maritime security. However, the United States has a growing influence in the issue of maritime security in the Straits of Malacca. Indonesia therefore worries about the erosion of its authority in maritime security cooperation.
In order to fend off the United States, Indonesia has turned to China and Japan for help. Professor Sudarsono emphasises in his speech that with the rise of Japan and China as economic power houses, there is now a need to recognise that these two major countries will also want to co-determine the terms and conditions of Western Pacific security, including maritime security. Enhancing the naval capabilities of both China and Japan within Northeast Asia and across to South-East Asia are major concerns of the nexus between the sea lines of communication and their links with energy security to the Gulf region.[3]Indonesia has sent a strong message to the United States that it wants its own say on who can help police the Straits of Malacca, rather than be at the mercy of the United States’ military power.
Professor Sudarsono broadened the notion of maritime security in his speech as securing the waterways not only in terms of naval deployments, naval presence and naval power, but also in terms of the concern for the fishermen in southeast Asia as well as the environment impact arising from the level of naval traffic that we have in the region as a whole.[4]The environment problem has been argued as one of main reasons causing the surge in piracy incidents in the Straits of Malacca. The mass traffic passing through the Straits of Malacca has not only led to the congestion of navigation in the Straits, but also imposed a negative impact on the local maritime environment, such as degradation of the fish habitats. This has led to decreased profits from fishing and aggravated the poverty of coastal fishers, especially Indonesian fishers. Poverty has provided strong incentives for coastal people to turn to piracy as an alternative source of income. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 further exacerbated the Indonesian economic situation and led to a dramatic increase in piratical incidents in 2000.
The speech of Indonesian Defense Minister Professor Sudarsono reveals that Indonesia is seeking more stakeholders to safeguard the Straits of Malacca as a balancing act, which might enhance Indonesia’s bargaining power in maritime security issues. At the same time, Indonesia is appealing for foreign assistance to solve its internal problems, such as piracy, which has spilled over and caused maritime security problems in the Straits of Malacca. The official responses from China and Japan to the Indonesian proposal are not known at present. China will possibly welcome the Indonesian proposal. Even so, it will be a long way to go. Indonesia and China have to go through the painstaking confidence building period first, and then enter the operational level cooperation. On the Japanese side, it will be easier; in fact, Japan has been helping Indonesia on navigation aids in the Straits of Malacca since the 1960s, through the non-governmental organisation Nippon Foundation.
[1] Dr Henry Xu Ke is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Maritime Studies at the National University of Singapore. This article was first published in 2007 Maritime Monitor 1(3): 13-14. It is reproduced here with permission.
[2] Juwono Sudarsono, ‘Securing Regional Waters: How Much Progress?’, paper presented to ‘The 6th IISS Asian Security Summit Shangri-la Dialogue’, Singapore, 3 June 2007, available at http://www.iiss.org/conferences/theshangri-la-dialogue/plenary-session-speeches-2007/fourth-plenary-session--juwono-sudarsono.
[3] ibid.
[4] ibid.
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URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MarStudies/2008/4.html